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COALITION POLITICS IN MALAYSIA
Zakiah Awang, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1983
This thesis has attempted to explain the success and
the stability of the coalition party system in Malaysia
from 1955 to 1982.

This success has been attributed to

three factors.
The most important factor is the role played by
political elites.

Malaysian political elites come from a

different racial background.

It is their willingness to

cooperate, work together in harmony and to find solutions
through compromises that helped to hold the coalition
party together.

Elite cooperation, in turn, has been

fostered through similarities in the leaders' socioeducational-linguistic backgrounds.
The success of the coalition party is also closely
linked to the dominant role of UMNO which is the leader
and the strongest party in the coalition.

UMNO has been

able to attract and maintain overwhelming support of the
Malays.
Lastly, the success is also due to the effectiveness
of the coalition party in meeting the goals of national
development, particularly in socio-economic fields.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
This study will examine Malaysia* s experiexice in coa
lescing its various ethnic groups through the formation of
coalition party system.

For the past 25 years, Malaysia

has been ruled by an inter-communal coalition party.

It is

the main concern of this study to identify the major reasons
behind the success and the stability of this coalition
party system in Malaysia.
Generally, there has been little disagreement among the
analysts of Malaysian politics about the basic characteris
tics of Malaysian society. It is commonly held that Malaysia
is a classic case of a plural society in the sense that it
is not only divided by race but also by language, religion,
culture and economic role.

Nordlinger, for example, des

cribes Malaysia as a society " whose institutions, cultures
and values differ fundamentally1* (1 9 72 :1 1 2 ).
A glance at the Malaysian society seems to confirm
these steretyped images.

Malaysia can be said to be a

crossroad in which indigeneous Malays, immigrant Chinese and
Indians have met in large numbers and have established
separate cultural identities (Mussolf and Springer, 1978:3)1
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In 1975» the population for the whole of Malaysia was 12,3
million.

The Malays made up about 4 6 .8 percent, Chinese

35*4 percent, Kadazan 1.8 percent, other natives 3.2
percent and others 1 .4 percent.
The three major races are divided by such factors as
religion, language,culture, value system, occupation and
primordial attachment.

Malays are Muslims, Chinese are a

mixture of Buddhists and Confucians, while Indians are
generally Hindus.

Although the National Language ( Malay

language ) is the main medium of communicationin the
official business and English is still widely used among the
elites of the various races, each community still guards
its vernacular language zealously.
Cultural and religious differences are further rein
forced by barriers of more concrete nature, particularly
economic role and place of residence.

Most of the Malays

live in the rural areas and are predominant in the east
coast states of Peninsular Malaysia and the northern states
of Kedah and Perlis, while majority of the non-Malays live
in the urban centers in the west and south of Peninsular
Malaysia.

Despite efforts to correct the imbalance in the

racial proportion of urban dwellers, the proportion of urban
dwellers among the Chinese was still about 50 percent in
1975 as opposed to 37 percent among the Indians and 18 per
cent among the Malays (Mid-Term Review of the Third Malay
sia Plan, 1976-1978. 1976:61). Imbalance is also reflected
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in the ethnic concentration of particular sectors of the
economy.

In 1980, the agricultural sector was made up of

65 percent Malays, 20 percent Chinese and 13 percent
Indians.

In the secondary sector, the Malays constituted

about 40 percent, the Chinese 53 percent and Indian 8.5
percent.

The Malays' share of jobs in the tertiary sector

was 47 percent compared to Chinese 4-1.6 percent and Indians
10 percent (Fourth Malaysia Plan. 1981-1985. 1981:57)*

Due

to these occupational differences, there are marked income
differences between the communities.

The result of the

agricultural census of 1976 showed that the average monthly
income per household of the Malays was M&358 while the
Chinese was MS892 and the Indians M$550 (Mid-Term Review of
the Third Malaysia Plan. 1976-1978. 1976:44-) •
Malaysia's plural society was the direct outcome of the
British colonial policy of encouraging large scale migrations
of Chinese and Indians into the country in the middle of the
nineteenth century as a response to the labor needs of the
tin and rubber industries.

The British never made any at

tempt to integrate these immigrants with the indigeneous
population.

Its policy of shielding the Malay peasants

from the distruptive forces of social and economic develop
ments that were taking place under the British rule had
the effect of leaving the Malays stagnant in the traditional
way of life.
progressed

In the meantime

the other

under the influence of

communities

development

and
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modern mode of production.
The imbalance was

further aggravated by a racially seg

regated education system which fostered the establishment
of vernacular schools.

Apart from a handful of the Malay

aristocrats' sons who were given the opportunity to attend
English schools, the rest of the Malays were provided with
vernacular primary education.

British educational policy

for the Malays were aimed at giving a few years of primary
vernacular education that stressed.manual labor (Funston,
1980:31).

The Chinese, on the other hand, were left to

themselves to establish vernacular schools with the funds
from wealthy businessmen.

The teachers for these schools

were imported from China and the curriculum and content
of Chinese education followed closely the Chinese National
Government's code of education (Simandjuntak, 1969:193)*
Indian education was closely associated with rubber estates.
Its primary goal was to teach

the Indians the value of

obedience and cultured behavior, so that they could continue
with the main preoccupation of tapping rubber trees.
When Malaya gained its independence in 1957» the most
complex task for the new nation was how to bulid a viable
political system out of the diverse ethnic groups who were
mutually antagonistic towards each other.

National unity

became the overriding concern of the new nation.

Conflic

ting demands from different groups made the task of creating
national unity very complicated.

Conflicting demands were
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reflected in such areas as education, national language,
religion, citizenship and the distribution of economic bene
fits.

The Malays, for example demanded that Malay language

be made the National Language of the country and that their
economic backwardness be redressed through preferential
treatment so that they can enter the modern sector of the
economy in which the non-Malays had played a more dominant
role.

The non-Malays, on the other hand, insisted on the

continued use of English or their languages to be adopted
as the official language or languages of the country.

They

also demanded a liberal citizenship qualification and
questioned the special privileges of the Malays.
Despite centrifugal forces ensuing from the communal
cleavages, threats from Communist terrorists and Indonesian
Confrontation, Malaysia has managed not only to survive as
a nation but also to register a successful note of develop
ment, much to the wonder of those who had been making pre
dictions or expressed doubts about the viability or longevi
ty of its political system.

At the root of this stability

and success is the unique political arrangement worked out
by the Malaysian leaders.
communal coalition.

This arrangement is an inter-

Originally, the coalition party was

made up of three communal political parties representing the
three major ethnic groups of Malaysia—

the United Malays

National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). This
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coalition which was formed as an electoral alliance was
simply called the Alliance Party.
The Alliance coalition was an answer to the dilemma
faced by all political parties in Malaysia.

Due to the

plural nature of the society, it was observed that only
parties which were communal in nature could succeed in sur
viving and in forming governments in Malaysia (Tennant, 1975:
81).

Yet due to the racial composition of the country, in

which no single race constitutes a clear majority, a party
which appealed to one community could not hope to obtain a
majority in the Parliament.
to a coalition formation.

The answer, naturally pointed
The dilemma was overcome when the

three political parties joined to form the Alliance Party.
Despite some stresses and strains, the ruling coalition
party has been in power since Malayan independence in 1957.
There had been some doubts expressed as to the effectiveness
of the Alliance formula following the racial riots of 1969*
Thus, the leadership of the coalition considered it neces
sary to reconstitute the political system into a slightly
new form of coalition— a more inclusive coalition called
the National Front— to provide for multiple representation.
In principle, the National Front is not much different from
the Alliance coalition since it is still based on the
idea of consociationalism and elite accommodation.
difference

is that it

The main

is more broad-based since a number

of former opposition parties chose to coalesce into the new
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coalition. Since 1974* the National Front has been winning
the elections with overwhelming majorities.
On balance, Malaysia can be considered to be a success
ful case of politics in a plural society and this success is
mainly due to the unique coalition party system. Though there
has been some violence,

it

is not endemic. Nordlinger con

siders Malaysia as one of the successful cases in conflict
regulation through stable coalition (1972:22). The demands of
the major communities, if not being fully satisfied, have at
least been dealt with by the ruling coalition (Tennant, 1975:
85). Furthermore, since independence, Malaysia has shown

a

steady economic growth. Apart from Singapore and Brunei,
Malaysia's national per capita is the highest in South

and

Southeast Asia. In the second half of the 1970's, the growth
rate of the economy was over 8 percent per annum. The incidence
of poverty dropped from 4 9 .7 percent in 1970 to 2 9 .9 percent
in 1.980. It is expected to drop still further to 16.7 percent
by the years 1990 (Malaysian Digest. April 30, 1980:4).
Theoretical Background
For the purpose of this study, the concept of coalition
needs to be defined. W.A. Gamson defines a coalition as the
"joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a mixed
motive situation involving more than two units." By a mixed
motive, he means "a situation where there is an element

of
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conflict since there exists no outcome which maximizes the
payoff to everybody" (196if:85)* Hinckley, while accepting
Gamson's definition, adds that a coalition activity involves
three necessary and sufficient components: (1 ) an applica
tion of power(i.e., the use of organization and application
of resources to gain certain ends), (2 ) individuals or groups
engaged in collective activity, and (3 ) a combination of
conflicts and coordination. Furthermore, both partners of
a coalition must be convinced that they could gain more be
nefits by working together than working alone(1 9 8 1 :ff-5 ).
A more inclusive definition of a coalition was offered
by E.W.Kelly who states that "by a coalition we mean a group
of individuals or groups of individuals who (1 ) agree to
pursue a common and articulated goal, (2 ) pool their re
levant resources in persuit of this goal, (3 ) engage in con
scious communication concerning the goal and the means of
obtaining it, and ( k) agree on the distribution of the pay
off (benefits) received when obtaining the goal" (1 9 6 8 :62 -6 3 ).
William Riker offers a slightly different definition
of a coalition. According to him, the central activity of
politics is concerned with the process of decision making*
Authoritative decisions are made by individuals, by groups,
by conscious process and by mechanical process. He calls the
decision making process in a group as a process of forming
a coalition (1 9 6 2 :1 2 ).
Riker also emphasizes the importance of size in coali-
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tion formation. He predicts that'the” minimun winning coali
tion" will form, and in his view this is the most stable
coalition since it yields the highest payoff to its members.
He defines a minimun winning coalition as one which is "ren
dered

blocking or losing by the substraction of any one

member" (1964:40-46)• When applied to a real political situa
tion, a minimun winning coalition is one whose parties con
trol over 50 percent of the seats in the legislature but the
withdrawal of any single party from the coalition causes it
to lose its majority. This is opposed to the larger-thanminimal or oversized coalition which can produce overwhelming
majority but is often beset by too many conflicting interests.
Oversized coalition would still control a parliamentary majo
rity even if one or more parties leave

the coalition (Almond

and Powell, 1978:218).
Theorists of coalition have identified several variables
which are important for coalition formation. These include:
_(1 ) size of actors in the coalition, (2 ) degree of preference
agreement (i.e., policy distance separating the actors and
the degree of ideological affinity, (3 ) coalition bargaining,
and (4 ) coalition payoff (i.e., the distribution of returns
or benefits) (Browne, 1982:3-4). The coalition payoff is the
most important variable since it is the main motivation for
actors to participate in the coalition.
Another aspect of coalition behavior is the maintenance
of a coalition. Unfortunately very little has been written
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on this aspect.

However, the duration of the coalition may

depend on such factors as the size of coalition, the bar
gaining styles of the members of the coalition ( for example
the more resolutely a member pursues a position, the more
difficult it is for the others to accommodate) and condi
tions of uncertainty affecting coalition decision making
(for example, members who have been working together in the
past may find it much easier to work in the present)
(Browne, 1982:5)•
The present ruling coalition party in Malaysia, the
National Front, is a larger than minimal coalition or an
oversized coalition.

It consists of 11 component parties.

The main reason behind the formation of an oversized
coalition is the need to avoid political outbidding. Con
trary to the predictions that a larger-than-minimal coali
tion tends to be unstable, Malaysia can be said to have had
stable coalitions.

This is the result of the willingness

of the component parties to work out common position on
crucial racial issues through compromises and bargaining.
In the National Front coalition and its predecessor,
the Alliance Party, the United Malays National Organization
(UMNO) has emerged as the dominant partner mainly because
of its strong electoral performance.

This fact is acknow

ledged by the other partners in the coalition.
Due to the permanent nature of the partnership, the
Alliance/National Front coalition can be considered a single
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super party in a multi-party system (Mauzy, 1980:70).
Malaysia can also be considered to be a highly elitist
society because most political activities sire conducted by
political elites on personal and informal basis.

The

political elite is defined as that group which possesses
most political power and makes most of the important poli
tical decisions in a society.

For this thesis, political

elite is used synonymously with political leadership.

In

Malaysia, the political elite or leadership are made up of
top government and party leaders such as the Ministers,
Deputy Ministers, the Chief Ministers and top party office
holders.
Another concept that needs to be explained is the
concept of consociationalism.

This term, as originally

put forward by Arend Lip.ihart, refers to a situation in
which two or more ethnic blocs, roughly equal in power,
cooperate, in spite of remaining substantially separated
in their activities, through agreement between their
leaders who at the same time are able to command the support
of their followers (1969:21b).

In the Malaysian context,

this style has been developed whereby

the leaders of

the component parties of the coalition have developed
close personal relationship with each other and worked out
communal compromises in which the interests of all parties
have been taken into account (Crouch, 1980:2).
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Review of Literature
There are a number of studies on Malaysian politics.
The main theme of these works revolve around the problem of
communalism in Malaysia, mainly the tensions and conflicts
between the Malays and the non-Malays. Most of these studies
have touched on the history and some aspects of development
of the coalition party system in Malaysia. However, they
only made passing reference to the success of coalition
politics in Malaysia. Professor Syed Hussin Alatas of Malay
sia has also made some references to the working of Malaysian
coalition politics in his article " Politics of Coalition
in Malaysia" (Current History. Dec. 1972).

But his article

focused mainly on the internal problems of the coalition,
particularly dissensions within UMNO over the question of
leadership. Ratnam and Milne in their detailed study of the
1964 parliamentary election in Malaysia, attributed the suc
cess of the Alliance Party to its inter-communal appeal, its
extensive organization, its relatively larger funds and re
sources and its historic role in gaining the independence
for Malaysia (1967: 42). For Nordlinger, the coalition suc
cess

in Malaysia is due to the fact that "non-elite accep

ted the

decisions negotiated by

(1972:80).

their natural leadrrs"

According to Lucian Pye, the strength of

ruling coalition party in Malaysia lies

the

in its pragmatism
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and its recognition of the basic fact of the society, that
is the communal divisions, thus setting out to formulate
policies designed to bring the major races together in a co
operative spirit (1974:56). Carlson, on the other hand,
argued that the coalition system holds together because of
the leadership’s preference for negotiated compromises and
continous accommodation. Furthermore, according to her,
there is no alternative and each race is afraid of breaking
away from the present mutual deterrence for fear of ethnic
tensions and violence (1 9 7 7 :2 0 ).
Gordon P. Means, in his detailed study of Malaysian po
litics, traced the development of Malaysian political system
since 1945 until the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.
A major part of the study also focused on the developments
within the Alliance coalition. In his opinion, the success
of the Alliance is due to its moderate position on communal
issues which gave it a wide appeal to voters of all races
(1970:400).
Objective of the Thesis
The purpose of this study is to examine the main fac
tors behind the success of the coalition party system in
Malaysia. Three hypotheses are advanced to explain the
success. The

first hypothesis is the

role and the be

havior of the political elite or the leadership is an impor
tant determining factor behind this success. The success
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or failure of a political system is largely dependent on the
political leadership.

They constitute an important variable

in the political process and they make the final decisions
among various demands and alternative forces in the society
(Darling, 1978:232).
The main aspect of leadership role that will be empha
sized in the first hypothesis is elite cooperation.

The

willingness of the Malaysian political elite to cooperate is
a crucial factor behind the success of the coalition party in
Malaysia.

On the other hand, elite cooperation is believed

to have been fostered through similarities in the social,
educational and linguistic backgrounds shared by the elites.
In Malaysia, political elite is largely drawn from Western
oriented, English educated groups with high social standing.
To test this hypothesis, this study will examine the
socio-economic, educational and geographical backgrounds of
the political elite of the ruling coalition party (the Mini
sters and Deputy Ministers) to find the degree of simila
rities.

This is then complemented by examining in detail

the role and political socialization of the three previous
Prime Ministers in their capacities as the leaders of the
ruling coalition party.

The data used in this study are

collected from Mcrais's, Who1s 7/ho Malaysia, 1965. Who's Who
Malaysia. 1965. Who's Who Malaysia. 1Q69. Who's Who Malaysia.
1Q71-1972 and Who’s Who Malaysia and guide to Singapore. 197k.
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Funston's Malay Politics in Malaysia, journal articles and
newspapers.

The data collected include year of birth, place

of birth, occupational backgrounds and length of time as
cabinet ministers.
Apart from the factor of political leadership, another
important variable that might have helped in the success
of the coalition party system in Malaysia is the dominant
position and role of UMNO.
of this study.

This forms the second hypothesis

Since 1955* UMNO has proved to be the party

with the greatest appeal to the Malays.

Among the component

parties of the National Front, UMNO has polled most votes
for the coalition.
number

It has contested and won the greatest

of seats in almost all the elections.

The top

national leaders have also come from the ranks of UMNO.

In

addition, it has widespread organization that reaches the
grass roots through its branches in the districts and
villages throughout the country.

To test this hypothesis,

this study will examine such factors as the electoral per
formance of UMNO, the sources of its electoral strength, the
political attitudes of the Malays with special reference
to UMNO, UMNO's mobilization efforts and the position of
the other component parties in the coalition vis-a-vis UMNO.
The third hypothesis deals with the socio-economic per
formance of the ruling coalition party.

The party has

tried to increase its legitimacy by promoting material pro
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gress and internal stability.

Legitimacy means the capacity

of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the
existing political institutions are the most appropriate
ones for the society.

To prove this hypothesis, the study

will analyze Malaysia's socio-economic development. .Its
economic programs and politics, particularly, the poverty
eradication and rural upliftment programs, will be examined
to observe any significant relationship between economic
progress and people’s support for the coalition.
Research Method
The research will be based largely on library materials,
such as books including those written by local authors,
biographical data, journals, periodicals, newspapers and
Malaysian official publications such as Malaysian Plans
(Second Malaysian Plan. 1971-1975. Third Malaysian Plan.
1976-1980. Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia

Plan and

Fourth Malaysia Plan. 1981-1985) and Malaysian Digests.

The data on Malaysian leaders will be collected mainly
from Morais’.s, Who’s Who Malaysia

(1 9 63 } 1965 } 1969 * 1971 -

1972 , 1974 ).
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CHAPTER I I
M ALAYSIA:

AN HISTO RICAL PERSPECTIVE

For the purpose of the subsequent analysis, a brief
discussion of the Malaysian historical background is warran
ted.

Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states: eleven in

the Malay Peninsula (known as Malaya before 1963) and two in
the island of Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak).

Malaysian history

before the founding of Malacca Dynasty in 1^03 is hazy and
fragmented.

Much of what is known before this period was

deduced from archeological frgments and comments of foreign
travellers, particularly, Chinese travellers (Area Handbook
for Malaysia. 1970:30)
It is believed that human habitation in Malaya can be
traced to as far back as 35jOOO years ago.

There are wide

spread evidence of the existence of Mesolithic culture begin
ning about
1500

10,000

years ago.

Beginning about

2500

to about

B.C., the Neolithic people began to settle in Malaya.

They were believed to have migrated from Indo-China or
Yunnan.

These people were known as the proto-Malays.

It

was the descendents of these people, together with the
people of the later migrations, who migrated from Indonesia
that constituted the ancestors of the Malays.

They gradually

settled in the coastal areas and the better agricultural lands
i

17
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(Means * 1970:15)
There had been contacts between the inhabitants of the
Malay Peninsula and the Chinese and Indian traders as early
as the beginning of the Christian era. These contacts were
primarily due to the strategic location of the Malay Penin
sula which lied at the crossroads of maritime trade between
China and India. In addition, the Malay Peninsula also came
under the Kindu-Buddhist cultural influence. Prior to the
sixth century, the Malay Peninsula was controlled by the
Funan Empire which was based on the Menan basin. With the
the disintegration of the Funan Empire in the sixth century,
the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula came under Indian in
fluence. Although there was no large scale Indian settlement,
and control or invasion by India ever took place, Indian
cultural influence was indeed great. It was from the Indians
that the Malays adopted their basic political ideas, prac
tices and organization (Tregonning, 1964:7). Indianized city
states sprang up throughout Southeast Asia. In Malaya, one
such city state was the present-day Kedah established during
the seventh century A.D.. Kedah was apparently a vassal of
of the Kingdom of Srivijaya, based in Southern Sumatra.
Gradually, the Malay Peninsula and parts of western Borneo
came to be incorporated into the Srivijayan Empire. Through
its control of Malacca Straits, Srivijaya became the most
powerful and the richest kingdom in Southeast Asiae
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Malaya entered into a fully

recorded historical period

with the founding of Malacca Sultanate in the fifteenth cen
tury.

Malacca was established by Sri Parameswara, a refu-

gee-prince from Sumatra in the year 1^03 A.D..

To protect

himself from his enemy, the Siamese, he sought recognition
from China.

He also embraced Islam and took the name

Megat Iskandar Shah.

Following his conversion,

of

Malacca

grew in strength and became a well-known trading center.
For the Malays in Malaysia, Malacca Sultanate .is s«,ill re
garded with special significance.

The fifteenth-century

Malacca still provides them with cultural heroes, dynastic
ancestors, patterns of statecraft and traditional
of ideal public and private behavior.

examples

Modern civilization

for the Malays began here (Area Handbook for Malaysia, 1970:
31).
The importance of Malacca as a trading center attracted
the Portuguese who had come to the east in search of trade.
When peaceful attempts to establish a trading post was

re

buffed by the Malaccan authority, the Portuguese captured
Malacca in 1511»

The Malaccan ruler fled south and

established a new capital in Johore.

later

In the sixteenth cen

tury, another European power entered the contest for the
control of the Malacca Straits.

The Dutch captured Malacca

from the Portuguese in 16^-1 with the help of Acheh.

The

Dutch, however, did not maintain Malacca as a trading
ter, for they v/ere interested in incorporating

cen

Malacca
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their system of trading bases and denied them to the Portu
guese.
Meanwhile, important developments were also taking place
in the northern Malay states.

Following the fall of iMalacca

to the Dutch, these states fell under the Siamese suzerainty.
Malayan history during the eighteenth century was pretty
much dominated by the Bugis®

The Bugis virtually controlled

the states of Johore and Selangor, and made themselves felt
in Kedah, Perak and Pahang.

In Selangor, the Bugis

became

the power behind the throne.
The British came to the scene at the end of the eighteen
th century, also motivated by trade considerations.

Basic

ally, there were three main reasons why the British

were

interested in Southeast Asia; (1) a need for a port

along

the China trade route which could be used for refilling and
protection of merchant ships, (2 ) a need for a naval base on
the sheltered side of the base of Bengal, and (3) a need for
a base that could be used by the British and Indian merchants
trying to expand trade in the Malayan Archipelago and parti
cularly, to obtain tin for the East India Company to

sell

to China (Pyan, 1976:92).
The search for such a base was successful when

Francis

Light managed to secure the island of Penang from the Sultan
of Kedah in 1786.

The Sultan allowed the British to estab

lish a settlement in Penang on conditions that

the British

provided him with an annual payment of ;)3 0 ,0 0 0 , a concession
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for the loss of Kedah's trade and most importantly, a

pro

tection against the Sultan's enemies, particularly, the
Siamese.

The Sultan was soon to be disappointed.

India Company who did not wish to be embroiled in

The East
the

af

fairs of Kedah was unwilling to give the protection. Never
theless, Francis Light proceeded with the establishment
a 3ritish Settlement in Penang.

of

The Sultan tried to regain

the control of the island but before he could make the move
he was defeated by Francis Light.
The next settlement to be established by the British
was Singapore in 18 19 • Singapore was then under the rule
of the Sultanate of Johore.

Stamford Raffles was

able

to

acquire the island of Singapore by becoming involved in the
struggles for succession over the throne of Johore. Follow
ing the death of Sultan Mahmud of Johore, the Bugis "underkingM placed the younger son of the Sultan on the throne,
thus bypassing the elder son who was away at that time.
Baffles decided to recognize the elder son as the Sultan of
Johore, and in return, the new Sultan gave the sole

right

to the British to build a settlement on the island of Singa
pore . From the beginning, Singapore was made a free port.
Large numbers of Chinese moved to Singapore, and the

pop

ulation of Singapore grew rapidly.
The British also occupied Malacca in 1795s at
of the French [Revolution, through an agreement with
Dutch.

the time
the

According to this agreement, the Dutch Government
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in-exile in Britain agreed to allow the British to take over
the various Dutch possessions in the East for the duration
of the war.

When the Napoleonic War came to an end, Malacca

and all the other Dutch possessions in the East were re
turned to them.

Nevertheless, Malacca was to remain in the

Dutch hands only for six years, for in 1824, Britain again
regained the possession of Malacca as a result of the London
Treaty in 1824, which divided their sphere of influence in
the East.
of Malacca.

The dividing line was drawn through the Straits
Areas south and west of this line were to be

long to the British sphere of influence.

Since Malacca was

on the wrong side of the dividing line, it was exchanged
with Bencoolen which also lied on the wrong side of the
line .
In 1826, Singapore, Malacca and Penang

were merged

together and given the name of Straits Settlements.

They

were considered as British colonies and ruled directly by the
British through its governor in Singapore.
British Intervention
in the Malay States
The actual British intervention in the Malay States did
not take place until 1874*

The apparent lack of British

interest in the affairs of the Malay States was because
their main interests was the protection of the China trade

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

and secondarily to establish trading centers in

the

whole

of the Malayan region (Ryan, 1967:97)*
Before the British intervention, the states in the Malay
Peninsula existed separately of each other.

In the

north

east, were the states of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu which
were subjected to varying degrees of Siamese control. These
states had to send yearly tributes of "Bunga Emas”

(golden

flowers) to appease the Siamese.

were

The other states

Pahang, Johore, Negri Sembilan, Perak and Selangor.
was founded by the Sultan of Malacca following
Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511*

Johore

the fall of

Pahang was ruled by

an

independent ruler of non-royal descent who owed allegiance
to the Johore Sultanate.

The state of Perak was established

before the fall of Malacca by the royal families
Malacca Sultanate.

of

the

Selangor was opened by the Bugis in the

eighteenth century and the ruling dynasty was a branch
the Bugis family from Rhio.

of

Negri Sembilan was originally

a dependency of Malacca Sultanate but was ruled-by various
chiefs.

Most of the inhabitants of Negri Sembilan were the

Minangkabaus who migrated from Indonesia in the sixteenth
century.

In the eighteenth century, Negri Sembilan

was

ruled by a prince from Minangkabau who was invited by these
chiefs.
There were several reasons for the British intervention
in the Malay States in 187^*

First, the establishment

of

Hong Kong in 18^-2 had reduced the importance of Singapore
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in the China trade.

Therefore, the Chinese and the British

merchants in Singapore were looking for trade alternatives
and they had to turn their attention to the Malay

States.

Their interest was further enhanced by an increase

in

the

scale of tin mining in Perak and Selangor (Milne and Mauzy,
1980:13) • The tin mines were originally owned by the iMalay
chiefs and some of them had invited the Chinese
work in the mines-

miners

to

Later, businessmen from the Straits Set

tlements were also invited to invest in the tin mines. When
fightings broke out in Perak between rival Chinese factions
over the control of the tin mines, these businessmen

began

to pressure the British to intervene in the Malay States in
order to protect their interests.

According to Waddel, "the

Chinese merchants and others who wished British to intervene
in Malaya had vested interests in trying to paint the
ture as black as possible.

They not only suggested

Germany might forestall Britain but that Holland,

pic
that

France,

the United States of America and even Italy might be

plot

ting to make a move if Britain delayed to make the move too
long.

They also tended to exaggerate the degree of disorder

into which the Malay States had fallen" (1972:128).
In 1873» Andrew Clarke was appointed as the Governor of
the Straits Settlements.

He was instructed by the

British

Government to investigate and report on the steps that could
be taken to restore peace in the Malay Peninsula. Clarke ex
ceeded his superior’s instructions and instead, he decided
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to intervene.

The British extended its power over the

Malay States through a combination of persuasion, pressure and
occasional show of force rather than by direct conquest. The
first state to be intervened by the British was Perak.

The

opportunity came when a Perak royalty, Raja Abdullah, asked
for the British support to claim

the Perak throne.

there were three claiments to the Perak throne.

In 1873,

Clarke

arranged for a meeting between the disputed contestants and
decided to recognize Raja Abdullah as the rightful heir
the throne.

to

This was done through the Pangkor Treaty.

In

return, Raja Abdullah agreed to accept the appointment of
a British Resident and to follow his advice on all questions
other than touching Malay religion and customs.
The next state to come under the British intervention
was Selangor*

The occasion for the intervention arose when

a Malaccan ship was attacked by pirates in 1873•
rates were identified to be from Selangor.
of the negotiations, the Sultan
a British Resident.

These pi

As the result

of Selangor agreed to accept

Subsequently, the Residential System

was extended to the states of Pahang and Negri Sembilan.
Under this system, the Resident's duty, was mainly to give
advice.

However, the British Government had no specific

ideas as to how this advice was to be implemented, and "the
Residents developed a tendency to do things for themselves,
to take short cuts in administration and they became execu
tive officers rather than advisors" (Ryan, 1976:165)*

In
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the beginning, there were much resistance from the

rulers

and the chiefs who felt that their powers were greatly

di

minished by the implementation of this system.
The practice of having a separate Resident for
state had created problems of coordination.

each

Therefore,

these states were merged into a federation in 1895*

The

four Residents were made responsible to the Governor of the
Straits Settlements in Singapore.

In the following

the four states became the Federated Malay States.

year,
The ap

pointment of the Resident General was intended to curtail
the power of the respective Residents and to enhance
powers of the sultans.

the

However, what happened was that the

powers which the Residents gave up did not go back

to

the

rulers but rather to the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur
and also to the Resident General.
Important development also took place in the four north
ern Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perils).
The British concluded a treaty with the Siamese authority
in 1909, whereby Siam agreed to transfer whatever rights
she had over these states to the British.

The term "rights"

referred to the Siamese suzerainty which to the Siamese
meant that these states recognized the general overlordship
of the king of Siam (Ryan, 1976:176).

These states became

the British protectorates and the rulers agreed to

accept

.British advisors to help in the administration of the
states.

These states together with Johore refused to
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incorporated into the federation and they came to be
known as the Unfederated Malay States.
The Makings of Pluralism
The establishment of the British Settlements, the in
creasing importance of tin mining industries and the subse
quent British intervention were to result in the growth of
plural society in Malaysia, for new waves of migrations
came to Malaya to take part in the economic development.
It cannot be denied that there were contacts between
the Malay Peninsula and China since the early Christian era
but these contacts were spasmodic.

During the Malacca Sul

tanate, there grew up a small Chinese community in Malacca
as the results of these contacts.

However, these phenomena

would not have any significant effect on the political
development of the Malay States had it not been followed by
large scale migrations during the middle of the nineteenth
century•
The Chinese immigrants came from the Southern regions
of China such as Kwantung, Fukien and Kwangsi.

They migrated

to various parts of Southeast Asia to escape the hardship
caused by civil wars in China.

They came in large numbers

to settle in Malaya and Singapore because of several reasons.
First, the Straits Settlements provided them with ample op
portunity for advancement.

Second, the British administra

tion had produced law and order which could provide protection
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for their goods and property and finally, there were less
restrictions or controls imposed by the British upon these
immigrants.

Following the consolidation of British power

in the Malay States, more immigrants poured in as the re
sult

of British encouragement to work in the tin mines

which were being opened up in large scale.

By about 1860,

the Chinese population in the Malay Peninsula totalled
about 25*000 as compared to about 150,000 Malays (Ryan, 1976:
141).

This is a far cry from the middle of the eighteenth

century when the Chinese population in Malacca was only
2,161 (Ryan, 1967:113).
The multi-racial composition of Malaya was made more
complex with large scale importation of Indian laborers,
particularly after 1910 to work in the rubber plantations.
The Indian laborers were- imported under an indenture system
(by which the laborers were bound to work for a fixed pe
riod for an employer who had engaged him through recruitment
agencies in India) and through the Kangay System ( a sys
tem whereby an agent was despatched to India to recruit
the local peasants to work for him in Malaya).

In 1901,

the Indians numbered about 120,000 but by about 1931 it had
grown to 625,000 (Gullick, 1981:64).

These migrations

continued unrestricted until the middle of 1930 s and under
this umbrella, by the second decade of the twentieth cen
tury, a plural society had been formed in Malaya (Tregonning,
1964:173).
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These latest Chinese and Indian migrants

considered

themselves as transients or "birds or passage". Their main
objective was to amass sufficient

fortune to retire com

fortably to their respective homelands. They did not con
sider the Malay Peninsula as their home and therefore, felt
little necessity to adapt themselves to the new environment
(Tregonning, 196i|-:18ff)• They also did not bother to demons
trate any loyalty to the British or the Malay rulers or to
be receptive to the native way of life. This would not have
mattered had they left Malaya but many of them stayed on
and by settling they created the inter-racial problems.
The nationalism of these immigrants was directed to
their respective homelands, the Chinese to China and In
dians to India. Events in China or India never fail to stir
their emotions. For example, when Dr. Sun Yat Sen was
fighting against the Manchu Dynasty in China, he received
generous assistance and donations from the Chinese communi
ty in Malaya. In fact, numerous branches of Dr. Sun’s Na
tionalist Party sprang up in Malaya following his visit
in early 1900. According to Waddel,"these events ha/*

a

great effect upon the Chinese of the Nanyang. It resulted
in a new flowering of pride in their mother country and a
growing sense of detachment from the country of their adop
tion. In Malaya

they became nationalistic, not in the

sense of wishing to promote the independence of Malaya and
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Indonesia, but in the sense of wishing to promote the in
terests of China and all things Chinese." (1972:140).

The

attitude of the British also helped to keep the Chinese
nationalistic fervor alive.

The British noted with indiffer

ence this ferment of the Chinese.

Their policy was to

ignore them as long as they did not disturb the peace
(Tregonning, 1964:180).
Malaya Between the Wars
With the creation of the Federation, administration in
the Federated Malay States became highly centralized and
the Malay rulers lost even more power.

Nevertheless, due

to the economic boom, nobody, not even the rulers, were
much concerned about this.

Only in the 1920s, when Malaya

began to experience the economic slum that many people in
cluding the rulers began to question the working of the
federation.

The rulers came to realize that they had given

too much of their power and they did not get much benefits
from the exchange of political power for.economic rewards.
Many of the British officials also began to have doubts
about the over-centralization of power in Kuala Lumpur,
not so much because they cared about the position of the
rulers but because over-centralization has proved too expen
sive and caused unnecessary duplication.
It was against this background that a policy of decen
tralization was considered necessary.

Basically, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

31

decentralization efforts aimed at increasing the powers
of the state governments.
decentralization, in

1925

met with total success.

There had been two attempts at
and

Both efforts had not

1931*

Only limited decentralization took

place, whereby, only minor powers were transfered to the
states.

The Federal Government still retained most of the

important powers and resources.

The failure of the decen

tralization programs was mainly due to the opposition of \
the Chinese and British business community who feared that
the decentralization efforts would affect their business
interests and prosperity.

In addition, the second decentra

lization process was also interrupted by the Japanese in
vasion of Malaya in December 1941.
The Japanese ruled Malaya from February
1945•

1942

to August

The Japanese occupation could be considered as one

of the major events in the history of Malaya for it "acted
as a catalyst for the emergence and the development of
nationalism in this country" (Wahid,

1979=97).

The Japanese

encouraged the growth of political consciousness, particular
ly, among the Malays and Indians.

They also created a

feeling of repugnance for western culture.

The lightning

speed at which the Japanese defeated the British, shattered
the myth of the superiority of the British to the eyes of
the people of Malaya, particularly the Malays.
At the same time, however, the Japanese occupation was
also responsible for the intensification of the

racial
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feelings.

This was mainly due to the different racial poli

cies pursued by the Japanese.

Towards the Malays, they

followed a moderate policy, encouraging the growth of the
nationalist movements and promoting some of the Malays to
higher posts in the administration.

Towards the Chinese,

they followed a hostile policy, mainly because of the SinoJapanese War.

Furthermore, even before the Japanese in

vasion, anti-Japanese activities among the Chinese communi
ty had already begun in Malaya.

The anti-Japanese movement

among the Chinese in Malaya was the projection of politics
in China.

With regards to the Indians, the Japanese used

the appeals of nationalism to win them over.

However,

the growth of Indian nationalism was directed towards India.
The Japanese allowed the existence of Indian Independence
League Movements which called for the liberation of India
from the British rule.

The different policies followed

by the Japanese for their own expediency had different
repercussions on different ethnic groups, thus complicating
further the task of nation building in Malaya.
Malaya after the Second World War
The first task of the British when they returned to
Malaya was to intoduce the infamous Malayan Union, designed
to effect some constitutional changes •

The scheme was

hatched in London during the war and it contained the fol
lowing features: First, they wanted to turn Malaya from a
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protectorate to a colony.

This would be implemented by

asking the Malay rulers to surrender their jurisdiction to
the British Government.

The status of the Malay rulers

would thus be reduced to "honorary rulers".

They would be

given some rights over Islamic Religion, but even in this
sphere, their power would be much curtailed since they would
only be members of the Religious Council with the British
Governor as the chairman.
Christian Chairman

The situation would thus be a

presiding over Islamic religious matters.

Second, the nine Malay states together with Penang and
Malacca were to be merged into a single political and admi
nistrative

entity, to be headed by a British Governor.

Another important feature

concerns the citizenship regu

lation, whereby the British would introduce the principle
of jus soli which would confer citizenship to any persons
born in Malaya after the establishment of the Malayan
Union.• The British also devised liberal citizenship provi
sions for other domiciled immigrants.
To implement this scheme, the British needed the coop
eration of the Malay Sultans.

For this task, the British

government sent Sir Harold MacMichael to get the signatures
of the Sultans.

The method used by MacMichael to get the

approval was a combination of threats and persuasion.

The

rulers were denied the opportunity of consultation between
themselves and with the members of their State Councils.
MacMichael put a uniform treaty before each ruler and told
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each of them that it could not be altered.

It was also

made clear to each ruler that he was expected to show
friendly attitude towards the British by signing the treaty
or the British would not hesitate to examine the behavior
of the rulers during the Japanese occupation.

The Sultan

of Kedah was provided with with an ultimatum, whether he
signed it or risked the prospect of being replaced by
another candidate.

According to Ryan, " They were asked to

agree to Malayan Union and there is little doubts that in
some cases MacMichael made sure that agreement to Malayan
Union came before recognition.” (1976:256)

It was therefore

no surprise that he was able to get all the rulers' approval
in the space of two months.
When the news of the Malayan Union reached the Malays,
the anger and oppositions were so great that the British
knew that this plan would be doomed to failure.

In Kedah,

5 0 ,0 0 0 people took part in the demonstration against the

Malayan Union and in Kelantan 36,000 people participated.
For the first time Britain found itself faced with a powerful
movement of Malay nationalism.

Dato' Onn, the son of the

former Chief Minister of Johore, was successful in mobi
lizing the support of the various Malays National Associa
tions to agree to form the first Malay political Congress
on March 1, 19^-6.

This congress was the predecessor of the

United Malay National Organization (UMNO). The main objec
tive of the congress was to unite the Malays into a strong
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body so as to obtain
tution.

a repeal of the Malayan Union Consti

When the Malayan Union took effect, the Malay rul

ers made their protests by refusing to attend the

formal

installation of the new governor of the Malayan Union,

Sir

Edward Gent.
Surprisingly, the non- Malays also showed little enthu
siasm for the Malayan Union.

The Chinese were more inter

ested in the restoration of their business damaged

by

the

war, rather than in politics (Allen, 1968:84)* With mount
ing agitations from,the Malays and lack of support of the
non-Malays, the British saw little point in pursuing

the

new scheme and in its place the British proposed the estab
lishment of the Federation of Malaya.
The Federation of Malaya came into being on February 1,
1948.

The new constitution provided the central

ment with control of public finance.

The Malay rulers also

gained their sovereignty— a symbolic expression
as a Malay country.

govern

of Malaya

It was also agreed that citizenship

would be conferred to the non-Malays who had been born

in

Malaya or if their parents had been residents in Malaya for
fifteen years.
The non-Malays were generally resentful of the restora
tion of the Malay privileges

(Gullick, 1981:85)*

The op

position was manifested in the formation of a political
movement called the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, in
v/hich the Malayan Democratic Union (consisted of a group of
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Chinese, Indian and Eurasian intellectuals with left-wing
views played a leading part. The opposition was ineffec
tual and the British went ahead with the Federation of
Malaya scheme in 1948. Following the implementation of the
Federation of Malaya, Malaya underwent her first Emergency
which lasted for 12 years as the result of armed insurrec
tion by the Communist Party of Malaya (MCP). The MCP's main
aim was to wrest control of the country from the British.
The main significant of the Communist insurrection was the
increased tensions between the Chinese and the Malays. The
membership of the MCP cocsisted mainly of the Chinese.
The MCP embarked on a policy of terror to frighten
people into supporting them. Their targets were mainly
Malay and British personnel, communication lines and estate
managers. However, innocent civilians also became their
victims. The MCP obtained most of its supplies from the
Chinese, particularly, the Chinese squatters who lived
near the jungle fringes. This support of the Chinese to
the Communist cause, further alienated them from the Malays
to whom communism was looked upon as a Chinese phenomenon
and an expression of Chinese nationalism.
The government fought back through military, adminis
trative and political countermeasures. The most important
measure was

the Briggs Plan,

named after General Briggs.

Under this method, the Chinese squatters were

removed

en. masse from the edges of the jungles and placed in
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the New Villages where their movements were severely res
tricted.

With this measure, the Communists were denied

their supplies.

The most important casualty inflicted by

the Communists was the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry
Gurney who was murdered in October 1951.

His successor,

who headed the fights against the MCP was Sir Gerald
Templer, one of the most distinguished British soldiers.
Through his endless efforts, the Communist threats were
greatly reduced by the middle of 1954 when he left Malaya.
The Emergence of Political Parties
Prior to the elections in 1952, political parties in
Malaya acted more as pressure groups attempting to seek
privileges and advantages for their respective communities,
rather than as political parties.

However, the 1952 local

elections had a profound effect on the goals and methods
of these parties (Ratnam. 1 9 6 3 :3 3 7 ).
The most powerful of the political parties was and
still is the United National Organization (UMNO).
inaugurated on May 11, 1946 at Johore Bharu.

UMNO was

It was formed

mainly as a reaction of the Malays against the Malayan
Union.

After its formation, it organized huge public rallies

and demonstrations against the Malayan Union.

The success

of UMNO in mobilizing the Malays against the Malayan Union
gained it an image of a successful nationalist party.

Ac

cording to Means, the main success of UMNO was its ability
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to mobilize Malay opinion to a degree thought impossible
(1972:143)•

Its importance was recognized by the British

when it became the only party to be represented on the
Working Committee which prepared the basic draft
Federation Agreement.

of the

Under the Federation, the leaders of

UMNO concentrated their efforts at consolidating its orga
nization and cooperating with the British.
The leadership of UMNO came mainly from the English ed
ucated Malays with aristocratic background.

Its first Presi

dent was Dato' Onn bin Jaafar from the aristocratic family
of Johore who was also the founder of UMNO.

The party drew

most of its support from the rural Malays and the sub-elite
strata of the Malay society such as the Malay school teachers
and land owners.

Today, UMNO has established a very ex

tensive organization that reaches every part of the country.
UMNO is organized along the following hierachical set up:
At the lowest level are branches which normally correspond
to the polling districts.

The next level in the organiza

tional hierachy is made up of divisions.

Each division is

normally composed of one parliamentary constituency.
Liaison Committees constitute the next level.

State

The Commi

ttee which is found in every state is made up of various
division leaders-

Their main function is to supervise the

activities of the lower party organizations.

In recent

years, the Liaison Committees have been given few powers.
At the national level, the party's organization is made
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up of the General Assembly which is the main policy-making
authority.

The General Assembly meets annually.

It consists

of the delegates from various divisions, three delegates
each from the Women's Section and the Youth Section.

The

General Assembly elects members to the Supreme Executive.
The Supreme.Council is the party's highest administrative
authority and is responsible to the General Assembly.

It

has the power to issue directives and pass them to the
branch level.

The Women's Section and the Youth Section

have their own organizational hierachies and they act as the
pressure groups within UMNO.
Another party that has been destined to make its mark on
the Malaysian political scene is the MCA.

The party was

founded in February in 19A-9 by Tun Leong Yew Koh in the
wake of the declaration of the state of Emergency and also
in response to the political transformation brought about by
the introduction of the Malayan Union (Hock Guan, 1978:1).
The MCA was meant to act as an alternative channel to Chinese
attraction to the MCP.

The MCA's longer term goals were to

protect the Chinese interests and to achieve inter-racial
cooperation.

In the initial stages of its existence, the

MCA acted more as a welfare, social and cultural organization.
It concentrated its efforts towards providing assistance to
the New Villages (Mauzy, 19r78:89)»
The MCA 's organizational set up is broadly similar to
that of UMNO.

Its basic units are the Ward branches.

They
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are normally expected to correspond to a city, town or Local
Council Electoral Ward where there were more than 50 members
reside (Ratnam and Milne , 1967:36-37)•
level is made up of divisions.

The next higher

The division is administered

by a divisional assembly which is made up of delegates from
the ward branches.

Like in UMNO, the divisions are also

expected to correspond to parliamentary constituencies though
there are some which cover more than one parliamentary consti
tuencies.

At the state level, the MCA has

State Assemblies

(an equivalent to the UMNO's State State Liaison Committees).
However, in.the case of the MCA, the State Assemblies have
more powers, compared to the UMNO's State Liaison Committees.
At the national level, the MCA has the President's Committeee
and the Central Working Committeee.
is the highest policy-making body.

The President's Committee
The MCA also has a

Youth Section which also acts as a pressure group.
Another political party that was meant to become the
partner in the Alliance coalition is the MIC, founded in
August 19^6.

Like the other two parties, the MIC is also a

communal party.

Its primary aims were to protect the in

terests of the Indians in Malaya and to get rid of the image
of the Malayan Indians as compliant laborers.
In its early years, the MIC was mainly concerned with
the development of Indian politics.

In fact, the party

took its name from the Indian Congress Party of India (Bedlington, 1978:18).

Its first president was John Thivy who
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had been active in the wartime Indian Independence League
and he was also a member of Subhas Chandra Bose Provisional
Government of Azad and Hind, The MIC was also involved for
a while with left-wing politics. It was only after 1951
that the MIC became less oriented towards Indian political
development and began to represent the views of the local
Indians, With the appointment of V.T. Sambanthan as

its

president in 1954 > the Malayan character of the party be
came more pronounced. However, from the beginning, the MIC
had had difficulty in getting the full support of the Indian
community. The party was led by a small group of an English
educated Indian professionals and businessmen who had few
links with the ordinary Indian laboring class.
Other political parties that were in existence in the
pre-1952 period included the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU),
the Malay nationalist Party (MNP), the All-Malaya Council
of Joint Action (AMCJA), the Pusat Tenaga Pakyat (Putera)
and the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP). The MDU, formed
in 1945 was the "foremost spokesman of the non-Malay commu
nities domiciled in the country" (Ratnam, 1965:147). Its
main aim was to provide opposition to the rise of Malay na
tionalism. The MNP was a Malay communal party but it con
centrated its efforts at uniting the leftist elements with
in the Malay community. The AMCJA was composed of various
loosely organized political parties with a mixture of var
ious political beliefs and aspirations. The party sought
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to obtain equal political rights for all persons who
pledged their loyalties to Malaya and wanted to make Malaya
their home • Putera (People's United Front) was also made
up of smaller Malay political parties, such as the Angkatan
Pemuda Insaf and Angkatan Wanita Sedar,
Malay interests.

It fought for the

Specifically, it wanted to make Malay the

the official language of the country; to apply the term
Malay to all citizens of Malaya and to incorporate the Malay
national colors (that is, the Indonesian red and white) into
Malaya's national flag (Ratnam, 1965:149-150).
The formation of the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP)
is highly significant because it was the first attempt to
introduce a non-communal political party in Malaya and ironi
cally enough, it was founded by Dato' Onn bin Jaafar.

Begin

ning in 1948, Dato' Onn was involved in the Communities Li
aison Committee (CLC) whose main function was to look into
the sources of ethnic conflicts and to try to find solutions
to these conflicts.

The members of this committeee also in

cluded Tan Cheng Lock, the President of the MCA,

Dato' Onn's

experience in the CLC had a profound effect on his views.
He became convinced that the path to independence depended
upon inter-ethnic cooperation, by way of a multi-ethnic po
litical party (Mauzy, 1978:96),

Subsequently, he tried to

pressure UMNO into opening its membership to all ethnic
groups and to change its name to United Malayan National Or
ganization,

UMNO's executives agreed but its general membership
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refused. Failing to make UMNO conform to his views, Dato1
Onn resigned from the party and in September 1951, he
formed a multi-ethnic party, the IMP. Unfortunately, how
ever, the IMP failed to get the support of either the Malays
or the non-Malays. The Malays were reluctant to support the
IMP because they felt that Malay interests could not be
guaranteed by a political union with other communities.
Support from the Chinese was not forthcoming mainly because
there was no reciprocal support coming from the Malays.
The Evolution of the Alliance Coalition
One of the most important turning points in the poli
tical development in Malaysia was the UMNO-MCA alliance
which came into being in early 1 9 5 2 , prior to the 1952
Kuala Lumpur Municipal election. The men responsible for
the Alliance were Yahya bin Dato1 Abdul Rahman, the UMNO
Kuala Lumpur Chairman of the election sub-committee and his
friend, Colonel H.S. Lee, an influential member of the MCA.
The MCA agreed to finance the election if the UMNO-MCA al
liance was created. The pact was announced in January 1952
and stated that UMNO and the MCA would field twelve joint
candidates for the coming elections. It should be remem
bered that at this stage the alliance was strictly an
electoral pact and the name Alliance Party was not yet in
use (Mauzy, 1978:102). This arrangement was also made with-
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out the prior knowledge of either UMNO's or the MCA's
leaders.

The ad hoc electoral alliance of UMNO-MCA was

able to win 9 out of the 12 seats in the election, while
the IMP was able to win only two seats.
The success of the UMNO-MCA alliance in the Kuala
Lumpur municipal elections spurred the national leadership
of the two parties to consider forming a more permanent
alliance.

As a first step towards this direction, the

leaders of UMNO and the MCA began to hold Round Table Con
ferences and they finally reached agreement on March 17»
1 9 5 3 * whereby it was decided by both parties to set up a

National Alliance Organization which was inaugurated on
August

23» 1953•

A Liaison Committee was also set up, con

sisting of two representatives each at the local levels to
provide institutional links.

In September 1954} a 30-

member National Council was established as the supreme body
of the Alliance Party and Tengku Abdul Rahman, popularly
known as the "Tunku" was named as the leader of the party.
Both parties had their reasons for agreeing to form
the coalition.

Mutual oppositions to IMP was an important

consideration for both parties.

Both UMNO and the MCA

were convinced that the multi-ethnic IMP could pose a
challenge to their positions.

The Tunku also realized

that if the IMP could expand its power, it would divert
the support from UMNO.

The MCA, on the other hand, was

not convinced with Dato Onn's non-communal

politics.
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They feared that Dato' Onn would still favor the Malays.
The two parties also realized that by joint efforts they
could win more seats than by going alone.

Bedlington

enumerated three reasons which prompted the formation of the
Alliance.

First, the British had made it clear that

independence
various

would not be granted until such times as the

groups showed that they could work together in

harmony; the alliance to contest the Kuala Lumpur elections
provided them with the opportunity to demonstrate that they
could provide an alternative to the multi-ethnic IMP which
was contesting the elections.

Third, UMNO during this period

was suffering a setback due to its conflict with Dato1 Onn.
Thus, an electoral alliance with the MCA would provide an
ideal opportunity to bolster its sagging image (1 9 7 8 :8 6 ).
The MIC decided to join the Alliance on October 17
1 9 5 4 j a few months prior to the first federal elections of

1955.

V/ith this move, the Alliance Party had embraced all

the three major communities of the country within its
organization.
Organs of Government
The Alliance won an overwhelming victory in the 1955
elections.

Following the victory, the Alliance

leader, Tengku Abdul Rahman

under its

concentrated all efforts at

gaining independence for Malaya. Independence was granted on
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August 3 1 , 1957»
The Merdeka (Independence) Constitution that came into
force is federal in nature and it gives considerable power
to the Central Government, namely control over health, edu
cation, finance, external affairs, internal security, civil
and criminal services.

The state governments only exercise

control over land, agriculture and forestry.
The country is ruled by a non-political Head of State
(the Yang Di Pertuan Agong), a bicameral Parliament which
is modelled on the British Parliament and a Cabinet.

The

Parliament comprises of the Dewan Sak.yat (House of Represen
tatives) and the Dewan Negara (the Senate).
is

The Dewan Rakyat

the principal lawmaking body and it has 154 seats.

Prime Minister is a member of the Dewan Rakyat.

The

The Dewan

Negara has 58 members: 26 members are elected by the Legis
lative Assemblies of the thirteen states and another 32
are appointed by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong.

Like the Dewan

Rakyat, it can initiate legislation and it has certain
ratificatory powers.
The actual power in running the country, however, lies
in the hand of the Cabinet.

Cabinet members are drawn

from the majority party in the Parliament, primarily from
the Dewan Rakyat.

Cabinet members are appointed by the Yang

Di Pertuan Agong who acts on the advice of the Prime
Minister.

In choosing his Cabinet members, the Prime Mini

ster usually

follows the wishes of

the

leaders of the
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component parties of the coalition.
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CHAPTER I I I

THE ORGANIZATION AND THE OPERATION
OF THE ALLIANCE PARTY
The first part of

this chapter will examine the orga

nization and the main characteristics of the Alliance Party,
particularly, its working style.

The second part of the

chapter will examine the Alliance coalition in operation,
particularly, its participation in the elections prior to
1970.
The Organization of the Alliance Party
The Alliance was registered as a political party only
in 1958.

From 1952 to 1958, its status was hazy.

liance as a political party is rather unique.

The Al

The party,

retained its three constituent bodies (UMNO, the MCA and the
MIC).
was
This

Each of this body had its separate members to whom it
responsible and from whom it collected subscriptions.
arrangement, according to Waddell, made the Alliance

Party "more an alliance than a party" (1972:_45).

Efforts

to merge the party into a single organization had met with
strong resistance from the members of each constituent body,
particularly, the UMNO members.
tioned on communal lines.

Each constituent body func

However, at the national level,

48
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the national leadership of the Alliance continued to empha
size inter-communal goals. According to Ratnam, the Alliance
was an inter-communal coalition and not a non-communal coali
tion party as some people perceived (1965:162).
The Alliance appeared as a single body only when con
testing elections and forming government.

At other times

it existed only at coordinating levels. The organization
of the

Alliance was restricted to committees which com

prised

delegates from the three bodies.

The highest

levels at which these committees functioned were the National
Executive Committee and the National Alliance Council. These
two bodies comprised the leaders of each constituent party
of the Alliance.

The Alliance Executive Committee which ■

was the primary decision-making body was made up of six
UMNO members, six MCA members and three MIC members. It had
the powers to select candidates to stand in the elections,
initiate policies, recommend disciplinary actions and
select chief party administrators (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:131).
The Alliance National Council was composed of sixteen repre
sentatives each from UMNO and the MCA, and six from the MIC.
The party did not provide for any general meeting of the mem
bers of the constituent bodies. Instead, each of the consti
tuent body had its own general meeting. Issues concerning
the Alliance were normally decided by consensus. Sometimes,
the Tunku made the important decisions. There also tended to
be a high overlapping between the members of the Executive
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Committee and cabinet members and this had given rise to
close personal relationship between the members, which made
it easier to have discussions in informal way.
At the state level, each state had its own Alliance
Liaison Committee and Executive Committee which coordinated
the activities of the member parties.

The lowest level at

which the Alliance Committee functioned was the division.
At the branch level, party activities were conducted entire
ly by each member party

of the Alliance.

The core of the Alliance policy was the reconciliation
of communal interests with broader interests of the society.
In theory, each of the component parties of the Alliance
had the prime responsibility of guarding and promoting the
legitimate interests of the community that it claimed to
represent.

The guardians of these interests were the national

leaders of each component party.

In the case of UMNO, the

leadership was composed of English educated members of the
traditional aristocracy and for the Chinese the leading
businessmen of the MCA.
The Alliance functioned on the basis of a bargain.

The

bargain refers to the compromises over the constitutional
position of the Malays and the Chinese reached by the MCA.
and UMNO leaders.

These formed the main features of the

Alliance Memorandum, submitted to the Reid Constitutional
Commission which was drafting the Malayan Constitution and
many of these proposals were later incorporated into the
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Constitution.
The first level was a silent bargain because it was
not mention in writing.

Specifically, it was an understan

ding that the Malays would have control over politics and
government while the non-Malays would be allowed a free
hand in the economic and commercial spheres.

The second

part of the bargain was explicitly stated in the Consti
tution.

It was a trade of of of the concessions between

the Malays and the non-Malays, whereby

non-Malay vital

interests were protected by UMNO, in return for non-Malays
recognition of certain Malay interests.

In particular, the

Malays gained the following concessions in the bargain:
Malay language was made the national language of the count
ry; Islam was made the official state religion but other re
ligions were extensively tolerated.

The non-Malays also

agreed to accept Malay special privileges and the functions
of the Malay rulers.

In return, the non-Malays gained a

very important concession— a liberal citizenship regulation,
particularly the granting of jus soli to those born after
the independendence day (after August 31. 1957). In addition,
citizenship was also granted with qualifications to any per
son whose father was a citizen at the time of his birth.
According to Nordlinger, very few other overseas Chinese in
the other Southeast Asian countries could ever dream to get
such concessions (1972:29).

Other concessions gained by

the non-Malays were the recognition of

their

rights
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to participate in politics and government administration and
unhindered participation in the economy. They were also al
lowed religious freedom and liberal use of their languages
for non-official purposes. On the whole, these bargains
"realized great benefits for all parties, in many cases, more
than the original participants had expected to achieve"(Esman, 1972:25)* However, these bargains were extremely diffi
cult to achieve. It took months of patient negotiations by
the leaders of the component parties of the Alliance.
Two other keys which were vital to the working style of
the Alliance were compromise and secrecy. Racial claims and
issues would be subjected to a series of compromises and bar
gaining. These issues which usually originated at the lower
levels would be presented by the communal leaders of the com
ponent parties to the Alliance Executive Committee. These
issues would then be taken up by the national leaders of the
Alliance coalition who would try to find solutions through
the process of compromises and bargaining behind closed doors.
This system is called consociationalism by political scien
tists. In this system, communal issues were settled through
compromises reached in private between leaders who enjoyed
the support of their respective communities.
Bargaining normally took place in an

atmosphere

of

trust and through a spirit of accommodation. Once a concen
sus is reached , it has to be defended by all the component
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parties of the coalition.

The leaders of each party

be responsible for explaining and justifying the

would

Alliance

decisions to their respective communities and for securing
their compliance (Esman, 1972:101).
The political style of the Alliance was also based
secrecy (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:131)*

Secrecy in the

on
bar

gaining process was considered vital by the Alliance lead
ers for "fear that public discussions would harden communal
positions and rupture the entire Alliance entente" (Gagliano, 1970:131).
The Alliance party has been described as a coalition
with no pretenses towards ideological formulation.

The par

ty emphasized political pragmatism and strived hard to pro
tect the bargain and preserve communal harmony.

The

ance platforms stressed socio-economic progress and

Alli
devel

opment, particularly, the extension of education, health,
housing and welfare services.

The Tunku stressed this point

when he explained 'HVe are ready and willing to accept

any

thing that we currently believe is either politically

or

socially good and productive.
partments in our policies.

There are no watertight com

In my party, we are right

and

center and left and according to what is needed and what we
think best." (Milne and Mauzy, 1978:131)
The fact that the Alliance Party did not provide for di
rect membership was both the source of its weakness
strength (Ratnam.and Milne, 1967:^1).

and

This is because,
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the one hand, the absence of direct membership enabled the
member parties of the coalition to project themselves as
the champions of their respective communities and thus
counterchallenge the opposition parties which thrived on
perennial communal issues.

On the other hand, the preser

vation of three separate identities would mean that the
leaders of the Alliance were responsible to three different
communities with three different sets of interests.

Arising

out of this arrangement, the Alliance was often under con
siderable stresses and strains and there were always the
need for constant bargaining and compromises.
Though the Alliance was a coalition of communal parties,
it represented a force of moderation because within the
Alliance it was not possible for the component parties to
do as much as they would like for their respective communi
ties.

UMNO, for example, must always bear in mind its

relationship with the MCA and the MIC in articulating the
interests of the Malay community since that relationship
could be destroyed if it pushed beyond the limit of the
toleration of the other two partners.

Similarly, the MCA

and the MIC would also have to adhere to the same rules
of the game.

For the sake of the Alliance unity, each

member party had to confine itself within the limits which
were necessary for the preservation of partnership with
others.
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The Alliance Party in Operation
The operation of the Alliance Party can be best evaluated
by examining its performance in the elections with special
reference to intra-Alliance stresses.
Since the introduction of the elections in Malaysia in
1952, the Alliance Party had enjoyed an unchallenged pre
eminence in Malaysian politics. In the 1955 federal elec
tions, the Alliance won an overwhelming victory, winning
51 out of 52 parliamentary seats. The Alliance victory in
this election was attributed mainly to its super organiza
tion, its independence issue and its past electoral success
(Mauzy, 1980: 122). The contestants in this election were
Party Negara and the Pan-Malaya Islamic Party(PMIP), also
known as PAS. PAS was formed in.1955* It is an Islamic party
and the most extreme Malay communal party in Malaysia. The
party has been trying to use Islam as the unifying force.
It advocates a theocratic state where Islamic rules, prin
ciples and administration would be followed. It sought to
make Malay as the only official language, recognition and
extension of Malay rights and restrictions on citizenship
to the non-Malays and the curtailment of non-Malay immi
gration (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:144). The bulk of its sup
port came from the rural and the more conservatives Malays
from the east coast states of West Malaysia.
The next federal elections in Malaysia

was held in
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August 1959*

In these elections the Alliance votes dropped

to a majority of 51 percent, though it still won 74 out of
the total 104 parliamentary seats.

This reduction in pop

ular votes were due to several factors.

First, the political

situation in the country had undergone significant changes
between 1955 to 1959*

Independence had been granted

in

1 9 5 7 * thereby the issue of independence which in the past

had united the people together, had now been removed from
the political scene.

The Alliance coalition was not as

united as it was in the 1955 elections.

It was also plagued

by internal problems.
The most difficult problem that plagued the Alliance
coalition was the problem of communalism within the party.
This problem was in part due to the peculiar structure of
the Alliance, composed as it was of communal bodies which
took communal stands on political issues but were generally
willing to compromise fot the purpose of preserving the
unity of the Alliance.

Within each constituent party of

the Alliance, there were elements which resisted the con
cessions made by the party to its communal partner (Means,
1972:161).

Within UMNO, these elements insisted upon a

more positive programs to promote and preserve Malay
interests.

Similarly, there were elements within the MCA

who wanted to make Chinese as an official language of the
country.
One of the most acute pressures faced by the Alliance
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prior to 1959 federal elections was in connection with
issue of allocation of seats for the 1959 elections*

the

The

problem of seat allocation came to the fore in the wake
the changes in the leadership of MCA*

In March 1958*

Dr.

Lim Chong Eu defeated Tan Cheng Lock as the president
MCA*

Tan Cheng Lock and his supporters were men who

As one of the founders of the MCA, he had

closely with UMNO leaders.

of
had

been closely associated with the Chinese Chambers of
merce.

of

Com

worked

The new elements which supported

Dr. Lim were largely Chinese educated and were more communal
in outlook and they were less concerned with Alliance unity
than Tan Cheng Lock and his associates had been.

They were

also motivated by left-wing and socialist ideas (Means,
1970:202).

The new leaders, who managed to capture most of

the important positions in MCA, wished to tilt the politi
cal balance to their favor by demanding more seats in
coming 1959 elections.

This demand had led to the

1959 crisis that threatened to split the Alliance.

the

July
The Al

liance National Council had decided to allocate 74 seats to
UMNO, 28 to the MCA and 2 to the MIC.

The new MCA leaders,

on the other hand, demanded that MCA be given 40 seats. The
party also demanded to select its own candidates (instead
of the Alliance National Council) and to have a review

of

language and education policies.
The Tunku considered the publicized demands as an ulti
matum and a stab in the back.

He also announced that
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Alliance would contest all the 104 seats in the elections
without the MCA,

For the MCA to remain in the

Alliance,

the Tunku laid down certain conditions: a complete

with

drawal of all MCA demands, a purge of certain radicals
the party and complete authority for himself to

in

select all

candidates for the federal elections (Vasil, 1972:4)•
Before the 1959 elections, the harmony in the

Alliance

had also been affected by the controversial issues
cation and the National Language.

of edu

As agreed in the

Alli

ance Memorandum, the provision on citizenship to the

non-

Malays was tied up to the acceptance of a Malayan educa
tional policy.

To implement this provision, a Committee

for Education was set up under the chairmanship

of

the

Minister of Education Datuk Abdul Razak bin Hussein.

The

main objective of the Razak Plan was the "Malayanization"
of educational system in order to develop a common

curric

ulum and to promote a common outlook among the various com
munities but without sacrificing each community's desire to
preserve its own language and cultural adentity.

To

this

end, the Razak Plan called for the preservation of the sep
arate language medium school system; Malay and English were
to be made the compulsory subjects in all schools; schools
were to be made eligible for grants in aid if they conform
to the educational policy; and the subject matter and

the

syllabus in all schools were to be common, though the

me

dium of instructions would be in different languages.
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This policy reflected the government's efforts to
counter the nationalistic orientation of the Chinese medium
schools by replacing subjects having strong bias for China
with subjects related to Malaya (Means, 1970:202).

This

plan aroused the opposition of the Chinese, particularly,
the supporters of the Chinese medium schools.

The MCA felt

that it had to play its role in resolving the issue and for
that purpose it set up a Central Education Committee to
study the consequences of the Razak Report.

Various con

ferences were also held under MCA's sponsorship to study
the problems of Chinese education and to pressure the
Alliance'Government to bring about an alteration in the
educational policies.

The involvement of the MCA affected

its relationship with the other

partners of the Alliance,

particularly, with UMNO.
The next election held in Malaysia was the 196if federal
elections.

These elections were conducted against the back

ground of "Indonesian Confrontation" to the formation of
Malaysia.

As the governing party, the Alliance was able to

use the confrontation as an election issue, calling on the
people to show patriotism and loyalty by voting for the ru
ling party.

Some of the opposition parties, such as the

Socialist Front and PAS, were clearly at the

disadvan

tage since their anti-Malaysia stance was used by the Alli
ance to discredit them.

The Alliance could also count on
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the non-Malay voters, particularly, the Chinese who

dis

approved of the Indonesian Government's harsh treatment

of

Chinese minority in Indonesia.
In this election, the Alliance won a massive
capturing 89 out of 10Z+ seats.

victory,

The votes among the

oppo

sition parties were divided with PAS winning 9 seats,
cialist Front 2, People Progressive Party (PPP) 2,

So

United

Democratic 1 and People Action Party 1 (Mauzy, 1978:131).
The 1969 General
Elections and the May 13 Riots
The federal elections of 1969 was one of the major
turning points in the Malaysian political history,

for

it

sparked off the infamous racial riots of May 13» 1969.
To understand the Alliance Party's performance
1969 elections and the subsequent riots, one has

in
to

at the period between 196^- and 1969* for the seeds
violence were sown during this period.
nessed

This period

the

look
of this
wit

increasing communal polarization, ethnic militancy

and outbidding.

The charged atmosphere was the results

of

PAP's participation in the peninsular politics, conflicts
and apprehensions over the implementatation of the National
Language Bill of 1967 which was the pro-Malay parts of
bargain.

the

Whereas the non-Malays had immediately gained

from the constitutional provision on citizenship, the
vision that made Malay as the National Language was

pro
only
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Implemented, in 196?(Mauzy, 1978:134) • There was much appre
hension among the non-Malays as the due date for the implemen
tation of the National Language provision was approaching.
The Chinese community appeared less willing to accept the
National Language provision. The groups most against the
implementation of this provision were the Union of Chinese
Teachers, Chinese guilds and associations. They were sup
ported by the MCA Youth Organization who conducted cam
paigns demanding for a more liberal stand on language, in
cluding making the Chinese language as one of the official
languages. These groups also demanded the establishment of
a Chinese University. The non-Malays objection to the Malay
Language being made the National Language was related to
consideration pertaining to cultural values and pride
(Ratnam and Milne, 1965:126). They also believed that their
cultures and languages were more superior than the culture
and language of the Malays.
These demands put the MCA in a dilemma. The MCA was in
fear of losing the support of the Chinese community if it
did not support the issue. However, if it backed up the
demand, there would be a collision with UMNO and this would
affect the unity of the coalition. Ethnic tensions were
heightened when the UMNO Youth called for a review of the
constitutional provision which had granted citizenship to
the non-Malays if the demands to make the Chinese language
as the national language continued.
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The unity of the Alliance was preserved when the leaders
of the coalition agreed to set up a top level Alliance Com
mittee which would study thhe language issue and prepare a
National Language Bill which would be tabled before the
Parliament. The bill, when it was passed, represented a
compromise, allowing the use of English for some official
purposes and a liberal use of Chinese and Indian languages
for non-governmental and non-official purposes.
The heightened ethnic tensions between the period I964 1969 was also due to Lee Kuan Yew's campaigns when Singapore
was in Malaysia. The People Action Party(PAP) under Lee Kuan
Yew decided to contest the peninsular 1964 elections.

The

main motive behind this move was to replace the MCA in the
Alliance coalition. Although it fielded only 9 candidates
in these elections, the consequences that were left behind
were serious. The PAP placed its candidates in the urban
and predominantly Chinese constituents, thus challenging
the Alliance where

the MCA candidates appeared on the

Alliance tickets (Means, 1970:337). It also hurled accusa
tions against the MCA, calling it a corrupt party which had
lost the support of the Chinese people.
Communal tensions was further heightened by the PAP's
campaign issues which contained anti-Malay innendo(Funston,
1980:59). The party called for a "Malaysian Malaysia" and
indulged in racial arithmetics which implied that the Malays
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were not the majority group.
duced results.

The aggressive campaign

pro

The Malays were alarmed by the challenge to

the constitutional bargain and the racial arithmetics while
the Chinese were excited by the prospect of political

re

alignment (Mauzy, 1978:13^)*
Having failed to replace the MCA in the Alliance,
PAP changed its strategy.

the

It shifted its attacks from the

MCA to the whole framework of the Alliance, as well the
concept and the terms of the constitutional bargain.

He

alienated the Alliance leaders by his prudent remark

that

Malaysia had been given independence on a silver platter
with red ribbons by the British royalty in uniform (Funston,
1980:59)*

In 1965* Lee Kuan Yew intensified his tactics by

sponsoring the formation of Malaysian Solidarity Convention,
a united front of non-Malay political parties composed

of

the PAP, two parties from Peninsula Malaysia, the United
Democratic Party (UDP) and PPP and two parties from Sarawak
(Sarawak United Peoples Party-SUPP and MACHINDA). This move
had the effect of intensifying communal tension to the ex
tent that the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur

had

to

take the necessary action of expelling Singapore from
Malaysia on August 9» 1965*

The main reason cited for the

expulsion was the fear and danger of widespread ethnic vio
lence (Means, 1970:333)*
In addition, personal factors and differences in
tical styles were also involved.

poli

Many of UMNO leaders,
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particularly, " the ultras" such as Tan Sri Syed Jaafar
Albar distrusted Lee Kuan Yew who was said to entertain
ambition of one day becoming the Prime Minister of Malaysia.
Lee Kuan Yew's agreesive political style also contrasted
with the Alliance style of finding solutions through bar
gaining, compromises and gradual approach.

The leaders of

the Alliance feared that open discussions and examination of
communal issues would inflame ethnic animosity and would be
hard to control.

On the other hand, Lee Kuan Yew believed

in taking.the case to the people to decide and to allow
open examination of communalism.

Lee

was a political

gambler, who was determined to force a new political re
alignment regardless of the effects on communal harmony,
political stability or prospect for the survival of democracy
(Means, 1970:348).

Though Singapore had been expelled from

Malaysia, the damage had been done.

Many people believed

that the seeds sown by Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP in 1964 and
1965 were reaped in the communal violence of May 13. 1979
(Mauzy, 1978:132).
When the Alliance contested the 1969 elections, its in
ternal cohesion had been eroded by the consequences of the
political events between 1964-1969• The MCA was losing
further support from the Chinese community, while PAS was
gaining ground against UMNO, particularly, in the east
coast states of Peninsular Malaysia.

Elections were held
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on May 10, 1969* When the election results for Peninsular
Malaysia were announced, it was clear that the Alliance had
been dealt a severe blow. Though the party was still re
turned to power, it was with a simple majority, not like in
the previous elections. It lost the state of Penang to the
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement-Gerakan)
and failed to wrest control of the state of Kelantan from
PAS. The Alliance also lost its majority in Selangor and
Perak.
There were several reasons which led to this reduced
support. First, there was the absence of outstanding
national issue, thus the election campaigns centered on
perennial racial issues and the tempo of electoral rhetoric
heightened racial tensions. The Democratic Action Party
(DAP) sought a "Malaysian Malaysia" and called for the
abolition of constitutional provision on the Malay Special
privileges and the elevation of Chinese, Indian and English
as National Language (Bedlington, 1978:12if). The DAP was
founded in March 1966 and it was the main off-shoot of Lee
Kuan Yew's PAP. The Alliance was also forced to resort to
racial politics because the Malay and non-Malay communal
parties were gaining support through racial appeals. To
counter the growing influence of PAS, UMNO was forced to
take a more conservative "Malay first" stance, thereby it
could not pay much attention to the efforts of getting the
non-Malay votes, leaving the task to the MCA and

the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
MIC (Bedlington, 1978:lif4).

The MCA and the MIC had proved

to be unworthy of the task.
On top of that, for the first time in Malaysian history,
the entire opposition parties had agreed to conclude an
electoral understanding, a "gentlemen agreement", not to
contest each other, thus avoiding the splitting of the
opposition votes*

When the results of the elections were

known, the opposition parties were jubilant.

Though they

could not topple the Alliance Government, they had managed
to reduce its majority.

To celebrate their victory, the

opposition parties headed by the DAP and Gerakan organized
a "victory" procession on May 11, 1969 through the streets
of Kuala Lumpur, shouting anti-Malay slogans (Gagliano,
1971:16).
On May 13, 1969 Tun Tan Siew Sin, the MCA's President
called for an emergency meeting of the MCA's Central Com
mittee and announced that the MCA would not participate
in the Alliance Government because of the MCA’s poor per
formance.

On the evening of the same day, UMNO's supporters

assembled at the resident of the Menteri Besar of Selangor
for a counter procession.

It was here that the assembled

crowd learnt that a group of Malays who were coming to
the procession was attacked by the Chinese and Indians.
With the news the crowd dispersed and the proposed march
turned into racial riots.

However, the riots were confined

only to Kuala Lumpur.
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On May 15» a state of Emergency was‘declared throughout
the country and the Parliament was dissolved*

The

was ruled by a decree through a special ten-men

country

National

Operation Council headed by Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussin.
This

Council was made up of Senior Alliance politicians

(including Tun Dr. Ismail, Tun Tan Siew Sin and Tun

Sam-

banthan) civilian bureaucrats, police and military officials.
NOC's first action was to suspend the elections which
still in progress in Sabah and Sarawak.

were

At the same

the cabinet which had been in office during the

time,

elections,

continued to exist, and it was headed by Tunku Abdul Rahman.
The main difference between the cabinet and the NOC was that
the NOC was mainly responsible for security situation.

Tun

Razak, as the head of the NOC, was responsible to the Tunku
and both men were in constant communication.
During the NOC rule, several measures were taken to re
store law and order in the country.

In June 1969* the NOC

decided to ban all political activities but this
lifted in September 1970.

ban

Government employees were

was
also

forbidden to participate in the Malaysian Trade Union Coun
cil.

In addition, the Minister of Home Affairs was

given

extensive powers of censorship of Malaysian press. The most
important was, however, the amendment of the Sedition
in 1970.

With this amendment, it became illegal to

Act
ques

tion certain constitutional provision such as the sover
eignty of rulers, special position of the

bumiputras
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(indigeneous people and the Malays) and the legitimate in
terest of others, the National Language, the use

of

other

languages for non-official uses and citizenship.
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CHAPTER I V

THE POST 1969 POLITICS: COALITION
BUILDING AND THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL FRONT
After twenty one months of NOC rule, parliamentary pro
cess was restored in February 1971*

Prior to that in Sep

tember 1970» the Tunku announced his retirement from

the

post of the Premier and he was succeeded by Tun Abdul Razak
with Tun Dr. Ismail as the Deputy Prime Minister.
The first task of the Parliament was to pass the

Con

stitution (Amendment) Bill which was designed to permanent
ly remove certain ethnically provisions from public
cussion.

dis

For this purpose, the Bill proposed the amendment

of Article 10 (which deals with freedom of speech) whereby ,
the Parliament would be empowered to pass laws which

made

it illegal to question any matter, right, status, privilege
or sovereignty established or protected by the provisions
of Part III of the Constitution (which deals with citizen
ship), Article 152 (the National Language), Article
(special position of the Malays and legitimate

153

interest of

other communities) (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:96). In addition,
the Bill also proposed to

amend Articles 63* 72, 152, 153

and 1 5 9 •^
Tun Razak and his political associates also set out

to

develop a new political strategy, designed to reduce further
69
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the scope for racial politicking. They felt that the Alli
ance formula was inadequate to meet the communal pressures.
The features of the new formula would emphasize Malay unity,
political consensus and the broadening of the Alliance(Milne
and Mauzy, 1980:177)•
The Alliance base would be broadened through the estab
lishment of a series of coalition governments in several
states between the ruling Alliance and the opposition par
ties. The political climate in the post-1969 period had also
undergone significant changes favorable for such a move. A
new spirit of cooperation also seemed to emerge between the
various ethnic groups.
The first coalition to be established was between the
p
Sarawak United Peoples Party(SUPP) and the Sarawak Alliance .
Tun Abdul Razak went to Sarawak to work out the arrangement.
The coalition agreement was signed on July 7, 1970. This coali
tion consisted of the Bumiputra Party and the SUPP as the ma
jor partners and Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak(Sons of SarawakPesaka) and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) as the mi
nor ones. Dato Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Yaacob of the Bumi
putra Party was made the Chief Minister. The post of the de
puty Chief Minister went to Datuk Stephen Yong of the SUPP.
In addition, the SUPP was also granted equal control over
policies and appointments and later a post of federal minis
tership.
The establishment of the SUPP-Sarawak Alliance coalition
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was motivated by the desire for stability in Sarawak and
the removal of Communist insurgency.

The coalition would

also pave the way for easier implementation of the Federal
Government's development programs in Sarawak.

Equally impor

tant was the desire to give greater representation to the
Chinese community to compensate for the weakness of the SCA.
Encouraged by the success of the coalition in Sarawak,
Tun Abdul Razak's next move was to establish a coalition
between the Alliance and the Gerakan which controlled the
state of Penang.

Negotiations between the two started in

December and were concluded in January 1972.

The motive

of the Gerakan in agreeing to the coalition had to do with
the crisis within the party.

There had been personality

conflicts within the party which had led to defections.
The crisis resulted in the party's reduced majority in the
Penang State Assembly.

The Alliance's motives were to gain

political and administrative responsibility over Penang, so
as to make it easier for the implementation of federal eco
nomic policies and projects as well as to co-opt a moderate
opposition party into the government's fold.
The terms of the agreement allowed for the participation
of the Alliance in Penang State Executive Council.

An

Alliance member would be appointed as a member of the Coun
cil.

The Gerakan also agreed to support the Alliance Govern

ment in the Parliament and State Assemblies,

A Consultative

Committee and Coordinating Committeee would be established
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as coalition forums. In addition, the Gerakan was allowed
to retain control of the State Government with Dr. Lim
Chong Eu to remain as the Chief Minister.
Four months later, the Alliance concluded a coalition
agreement with the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP). The PPP
was formed as the Perak's Progressive Party in January 1953
by two Ceylonese lawyer brothers, D.R. Seenivasagam and P.
Seenivasagam. The party was influential in the Ipoh town area.
The support for the party came mainly from Chinese and Indian
laborers in Ipoh area. The party's platform advocated the pro
motion of Chinese and Tamil languages and the ending of Ma
lay Special Privileges. The PPP became ineffective in the
1960s and its main activities centered on running the Ipoh
Council.

Following the death of D.R. Seenivasagam in 1969j

the party grew weaker, though it managed to retain the con
trol of Ipoh Municipality in the 1969 elections.
The coalition with the PPP was confined only to the
state level and only for the current term of the Perak State
Government (Mauz.y, 1978:217) • In concluding coalition agree
ment with the PPP, the Alliance was motivated by the follow
ing reasons.

First, the Perak UMNO at that time had become

weak due to factionalism, particularly at the divisional
levels and the State organization was equally ineffective to
exert control.

If this was allowed to continue the Alliance

position! in Perak could be threatened.

Second, the Alliance

also wished to reduce political animosity, so that

Communist

terrorism in Perak could be effectively combated and develop
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ment projects could be implemented.

Third, it was also a

device to foster unity between the Malays and the non-Malays.
Lastly, UMNO was also concerned about the weakening ability
of the MCA to attract support from the Chinese population,
thus by co-opting other non-Malay parties such as the Gerakan
and the PPP into the coalition, UMNO's reliance on the MCA
to obtain support from the non-Malays could be reduced
(Funston, 1980:250).

To the PPP, a coalition with the

Alliance would provide the opportunity to obtain more funds
for the implementation of its projects in Ipoh Municipality
where most of its support was concentrated.
The Alliance's most priced catch was PAS.
had been the bitterest of enemies.
main obstacle to Malay unity.

UMNO and PAS

UMNO regarded PAS as the

Against this background, it

was no surprise that the coalition agreement between the
two parties took the longest to negotiate.

UMNO had been

wooing PAS for sometimes but PAS appeared unenthusiastic.
There had been rumours about the possibility of coalition
even during the NOC's period.

In December 1970, UMNO public

ly broached the subject but there was no positive reply from
Dato' Asri, the leader of PAS.

It was only in September

1972 that actual negotiations took place and the agreement
was concluded in early December of that year.
became effective on January I, 1973.

The coalition

The terms of the agree-

met were contained in a thirteen point Communique signed
by Dato' Asri and Tun Abdul Razak.

The agreement included
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a preamble and separate statements of PAS and UMNO's objec
tives in entering the coalition. The preamble emphasized the
importance of unity in order to achieve stability and econo
mic growth. The agreement provided for the following: the
appointment of PAS members to cabinet posts and to a number
of lesser posts at the national level, namely a post of De
puty Minister, a Parliamentary Secretary and a Political Sec
retary. Dato1 Asri was given the post of a Federal Minister
as well as the post of the National Council of Malaysian Is
lamic Affairs. PAS members would also be given the opportuni
ty of being included in the committees, boards.and corpora
tions (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:187).
In return, it was agreed that two Alliance members
would join the Kelantan Executive Council, thus giving the
Alliance participation in the administration of Kelantan
State Government. The two parties also agreed not to contest
against each other in the by-elections in any constituency
formerly won by PAS or Alliance.
From the standpoint of UMNO, the coalition with PAS
was vital for the Malay unity and for reducing politicking
so that all energies could be devoted to the implementation
of the New Economic Policy. The Alliance also desired coa
lition with PAS in order to reduce political outbidding.
PAS motives motives in concluding the coalition agreement
was more difficult to discern. The party claimed that it
entered the coalition for the sake of national unity. How-
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ever, other possible motives may include the following:

the

weakening of PAS influence in Kelantan and the other
northern states; the implementation of the Sedition (Amend
ment) Act of 1971 and the Constitution (Amendment) Act which
prohibited any party from using sensitive issues had also
affected PAS.

Another reason could be the need for federal

assistance for the development of the state of Kelantan.
PAS was also experiencing leadership crisis.

Dato' Asri

hoped that by entering the coalition he could preserve his
leadership.(Milne and Mauzy, 1980:188).

According to Alias

Mohamad, it was the changes in UMNO's leadership in the
post-1 9 6 9 period which encouraged PAS to agree to the coali
tion.

Tengku Abdul Rahman was viewed by PAS as a "colonial

relic" who lacked the understanding about Malay predicament,
while his successor, Tun Abdul Razak, presented a different
image— an image of a man who was dedicated to the uplift of
the lots of the poor Malays— and this strategy was approved
by PAS (1978:177).
Having completed coalition agreements with all the major
opposition parties, Tun Razak embarked on creating a formal
organization which would unite these coalition partners
on a more permanent basis.

On June 1, 197^+j the formal

organization called the Barisan Nasional (National Front)
was registered as a confederation of political parties.

At

the time of the registration, there were nine political
perties in the National Front:

UMNO, the MCA and the MIC.
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PAS, the Gerakan, SUPP, Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu, the
PPP and the Sabah Alliance.

Tun Razak was appointed as

chairman with Michael Chen as secretary and Dato' Asri
as treasurer.

It was also agreed by all the component

parties to use a common National Front symbol (the scale
of justice) and to contest the future elections under this
symbol.

The Alliance symbol would no longer be used.

It

was also agreed that as the leader of the National Front,
Tun Razak would have the final say in the selection of all
the National Front candidates.
In forming the National Front, Tun Razak’s main
consideration was to reduce political tensions and political
outbidding so as to lessen the possibility of further
disturbances on the

1969

scale.

He also wanted to devote

all energies and resources for the implementation of the
New Economic Policy (NEP).

Equally important was his

genuine desire to establish the broadest possible political
consensus in the country.
Basically, the National Front is similar to the Alliance
in its organization except that the National Front is a
broader and more inclusive coalition.

Like the Alliance,

the National Front is also based on elite accommodation.
The administration of the National Front was to be handled
by a Supreme Council with the leaders of each component
party represented on it.

The National Front also allowed

greater representation of non-Malay political parties in the
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governmental affairs but at the same time, the superior po
sition of UMNO is more pronounced than it was before.
Major Developments
Within The National Front Coalition
The National Front had undergone further consolidation,
changes and expansion since its formation in 1974.

The

Sarawak National Party (SNAP) joined the National Front
June 1976,

in

SNAP's senior Vice-President, Edmund Langgu was

appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture and two SNAP

mem

bers were made parliamentary secretaries.
The official reasons cited by SNAP for joining the

Na

tional Front was to participate in the implementation of
the Third Malaysia Plan,
with the detention

However, the key motive had to do

of its president, Datuk James Wong,

SNAP hoped that by joining the National Front Datuk
would be released.

James

The motives of the Federal Government

in accepting SNAP into the coalition include:

to

prevent

the danger of Iban alienation in Sarawak by including

them

in the sharing of power and to reduce politicking in Sarawak,
so that greater attention could be given to development
(Mauzy, 1978:319).
Two other political parties from Sabah were also admit
ted into the National Front coalition in June 1976.

They

were Berjaya and USNO (the United Sabah National Organiza
tion) which was formed in December 1961 by Tun Datu Mustapha
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bin Datu Harun.
the Muslims.

Most of the support for the USNO came from

USNO has been the most powerful partner in

the Sabah Alliance.

Berjaya was formed by ex-USNO members

who had been dissatisfied with Tun Mustapha’s methods of
running Sabah.

On the other hand, PAS was expelled from the

National Front in December 1977 9 following strained relations
with UMNO, the National Front and top federal leaders.

The

main factor which led to the break-up was the Kelantan
crisis.

In 197^» Datuk Mohd. Nasir from PAS was appointed

as the Menteri Besar(Chief Minister) of Kelantan at the in
sistence of Tun Abdul Razak and much against the wishes of
Dato' Asri.

Datuk Mohd, Nasir set out to clean up the

state Government and began cancelling forest concessions and
repossessing alienated lands and pressed for investigations
into land deals made by the previous PAS State Government.
This embarrased Dato' Asri whose reasons for joining the
National Front included to avoid such an investigation.
Dato' Asri and the Kelantan PAS Liaison Committee pressed
for the resignation of Datuk Mohd. Nasir but Datuk Mohd.
Nasir refused to resign and the PAS Liaison Committee passed
a vote of no confidence against him and later expelled him
from the party.

Mass demonstrations held by the supporters

of Datuk Mohd. Nasir were later turned into riotings and
spasmodic violence.
The Federal Government imposed a state of Emergency in
Kelantan, ignoring PAS threats of quitting the National
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Front if such an action was taken.

When the Parliament

tabled the Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Bill 1977, PAS joined
the DAP in voting against the Bill.

The National Front Su

preme Council in its special meeting on December 5, 1977
passed a decision which required that PAS expelled its mem
bers who had voted against the Emergency Bill.

The

PAS

leaders decided that PAS could not accept the National Front's
ruling.

The National Front Supreme Council in the meeting

held on December 13, 1977 passed a deadline requiring that
PAS expel

its MPs before December 19, 1977*

If the

date

line was not met, PAS would be automatically expelled.

PAS

remained adamant and announced that it considered itself
expelled from the Front.
The National Front And The Post 1969 Elections
Barely three months after its registration as a politi
cal party, the National Front announced its readiness to go
to the polls.

The 197*t elections were to be held in August

and it was a contest for 15*t parliamentary seats and
360 State Assembly seats.

for

However, from the beginning,

was clear that the elections were going to be more in

it
the

nature of referendum than a contest to see who would govern.
Due to the restrictions imposed by the Sedition Act, the
campaigns were conducted in an atmosphere of restraint. The
campaign issues, therefore, centered on personalities
on the economy.

and

The National Front campaigns focused
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primarily on six issues: national unity, national security,
the economy, foreign policy, religion and social services
(Mauzy, 1978:270).
In these elections, the National Front won an overwhelm
ing victory.

The Front won 10lf out of 114 parliamentary

seats in West Malaysia and 31 out of 40 in Sabah and Sarawak,
making a total of 134 seats out of 154 parliamentary seats.
This equalled approximately 87 percent of the seats and 60.7
percent of the popular votes (Crouch, 1980:7).

The National

Front also did well in the State Assembly elections, obtain
ing a clear majority in every state, including in the diffi
cult states of Sarawak, Kelantan, Penang and Perak.
In the 1978 federal elections, the Front again obtained
an overwhelming victory both at the Federal and State levels.
In these elections, the Front won 131 out of the 154 parlia
mentary seats, 4 less than in 1974.

The reduction of

the

Front's share of the seats was mainly due to the withdrawal
of PAS from the National Front coalition.
The main opponents of the Front in these elections were
PAS and the DAP.

PAS managed to win only 5 seats but

the

DAP won 16 seats.

The DAP was clearly a major threat

to

the Front.

Like the 1974 elections, the tempo of the cam

paigning was also restrained due to the Constitution (Amend
ment) Act.

The main form of campaigns were the "ceramah"

(dialogue) sessions, held normally at the supporters' houses
and the house to house campaign.
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In these elections, the National Front Manifesto pledged
to devote serious efforts to eradicate poverty, to uplift
the lots of the Malays, to encourage investments and to en
hance the quality of life (Indorf, 1978:219)• The manifesto
also emphasized the ruling party's record in achieving eco
nomic development and ethnic accommodation which had brought
stability and prosperity to the country.
In the 1982 federal elections held in April 1982, the
Front again won with overwhelming majority. It captured
132 parliamentary seats (out of 15^)* representing about
88,9 percent of the total seats. It did equally well in the
State Assembly elections, winning 281 seats out of the total
of 312 seats in West Malaysia (Mala.vsian Digest. May 15, 1982:
3), Though there was only an increase of only two
mentary seats over the 1978 elections, in the

parlia

process, the

Front routed its main opponent, the DAP, which lost 9 pre
sumably safe seats in their own heartland in Peninsular
Malaysia. The DAP managed to retain only 6 parliamentary seats.
The 1982 elections were held one year in advance because
the new Prime Minister who took over the post of Prime Minis
tership following the retirement of Datuk Hussein Onn,deci
ded to seek a fresh mandate from the people, so that he
would be able in a better position to implement his policies.
The National Front campaign slogan was vote for a
"clean, efficient and trustworthy governmnt," As in the past
elections, the Front's manifesto also emphasized economic
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development, the importance of industrialization, eradic
tion of poverty and safeguarding of religious freedom.
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CHAPTER V

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
AND THE SUCCESS OF THE COALITION
The main aspect of leadership role that will be

empha

sized in this chapter is that of overarching elite coopera
tion.

In Malaysia, the coalition party system is able

survive and remain stable because the political elite

to
re

cognized the need to cooperate, have been willing to coope
rate and have worked out rules and agreements for such

co

operation as indicated by the compromises and the bargains.
It is hypothesized here that similarities in their educa
tional and socio-economic backgrounds have given rise

to

similarities in their political outlook and attitudes.
test this hypothesis, this chapter will examine the

To

main

characteristic of political leadership of the coalition,
focussing on their socio-economic-ge*ographic backgrounds to
find out their main similarities and differences.

This

is

then complemented by examining in detail the political so
cialization and the role of the three previous Prime Minis
ters in their capacity as the leaders of the coalition. The
leaders to be examined are Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun
Razak and Datuk Hussein Onn.

Abdul

The data on their backgrounds

are obtained mostly from Who’s Who Malaysia. Funston, Malay
Politics in Malaysia and Ibrahim Mahmood, Seiarah Periuangan
83
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Malaysia and Ibrahim Mahmud, Se.iarah Periuangan Bangsa Melavu.
Political leadership in this study refers to those per
sons holding high political office and are involved in the
decision-making process.

In the Alliance/National Front

coalition, leadership is concentrated in the hands of a
small group of people, the national leaders of the component
parties of the coalition.

Within this group, UMNO's nation

al leaders play the most important role.

According to Milne

and Mauzy, because of the predomince of UMNO, the styles of
leadership are basically Malay styles which in turn affect
non-Malay styles (1980:357)*
Characteristics of the Political Leadership
With Special Referrence to Educational Background
On the whole, the national leaders of the ruling coali
tion, irrespective of their racial background, shared many
things in common.

Most of them are English-educated, West

ern oriented and came from the upper strata of the society.
By virtue of their English education, they are less affected
by primordial attachments and the basic communal cleavages
found in the society and are, therefore, able to provide
the main channels of inter-communal communication.

The

original leaders of the Alliance such as the Tunku, Tun
Abdul P.asak, Tun Sambanthan and Tan Cheng Lock had been
responsible for working out the major consociationai ar
rangement that had helped to preserve peace in the country
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Through the compromises, they were able to some extent

to

bring together the diverse social, racial and cultural
elements found within the society and satisfy their compet
ing demands. The importance of being English-educated

is

best described by Means in these words: "A fractured

so

ciety was insecurely bound together at the top by its small
English speaking, westernised elite." (1970:1*17)
Tables 1 and 2 and Appendix A are attempts to note
socio-educational-geographic backgrounds of the Alliance/
National Front leaders at the national level. The

data

tabulated are those of the known ministers from 1955 to
1981 (a few ministers may have been left out). The tabula
tion is divided into three periods to coincide with three
different eras under the three previous Prime Ministers:
1955-1970 (Tunku Abdul Rahman's Cabinet); 1970-1975 (Tun
Abdul Razak's cabinet); and 1976-1981 (Datuk Hussein's
cabinet)•
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TABLE 1

Educational Background of the Alliance and
National Front’s Cabinet Ministers (1955-1981)
(in numbers and percentages)
Malay Ministers

English Ed,
L
U

T

T

R

H

(3*3%)

i—tR
•

S
(2020

Na

H

12
13
20
(60%) (50)0 (66,620

C

P

R

Malay Ed.

6
2
(2350(6.6%)

Malay & Islamic
Ed.
T
R
H
2
1
(7.7%) (3.3%)
1
1
(3.8%) (3.3%)
(5%)

3
4
2
(15%)(15.4%)(6.6%)
2
(6.6%)
16
3
4
5
1 3
2
19
23
(8050 (73%) (76.5%) (15%) (15.4%) (16.5%) (5%) (11 .550(6.6%)

L= level of education, U= University education,
C= College education, S= Secondary education,
P= Primsiry Education, Na= not available
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Non-Malay Ministers

English Ed.
L

T

U

R

Others
H

4
4
14
(30.7%) (36.4%) (77.7%)
6
2
5
(46.2%) (45.5%) (11.1%)
-

C
S
P
Na
Total

10
16
9
(76.9%) (31.8%) (88.8%)

T

R

H

2
2
3
(23.1%) (18.2%) (11.1%)
2
2
3
(23.1%) (18.2%) (11.1%)

L= level of education, U=University education,
U= College education, S= Secondary education,
P= Primary education, Na= not available
Table -1 demonstrates the predominance of the Englisheducated among the coalition leaders. For UMNO an average
of about 78 percent of its national leaders were educated
in English medium and about 55 percent of this category had
tertiary education. The trends towards tertiary education
among the Malay and non-Malay leaders have increased over
the years. For the non-Malay leaders of the coalition, an
average of about 83 percent received English education.
A large proportion of the Alliance and the

National

Front cabinet ministers had law degrees from foreign uni
versities.

These include the first three Prime Ministers.
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There have been fears expressed that with the emergence
of the new second generation leaders, the stability of the
coalition might be threatened since they tended to be more
compartmentalized in their outlook (Means, 1970:417).

How

ever, thus far, the emergence of these leaders have not
affected the stability of the coalition in any significant
way.

This is because the second generation leaders who are

now assuming power have much in common with the original
leaders, particularly in their educational background.
Some of these leaders who had been branded as " radicals"
or extremists in the past have become moderates due to
maturity and experience gained over the years.
Social Status of Political Leaders
Host of the Alliance national leaders also came from
similar social background.

The leaders of UMNO who served

as cabinet ministers, in the initial stages came from high
social status, particularly from aristocratic and bureaucracratic backgrounds.

According to Neuman, majority of Malay

legislators prior to 1964 came from wealthy families.

Her

findings revealed that about 45 percent of UMNO legislators
came from this group (1971:113).

Since 1964 there have been

an increasing number of UMNO leaders who came from middle
class background.

The three fromer Prime Ministers came

from upper class background.

The Tunku is the son of the

Sultan of Kedah, while Tun Abdul Pazak and Datuk Hussein Onn
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came from aristocratic families.
Leadership position within the MCA and the MIC also ap
pear to have been derived from economic wealth and

power.

Most of the leaders of the MCA came from the wealthy and
influential Chinese commercial class. Sir Tan Cheng Lock,
one of the founders of the MCA, was the son of Tan Cheng
Bock who was the founder of the first line of steamship in
the Straits Settlements. Sir Tan Cheng Lock himself was a
large proprietary rubber planter. Tan Siew Sin who

became

the President of the MCA from 1961 to 197A- is the son
Sir Tan Cheng Lock.

of

Tan Siew Sin also managed the family's

business before joining politics. Other leaders such

as

Colonel H.S. Lee, Ong Yoke Lin also came from influential
families of the Chinese community.
Similarly, leadership position in the MIC have also been
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy merchant class. Tun
V.T. Sambanthan, MIC's President from 195^ to 1973» was a
rubber planter before becoming actively involved in politics
while Tan Sri V. Manikavasagam began his life as a business
man and a landed proprietor as was his father.
Recruitment Pattern of Political Leadership
The national leaders of the coalition, particularly UMNO
leaders, are predominantly drawn from a bureaucratic

back

ground. The non-Malay party leaders came mostly from

com

mercial background and professionals (see Table 2).
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TABLE 2

Cabinet Ministers: Pattern of Recruitment
(1955-1981)
Malay Ministers

1955-■1970

1971-1975

1976-1981

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

Bureaucracy

16

64

12

46.2

10

32.3

Professional

7

28

10

38.5

14

45.2

Business

1

4

1

3.8

1

3.2

Others

1

4

1

3.8

2

7.7

6

19.3

Occupation

Unknown
Total

25

100)4

26

100)4

31

100)4

Non-Malay Ministers

1971-1975

1976-1981
r./
JO

%

No.

%

No.

Bureaucracy

4

28.7

2

16.6

6

31.6

Professional

1

7.1

1

8.3

6

31.6

Business

7

7

58.3

4

21

Others

1

7.1

1

8.3

Unknown

1

7.1

1

8.3

3

15.8

19

o
o
t—

Total

50

12

100)4
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o
o
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Date and Place of Birth
Date and place of birth of political leaders are assumed
to have some influence on their attitudes, particularly to
wards elite cooperation. Leaders of the same generational
group are believed to have a better working relationship.
For UMNO, prior to 1970, most of its leaders were

born

before 1920. Almost half of the cabinet ministers who served
under Tunku Abdul Rahman were born in the pre-1920. The next
largest group of UMNO leaders were born in the early 1920s.
For the MCA, most of its leaders were also born prior

to

the 1920s. Under Tun Abdul Razak, majority of UMNO leaders
were born in the early 1920s. However, for the non-Malay
party leaders during this period, those born prior to 1920
are still dominant. This is because the same leaders con
tinue to hold ministership posts well into the 1970s. From
the middle of the 1970s there is a considerable increase in
the number of young leaders, particularly those born in the
1930s for both the Malays and the non-Malays in the

ruling

coalition.
The analysis of the age factor also reveals another in
teresting fact: that is, the remarkable stability of the
political leadership in Malaysia, which, in turn, contributes
to the stability of the coalition. The majority of the
leaders remain as cabinet ministers for a long period

of
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time* Out of 18 full ministers in 1969s at least seven have
been holding ministership posts since 1955» They include
the Prime Minister (Tunku Abdul Rahman), Deputy Prime Minis
ter (Tun Abdul Razak), Tun Dr. Ismail, Tan Sri Sardon Jubir,
Tun Sambanthan, Tun Tan Siew Sin and Encik Khir Johari.

In

the 1974 cabinet line up, six had been ministers since 1957
and another six had been cabinet ministers since early
1960s. In the 1978/1979 cabinet line up, one minister

had

been holding the post of a cabinet minister since 1959 (Tan
Sri Manikavasagam). During this period, there was a prepon
derance of the leaders who had been ministers since the
1960s and early 1970s.
This continuity in the leadership is believed to promote
cohesiveness and closer interaction between the leaders

of

the constituent parties of the coalition, which in turn con
tributes to the success and the stability of the coalition.
As for the geographic background, the majority

of

leaders cf the Alliance/National Front come from the

the

west

coast states of Peninsula Malaysia. This could be another
factor that helped to shape the outlook of the leaders

in

regard to cooperation. The Malay community in the west coast
states, due to their exposure and closer contact with

the

non-Malay communities, have been less conservative in their
communal views compared to the Malays in the east coast
states of Kelantan and Trengganu.
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Majority of the UMNO leaders come from the west

coast

states with Johore providing nearly twice as many national
leaders as any other states* Pahang, Kedah and Perak provide
about the same number of leaders* The rise of Pahang

and

Kedah appears to have been connected with the election

of

the Tunku and Tun Razak as the Presidents of UMNO. As

for

the non-Malay party leaders, Perak appears to top the list,
followed by Selangor, Pahang and Malacca*
The Role of Prime Ministers in the Coalition
The success of the Alliance was attributed partly to the
efforts of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman*
Parmer describes Tunku in the following words: "The Tunku
has been a powerful influence for political unity in Malaya*
Son of a Sultan of Kedah, he is trully a national leader,
liked and respected by members of all racial communities and
considered fair and tolerant*" (1963:236)

This view

was

shared by Ratnam and Milne who write: "The Alliance is for
tunate in having a leader (Tunku Abdul Rahman) who enjoys
wide support from all sections of the population and whose
stature within the party is a valuable aid in resolving in
ternal conflicts*" (1967:^2)

The Tunku is also considered

as "more than a leader, more than an institution. He is a
nation." (Morais, 1965:xxxi)
The Tunku was born on February 8, 1903 to Sultan

Abdul

Halim Shah of Kedah. His mother was the daughter of a
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chieftain of one of the Siamese Shan states.

Being a

royalty gave him an added qualification to govern, parti
cularly to the Malays.

He received his early education in

English and Malay in Kedah and Siamese education in Bangkok.
Later he enrolled at St. Catherine College, England and
graduated in 1925.

Upon getting his degree, he came back

to Malaya but was sent back to England to take up law at the
Inner Temple.

He failed his examination and came back to

Malaya in 1931 and worked in Kedah State Civil Service as
a District Officer.

As a District Officer, he devoted all

his energies to this task and sometimes he resisted the
British in order to protect the interests of the peasants*
As the result, he became very popular with the peasants.

In

1946, he returned to England to resume his legal studies
and became a barrister in 1949 at the age of 46.
After World War 11, he worked together with Dato1 Onn
to unite the Malays in UMNO and in 1951, he became the Pre
sident of UMNO when Dato* Onn left the party to form the
IMP.

He

was the leader of the independent movement and

his greatest triumph came when Malaysia was given indepen
dence in 1957*

He was awarded the title of "Bapa Merdeka"

(Father of Independence).

He was also the architect of the

Alliance formula— the bargain and the compromises, which
was later incorporated into the constitutional system.
During his 14 years as the Prime Minister and the lead
er of the Alliance, he had to face crisis after crisis caused

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55

by the ultra-nationalistic Malays and the chauvinistic
elements in the MCA.

Believing in racial harmony, his

greatest test of strength came when he resisted demand by
certain sections in UMNO who insisted that the MCA be
given minimal seats in the 1955 elections.

By threatening

to resign, he managed to get his wayand gave a fairer pro
portion of seats to the MCA.
that he should support

To the Malays

who insisted

only the Malays, the Tunku warned

that "to advocate such intolerance is highly dangerous.

It

is so vicious and potentially explosive that it must be
stopped." (Morais, 1965=xxxii).

He also stood firm in the

face of Chinese demand to make Chinese as one of the national
languages.

It was through his negotiating skill that the

crisis was averted and the Alliance was able to face the
1955 elections from the position of strength.

In 1959 j another crisis occured within
which really threatened to break it apart.

the Alliance
The crisis was

the result of MCA's publicized demand for more seats. His
strongest objection was the way the demand was made with
out the usual process of negotiation and compromises. As
the result of his firmness, the MCA backed down and the
Alliance was again able to face the 1959 elections as a
coalition.

The victory of the Alliance in the 1959 elec

tions was also

uue to his personal efforts.

sensing that the Alliance might

In

1959 >

face a strong challenge

in the forthcoming elections, he resigned from the.post
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of premiership to devote all his energies to the

Alliance

Party. He travelled extensively throughout the country
strenghten the Alliance machinery and to have closer

to
con

tacts with the people. He used his own money to pay for the
expenses of the tour. He was sworn in as the Prime Minister
for the second time in August 1959» following the Alliance
victory.
The Tunku was also responsible for the formation of
Malaysia and was honored with the title of nBapa Malaysia"
(Father of Malaysia). In 196ft- elections, he again led

the

Alliance to a resounding victory.
The Tunku*s style of rule was personal (Milne and Mauzy,
1980:357)* He attached great importance to personal loyalty.
He exercised strong personal leadership over UMNO

and

the

Alliance. He also performed the vital role as the ultimate
"court of last resort" or the arbiter. He preferred to avoid
partisan role on the behalf of UMNO. This is crucial for the
smooth functioning of the Alliance, for by such action

he

appeared in the eyes of the leaders of the constituent par
ties of the coalition as a fair and tolerant person. When
issues arose in the Alliance, he allowed the leaders of the
constituent parties to make their demand and to engage

in

the process of negotiated settlement. When there was dead
lock over any controversial issues, the Tunku would inter
vene to work out an acceptable compromise and if necessary
to make the final decisions.
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The Tunku also possessed a quality which induced people
to like him. Though he is a prince, he has the heart

of

a

commoner, having lived most of his life among common people.
According to Willard Hannah, the Tunku is very easy to like
and hard to dislike. He excelled in getting people

to

concile their differences (1963:3)• Since he liked to

re
meet

people, he enjoyed his busy work schedule of elections,
state visits, country tours and public appearances.
The Tunku resigned from the post of premier in September
1970. Some Malays tend to blame him for neglecting the Malays
and giving in too much to the non-Malay demands. Nevertheless,
he is still one of the most successful leaders in the new na
tions in the twentieth century (Funston, 1980:113). The Tunku
was succeeded by the. Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak.
Tun Abdul Razak
As The Leader Of The Coalition
Tun Abdul Razak was born on March 11, 1922 in the royal
town of Pekan, Pahang. He had his primary education

in

a

Malay school. Though he was the son of one of the four major
chiefs of Pahang, he was sent to school on bicycle instead
of by the family car. Later he enrolled in the prestigious
Malay College in Perak and Raffles College in Singapore. In
1947j he went to England to study law at Lincoln Inn and
passed his Bar Finals in April 1949* In 1950, he joined the
Malayan Civil Service and at the age of 28 he was appointed
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Chief Secretary of Pahang, the highest rank of the

state

bureaucracy, he was also a member of the Federal Council un
til 1955» I-n- February of that year, ne was appointed Acting
Chief Minister of Pahang but resigned in June in order

to

contest the 1955 elections. Following his victory, he was
appointed Minister of Education. In 1956> he was included
in the group that negotiated for Malayan independence, led
by the Tunku. In September 1957» Tun Razak was appointed
the Deputy Prime Minister for the newly independent Malaya.
In addition to being the Deputy Prime Minister, he also held
the Portfolios of Minister of Defense and Minister of Rural
Development. From June 1967 to May 1969» he also held

the

fortfolio of Minister of Internal Security. Following

the

racial riots of 1969 and the declaration of the state

of

Emergency, he was made Director of the National Operations
Council.
Tun Razak became Prime Minister on September 22, 1970.
At the same time he also held the portfolio of Foreign Af
fairs and Minister of Defense. As Prime Minister, he was
also Chairman of the National Action Council and the National
Unity Council. Tun Razak was the architect of the

National

Front— a framework for Malaysian consensus. Ke was a skilled
negotiator and through his negotiating skill, he was able to
co-opt most of the opposition parties into the coalition and
thus reducing political outbidding and politicking. As the
leader of the National Front, he also played the role

of
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arbitrator.

He was often called to intervene or settle

conflicts in the constituent parties of the coalition.
Tun Razak was also responsible for the formulation
of the New Economic Policy which aimed at promoting national
unity through the two-pronged objectives of poverty eradi
cation and restructuring of society.

He also travelled

extensively throughout the country to see the progress of
the projects and to see the effects of the projects on the
people.
In his political style, he preferred the indirect
approach rather than frontal assault (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:
361).

This indirect approach was often used in dismissals

of the leaders from office.

He would offer a face-saving

exit, such as by offering another less important post.
This v/as best illustrated in the case of Datuk Harun bin
Idris, the former Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Selangor
and the leader of the UMNO Youth.

Before Datuk Harun was

brought to trial for corruption, he was offered the post
of Ambassador to the United Nations.
Despite UMNO's dominance in the Front, the leaders of
the other constituent parties of the Front had trust and
confidence in him and he was able to assuage the non-Malay
fears.

Endorsement to Tun Razak's policy of accommodation

and stability was clearly demonstrated in the resounding
victory obtained by the Front in the 1974 elections.

The

victory was particularly significant because it took place
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immediately following the registration of the National Front
as a political party. This election was viewed as a crucial
test of support of the people for Tun Razak (Mauzy, 1978:267)•
The National Front campaigns in these elections focused
mainly on the theme of confidence in Tun Razak and the
non-Malay parties of the Front, particularly the MCA and the
PPP played up Tun Razak's visit to China to normalize rela
tions (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:198).
Tun Razak died suddenly on January 14, 1976 in London
after suffering from leukaemia for six years. Prior to his
death, not even his friends knew that he was battling with
the disease because he kept up his tight schedule of work
and performing his duties as usual. When he died, an edito
rial tribute summed up his leadership and achievement: "Tun
Razak had built up a development strategy which, if it did
not satisfy the aspirations of all, was acceptable as

the

only workable compromise between mutually contradictory ex
pectations of the various sectors of Malaysian society. It
was accepted because of the confidence the Tun was able to
inspire as a fair and just leader" (Far Eastern Economic
Review. January 23 > 1976:5)* The Tun was succeeded by Datuk
Hussein Onn who was then the Deputy Prime Minister of Malay
sia.
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Datuk Hussein Onn
As the Leader of the National Front Coalition
Datuk Hussein is the son of Dato'Onn bin Jaafar,

the

founder of UMNO. He was born in 192** in Johore Bharu. Datuk
Hussein entered Johore Military Force as a cadet. He had
military training at the Military Academy Dehra Dunn, India,
following which he joined the Indian army.
In 1942, he was sent to Egypt, Syria, Palestine and
Iraq. Thereafter, he served with the intelligence branch of
the military headquarters in New Delhi. In mid-19/f5, Captain
Hussein Onn was sent back to Malaya and was appointed as
Commandent of Police Depot in Johore Bharu.
He joined UMNO following its formation by his father,
Dato'Onn, and was elected Secretary General and Head of UMNO
Youth Division. He was at this time a captain in the Johore
Military Forces. Following the demobilization of the Johore
Military Forces, Hussein Onn joined the Malay Administrative
Service and served as an Assistant District Officer for
Kuala Selangor. He was appointed Federal Councillor in 1950»
At the same time, he was also a member of the Johore State
Executive Council. While serving as a member of Integrity
Service, he decided to study law at Lincoln Inn. In 1958>
he passed his Bar Final and returned to Malaya.
He rejoined UMNO in 1964 and was appointed a member of
UMNO Executive Council in June 1965 and reelected in January
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1971* Datuk Hussein was appointed Minister of Education

in

September 1970. He was elected one of the vice-presidents
of UMNO in 1972. In August 1973* he was elected Deputy Pres
ident of UMNO at its Supreme Council Meeting. Datuk Hussein
was appointed Deputy Prime Minister on August 13, 1973» fol
lowing a cabinet reshuffle. He also held the portfolio

of

the Trade and Industry.
Datuk Hussein became Prime Minister during one of the
turbulent periods in the nation's history. UMNO's unity was
being threatened by power struggle between the older gener
ation and the new leaders brought into the cabinet by Tun
Abdul Razak. The problem of Communist insurgency also began
to rear its ugly head again.
Datuk Hussein shunned personal publicity. To him duty
to the nation was above everything. He used to say "Me, I
am not important, my work is important" (Das, 1976:10). When
he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, he was quoted to
have said: "What is high office? It only means greater reposibilities. What are we for? People don't give us power
to satisfy our personal wants* They expect us to help. This
trust you must discharge." (Morais, 1979:PA 31)
Unlike Tun Razak, Hussein Onn was more direct in his
political style. His firmness and decisiveness in dealingwith difficult situations dispelled earlier doubts that he
was a weak man. His firmness was demonstrated in the case
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of Datuk Harun. Despite warnings that court actions against
Datuk Harun might split UMNO, he pursued the case and in
the end had Datuk Harun convicted for corruption. He also
toppled another powerful person Tun Datu Mustapha,the Chief
Minister of Sabah who was turning the state into his own
fiefdom. His firmness in handling these cases won him re
spects from the men in the streets.
Like his predecessors, Datuk Hussein was also a leader
with moderate views whose cherished vision was to see

a

united Malaysia. This is a continuation of his youthful
dreams when he and his father left UMNO, after failing to
open the party to other races. He viewed that national unity
can be achieved through economic policies, especially by
making the economic cake bigger, so that every racial group
can have equal share.
He continued the consociational practice of Tun Razak.
He had shown high statesmanship and calibre in dealing with
several communal issues in UMNO and the-National Front and
as a result, there was high confidence in his leadership.
By 1978, he was able to consolidate the position of UMNO and
the National Front, so that the party was in the state

of

confidence when it contested the 1978 general elections.
The Front again won an overwhelming victory in these elec
tions. Datuk Hussein resigned in the middle of 1981, fol
lowing a coronary by-pass operation. By the time of his de
parture, the position of the Front had been consolidated
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and most of the internal issues had been settled.
On the whole, the role of political leaders has proved
to be crucial for the success and the stability of the party.
The fortunes of the party depends to a large extent on their
ability to work together in a cooperative spirit. The poli
tical leadership of the ruling coalition has been able

to

bridge the basic communal cleavages in the society and

to

provide an important channel for meaningful inter-communal
contacts.
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CHAPTER V I

THE ROLE OF UMNO IN THE C O A LITIO N

The following pages of this chapter will examine
position and the role of UMNO in the Alliance and the

the
Na

tional Front coalition, to analyse how its dominant position
has contributed to the stability and the success of the co
alition. In particular, the following factors will be

ana

lyzed: the electoral strength of UMNO; the sources of UMNO's
electoral strength; the political attitudes of the Malays
with special reference to UMNO; UMNO's mobilization methods
and the position of the other component parties in the coa
lition vis-a-vis UMNO.
UMNO is clearly the senior partner and the leader of the
Alliance and the National Front coalition. Since the attain
ment of independence, UMNO has been the backbone of the
Malaysian government (Crouch, 1980:11). The party

is

the

largest, the oldest and the best organized, not only in the
coalition but also in the country. UMNO has provided the
nation with top leaders including every Prime Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister. Other key posts such as the Minister
of Home Affairs, Foreign Minister, Finance, Defense and In
formation are also being held by UMNO politicians. A large
proportion of cabinet ministers also came from the ranks of
105
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UMNO. The leaders of UMNO have also been responsible

for

setting up rules for racial accommodation and for the for
mulation of the country's political and economic policies.
Despite UMNO's supremacy, genuine bargaining did occur
within the coalition and political issues are often settled
through compromised solutions (Mauzy, 1978:120). Given the
dominant position of UMNO in the Malaysian politics, it is
maintained in this chapter that only UMNO is capable

of

forming a large central position coalition and it is also
its politics of accommodation that has held the
coalition together as well as the stability of

Malaysian
Malaysian

polity. UMNO's powerful position is derived primarily from
the overwhelming support it receives from the Malays as
well as the historical identification of Malays as the in
digenous race. This dominance is further reinforced by the
willingness of the other partners to recognize the
pre-eminence of the Malay community. In 1955> the Malays
made up of about 82 percent of the total electorate

in

Malaya. Since 1959» however, their superiority has dimin
ished slightly but they are still dominant. The number

of

the Malay electorate up to 1974 is indicated in table 3»
The Malays also form a majority in a large number of con
stituencies. In 1955> they accounted for more then 50 per
cent of the electorate in 50 out of 52 constituencies. In
1964> the Malays also formed a majority in nearly 60 percent
of the total constituencies of 104. The preponderance of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

niavG

in the constituencies in 1955 was because they formed

a ,”ood majority of the country's citizens. In addition,
about

75

percent of the Chinese and Indian Federal citizens

were under 21 years of age in 1955 and therefore, were not
eligible to vote. In the following elections, the Halay pre
ponderance in the constituencies dwindled due to the increase
in the non-Malay voters as the result of 1957 constitutional
provision on citizenship. Nevertheless, the Malays are still
predominant in the majorities of the constituencies.

The

Malay majorities in the parliamentary constituencies in the
1959 and 1964 elections are shown in table 4.

TABLE 3
Communal Composition of the Peninsular
Malaysian Electorate in Parliamentary Election Years

Malays
Years

Number
(55)

Chinese
Number
(%)

Indian1

Total

Number
(55)

1955

1,077,562
(84.2)

142,947
(11.2)

60,356
(4.6)

1,280,865

1959

1.244.827
(57.1)

752,846
(34.5)

1 8 4,6 65

2,182,338

1964

1,503,836
(54.4)

1,039,264
(37.5)

223,438
(8.1)

2,706,531

1969

1,835,908
(55.7)

1,055,958
(36.3)

264,890
(8.0)

3,296,256

1974

1.971,305
(57.9)

1,176,361
(34.5)

258,995
(7.6)

3,406,661

(8.5)

1 Includes all communities except Malays and Chinese.
Source: Sothi Pachagan, 1980. p. 269

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108

TABLE if
Humber of Parliamentary Constituencies
With Various Racial Majorities; 1959 and 196if

Malay absolute majority over all
other races
Malay RelativeMajority
Total

1959

196if

60

59

3

3

63

62

1959

196if

Chinese absolute majority over all
other races

26

32

Chinese majority

15

10

if!

if2

Total

Source: K.J. Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamen
tary Election of 196A. 1967» p. 368
UMNO enjoys overwhelming support of all the elements in
Malay society mainly because of its past record, particularly
its role in resisting the British Malayan Union and in
achieving independence for Malaya. Its success in mobilizing
the Malays against the Malayan Union had gained it an

in

stant image of a successful mass political party (Funston,
1980:79). The appeal of the Malays to UMNO is also the re
sult of its economic as well as its education policies. How
ever, the most important factor is to be found in the poli
tical culture of the Malays; that is, the political attitudes
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of the Malays towards their leaders.
Political Attitudes of the Malays
With Special Reference to UMNO
The Malays place high value upon ascribed status.
They accord highest prestige and status to their traditional
leaders, especially if the leaders have a royal or aristo
cratic ■background.

Even at the village level, the heredi

tary traditional leader is sometimes respected more than
the government appointee (Nagata,

1975:155)*

This system

of deference can be traced to the old feudal establishment,
whereby there was a sharp division of the Malay community
between the ruling and the subject class.

Each of Malay

states had its own sultan or ruler and the sultan was assis
ted by the senior and minor chiefs who often enjoyed near
autonomy in their own districts.

To the Malays government

was the sole business of the sultan and his chiefs.

Des

pite the changes brought by the colonial period, the basic
attitude of the Malays towards their leaders and their
preoccupation with status prevail.

Today rank and status

can be obtained not just by birth but also through occupa
tion, position, education and honorific titles awarded by
the ruler of each state or by the Yang Di Pertuan Agong.
The system of deference holds special importance to
UMNO, for, by securing the support of the Malay upper
class elites, it has been instrumental in maintaining the
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continuity between the Malay society and the new political
institutions based on democratic and public mass support,
(’loans, 1970:169).

In the words of Moore, the party "could

usurp the centralizing role played by the sultanate" (1 9 5 9 :
b5).

UMNO is therefore able to retain the support of the

Malays on the basis of traditional loyalties.

This can be

further illustrated by the fact that every president of UMNO
in the past (with the exception of the present Prime Minis
ter) came from a royal and an aristocratic background and
they commanded overwhelming support from the Malays.
The Malays have been inculcated with the value, that it
is impolite to challenge leaders and elders and " to the
Malay mind, to challenge him (the Prime Minister) would
amount to an act of heresy" (New Straits Times. 28 March,
1976).

A national leader is regarded by the Malays as a

father figure.

This explains why the election of the Prime

Minister for the post of UMNO's President has seldom been
challenged.

In the past, only Datuk Hussein Onn was chal

lenged for the post of UMNO's President but the challenge
was easily defeated.
Electoral Performance of UMNO
And Its Mobilization for Support
The strength of the Alliance was largely derived from
the ability of UMNO to retain the support of the Malay voters.
The electoral strength of UMNO is reflected from the seats
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it contested and won in all the elections held in the
country since 1955*
was almost total.

In the 1955 elections, its support
According to Ratnam and Milne, the most

notable feature of this election is that the overwhelming
support given to the Alliance was based principally on the
large numbers of votes cast for

UMNO (1967:368).

Another

significant feature of this election is that there was a
manifestation of non-communal trend in Malayan politics,
for some of the non-Malay candidates of the Alliance who
stood in the Malay dominated constituencies against the
Malay candidates of the Malay opposition parties managed
to win (Wahid, 1980:151-152).

In this election, the Malays

formed about 84 percent of the total electorate of 1,280,000
registered voters.

UMNO was allocated 35 seats, the MCA

15 seats and the MIC 2.
tary seats^.

Altogether there were 52 parliamen

The Alliance was said to be generous to the

MCA, considering that the Chinese electorate were only 11.
2 percent.

UMNO was able to win 34 seats out of 35 seats.

In the subsequent
slightly declined.

elections, the support for UMNO
However, since the formation of the

National Front in 1974, its performance at the polls has
improved considerably.

In the 1974 elections, the party

won all the 61 seats it contested* In 1982 elections,
it won 70 out of 73 seats.

Tables 5, 6, 7,8 and 9 indicate

the overall performance of UMNO in the elections since
1955.
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TABLE 5
Parliamentary Elections Results for Peninsular
Malaysia: Seats Won and Contested By The Alliance
During Election Years 1955> 1959* 1964 and 1969

Seats Contested
Parties

Seats Won

1955

1959

1964

1969

1955

1959

1964

1969

UMNO

35

70

68

67

34

52

59

51

MCA

15

31

33

33

15

19

27

13

MIC

2

3

3

3

2

3

3

2

Source: 1955 elections, Zainal Abidin Abdul Wahid, "The Rise
of Political Parties" in Zainal Abidin Abdul Wahid,
ed., Glimpses of Malaysian History, p. 151•
1959, 1964 and 1969 elections, R.K. Vasil, The 1969
Parliamentary Elections.
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TABLE 6
Parliamentary Elections For Peninsular
Malaysia: Seats Won and Contested By Component
Parties of the National Front in Election
Years 1974, 1978, and 1982

Seats Contested

Seats Won

1974

1978

1982

1974

1978

1982

UMNO

61

74

73

61

69

70

MCA

23

27

28

19

17

24

MIC

4

4

4

4

3

4

PAS

14

a

a

4

a

-

Gerakan

8

6

7

5

4

5

PPP

4

1

b

1

0

Parties

a.
b.

During 1978 election PAS was in the rank of opposition*
For 1982 election PPP was not given any seat.

Source:

1974 and 1978 elections, Harold Crouch.
"Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Elections." p. 309
1982 elections, data compiled from Malaysian papers.
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TABLE 7
State Election Results For Peninsular
Malaysia: Seats Won and Contested By Component
Parties Of The Alliance in 1959>
1964, and 1969 Elections

Seats Contested

Seats Won

Parties

1959

1964

1982

1959

1964

1969

UMNO

191

189

181

140

164

133

MCA

78

82

80

59

67

26

MIC

13

11

10

7

10

3

Source: Vasil, R .K., The Malaysian General Election _2£
19_6_9.._J9-72» p. 75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

TABLE 8
Parliamentary Elections far Peninsular
Malaysia: Votes Polled by Component Parties
Of the Alliance in 1959» 1964* 1969 and 1978
Elections (Percentage of the total)

Years
Parties

1959

1964

1969

1978

UMNO

35.94

38.14

33.67

3 6 .1 0

MCA

1 4 .8 2

1 8 .6 8

13.50

14.91

MIC

1 .0 2

_ 1.55

1 .2 4

2.21

Gerakan

-

-

-

3.24

PPP

-

-

-

0 .3 0

Figure for 1974 and 1982 elections are not available
Source:

Vasil, R.K. The Malayan General Election of 1Q6Q.
P . 85
1978 elections, Diane K. Mauzy, "The Malaysian
General Elections", Asian Survey. Vol. XIX, No. 3>
March 1979» p. 284
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TABLE 9
State Elections for Peninsular Malaysia: Votes
Polled by Component Parties of the Alliance and
National Front Coalition Party
In 1959> 1964* 1969 and 1978 Elections

Years
Parties

.1964

1969

1978

UMNO

36.98

37.70

33.50

34.99

MCA

16.29

17.39

12.71

13.75

MIC

2.25

2.53

1.74

2.68

Gerakan

-

-

-

4.59

PPP

-

-

-

.
-p00

1959

Figures for 1974 and 1982 elections are not available.
Source:

Vasil, R.K.
1960. p. 73

The Malavsian General Election of

1978 elections, Diane K. Mauzy, "The 1978 General
Elections", Asian Survey. Vol. XIX, No. 3> March
1979, p. 285
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The wide support received by UMNO was also due to its
extensive mobilization effort. As has been noted in Chapter
11 }the party machinery has penetrated the grass root through
its numerous branches in almost every part of the country.
In addition to the parent body, UMNO has two separate wings,
the UMNO Youth which mobilizes support among the youths and
the Women Section which helps mobilizing support among

the

women folks.
UMNO attaches great importance to the expansion of mem
bership. In 1963j UMNO's membership was estimated to be
300,000. Unfortunately, figures for the recent years are not
available. To be a member of the UMNO, a candidate has to be
a Malaysian citizen, at least 16 years of age, acknowledge
loyalty to the principles and organization of UMNO and must
not be a member of another political body. Application for
membership can be made at the branch level and the decision
to reject or accept can be made by the Branch .‘•xocutive.
Ultimately, however, this has to be approved by the Supreme
Council which also acts as the appeal board for those re
jected. UMNO Youth also accepts membership (under forty years
of age) but such members have first to qualify as ordinary
UMNO members (Funston, 1980:170). Application for UMNO mem
bership can also be made via an organization affiliated to
UMNO (that is an organization which is prepared to acknow
ledge full agreement witn UMNO ideology and to submit to the
guidance of the Supreme Council of UMNO on all matters)
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(Funston, 1980:170).
At the branch and the divisional levels, UMNO membership
is normally composed of minor government employees

such as

school teachers, clerks, village headmen and large land
owners. These personalities have been instrumental in mobi
lizing grass root support for UMNO. To attract membership,
fees are kept low. UMNO workers also undertake local welfare
projects and run political courses, particularly at the di
vision level.
Apart from gaining support from membership drives, UMNO
also resorted to the following ways to gain support: har
nessing the bureaucracy to the party needs, the distribution
of the government largesse and the indirect control of the
non-governmental mass media. Certain sections of the Minis
try of Information have been known to have assisted UMNO
during their field work by carrying surveys to assess the
weakness and strength of UMNO, particularly at the grass
root. The mobile film unit of the Ministry of Information
indirectly helps UMNO in publicizing the achievements

of

UMNO dominated coalition government. This unit travelled
throughout the country, particularly in the rural areas.
Adult education program at one time was another way which
support for UMNO is solicited.
Distribution of largesse normally takes the form of pub
lic works,on the spot grants for the building of mosques
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and community halls. The fund usually comes from the social
and welfare lotteries and from the Fund for Immediate Devel
opment. Distribution of land is another form in which

UMNO

politicians, particularly at the state level have used

to

build political support. In Malaysia, land falls under the
jurisdiction of the state governments. A study of the land
distribution conducted by Guyot in the states of Trengganu
and Johore indicated that large scale distribution of land
for development occurred one or two years prior to the elec
tion years and even the processing of ordinary elections
for land also appeared to be tied up to the election cycles.
More applications were processed during the election year

( 1971: 373- 374 ).
Non-governmental mass media also helps in attracting
support to UMNO by publicizing governmental effectiveness
and performance, particulalrly in the socio-economic fields.
Newspapers such as the New Straits Times. Utusan Melavu and
Berita Harian have done their bid by helping to attract sup
port for UMNO through their favorable reporting of the
achievements of UMNO-dominated government and limiting their
criticisms. Utusan Melayu, which has one of the largest cir
culation among the Malays, particularly the rural Malays,
has in fact been acting as a non-official mouthpiece of UMNO.
A study by Ratnam and Milne on the 1964 elections shows that
Utusan Melayu and Berita Harian contained the largest pro
portion of references to the UMNO-dominated Alliance

and
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they gave prominence to UMNO's success (1967:205-207).
Utusan Melayu has been controlled by individuals members
of UMNO who bought shares in the company and in 1961, the
newspaper had an UMNO member as its editor.

The Straits

Times which has the largest circulation in the country is
controlled by the Straits Times Group which only until
recently owned by foreigners (British).

Its relation with

the government has always been good.
In Malaysia, nev/paper publication is not completely
independent in the sense that there are certain restrictions
imposed on them.

The main legal control over the press is

the requirement that a permit must first be obtained annual
ly from the government before a person can start a newspaper.
In addition, the Internal Security Act (I960) prohibits the
printing, sale and circulation of any document including
newspapers which can promote feelings of hostility between
racial groups.

These restrictions have indirectly influenced

newspapers in Malaysia to be biased in favor of the govern
ment.
Further steps taken to consolidate support behind UMIIO
include the reorganization of the party,

the wooing of

senior government officials and giving way to young and
bright UMNO members to climb up the leadership ladder.
When Tun Pazak and Datuk Hussein were Prime Ministers, they
brought in young UMNO members with impressive academic re
cords into the leadership hierachy and into the cabinet. At
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the state level, young UMNO politicians were also appointed
as Chief Ministers.

Extreme and corrupted UMNO leaders

were gradually eased out of the leadership posts.

This

include the charismatic UMNO Youth and the former Ment&ri
Besar (Chief Minister) of Selangor, Datuk Harun hin Idris,
who was sent to prison on charges of corruption.
Party machinery has also been consolidated.

At the

thirteenth UMNO General Assembly held in July 1979* two
major amendments were made to the UMNO's constitution.

The

first amendment requires that each state holds its convention
prior to the National General Assembly, so that states
issues and problems can be discussed at the state level,
leaving the General Assembly to discuss national issues.
The second major amendment concerns the election of UMNO's
office bearers at the state and national levels as well as
the membership approval for the application from ex-UMNO
members or from persons from another party.

In the past,

any UMNO branch can give approval to any Malaysian Malay
who applied for UMNO's membership.

With the new ruling,

applications from ex-UMNO members or from persons from
another party must be approved by the National Supreme Coun
cil.

The ruling also requires that any UMNO member wanting

to stand for the party posts at divisional level must be
nominated by at least by one UMNO branch.

This is to avoid

the party from being infiltrated by undesirable elements.
There have been conflicts and power struggles within
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UMNO, particularly between the old generation and the new
young leaders, especially when Datuk Hussein was the Presi
dent of the party and the Prime Minister of the country.

As

stated earlier, Tun Abdul Razak and Datuk Hussein had pro
moted bright young UMNO member to leadership posts and this
move was resented by the old generation leaders.

Despite

these struggles, the party has managed to remain intact.
The struggles ended in favor of the new leaders . The chal
lenge to top party leadership by the old generation leaders
failed because these dissidents were not confident of
winning and also because of the ” aura of authority that
surrounds the UMNO leaders” (Crouch, 1980:34).
The Position of the Other Component
Parties of the Coalition vis-a-vis UMNO
The dominant position of UMNO in the coalition was also
due to the willingness of the other partners, particularly
the MCA and the MIC to acknowledge Malay supremacy.

The

willingness of these parties to acknowledge the supremacy of
UMNO was the result of their own weakness.

From the time

of its formation, the MCA did not represent the Chinese
community to the same extent as UMNO represented the Malays
(Ratnam, 1967:154)•

Instead, the MCA came to acquire the

image of a party of the notables because of its association
with Chinese business community.

It was an open secret that

the MCA was kept afloat by donations from Chinese ” towkays”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

(Chinese businessmen).(Siaw, 1980:216).

Some Chinese

even regarded the party as another business organization
interested in making money.
Over the years, the

mca

has gradually lost ground to

other Chinese-based opposition parties, particularly the
DAP.

This is because to the Chinese eyes, its association

with UMNO reduced the party's effectiveness in defending
the interests of the Chinese community (Crouch, 1980:17).
The MCA has little room to manoeuvre, for, as a partner in
the coalition, it cannot give in too much to the communal
demands of the Chinese community.

Such communal concessions

will be detrimental to its relationship with UMNO.

It could

not campaign on the sensitive issues that would attract
Chinese support such as issues on education policy or the
Malay privileges.
it

As it failed to champion these demands,

was accused of selling out the Chinese interests to

the Malays.
Furthermore, in the case of the Chinese, traditional
loyalty and deference to the upper class has been relative
ly weak. The more urbanized middle -class Chinese are more
attracted to the chauvinistic appeals of the various Chinese
based opposition parties, foremost among which is the DAP.
The MCA also has to compete for loyalty of the Chinese com
munity with Chinese guilds and associations.

The MCA,

therefore, has to gain the cooperation of the leaders of
these guilds for support.
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The MCA leadership has come almost exclusively from a small
segment of Chinese business community and some of these
leaders are not even fluent in any of the Chinese dialects.
The erosion of the Chinese support for the MCA has been
becoming clear since the 1959 elections.

In that year, it

managed to win only 19 out 31 seats allocated to it by the
Alliance.

In the 1964 elections, it won 27 out of 33 seats

it contested.

More importantly, in the 1959 elections, the

MCA were successful only in the constituencies with a
sizeable number of Malay voters.

This shows that in these

constituencies, the defection of the Chinese voters to the
opposition parties were compensated by the Malay votes
(Vasil, 1972:1).

Similarly, in the 1964 elections, the MCA

candidates were also successful only in constituencies
where at least 25 percent of the electorate were Malays
(Vasil, 1972:38).

A study by Mauzy on the 1978 elections

reveals a similar pattern.

The percentage of vote for the

MCA declined once the Malay percentage of the electorate
slipped below 30 percent (1979=294).
The MCA suffered its worst setbacks in the 1969 elec
tions when it won only 12 out of 33 seats allocated to it
and the defeats included that of 2 MCA Ministers.

Its per

formance at the state level was also dissappointing when it
won only 26 state assembly seats out of 80 seats it con
tested.

It lost the state of Penang, where it previously

enjoyed a chief ministership.

In Perak, its seats declined
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from 12 (in 1964) to one and in Selangor, from 9 to one
(Hock Guan, 1978:181).

Due to its serious defeat, the MCA

decided to pull out from the coalition hut due to the
subsequent riots and the state of Emergency, it was per
suaded to stay in the coalition.
Throughout its existence , the MCA has also been beset
by serious internal conflicts resulting from the power
struggles between the "old guards" and the "young bloods."
It was the old guards who forged the original agreement
with UMNO leaders in the early days of the Alliance.

The

first major power struggle in the party occured in 1958
when the younger group led by Tan Joo Hing and Tan Suan Kok
tried to depose Tan Cheng Lock, the President of the MCA.
They managed to get their candidate, Dr. Lim Chong Eu as
the new president.

However, the new leadership failed to

establish a good working relationship with UMNO leaders
and this led to a major crisis in the Alliance.

Dr. Lim

later resigned from the party and founded Gerakan.

In

1961, MCA's leadership reverted back to the old guard when
Tan Slew Sin, the son of Tan Cheng Lock, was elected presi
dent of the MCA.

Disputes between the old guards and the

new bloods continued from time to time and it emerged
again in 1973•

The young leaders included Alex Lee, Dr.Lim

Keng Yaik and Tan Tiong Hong who were trying to reform the
party.

However, they alleged that their efforts were

thwarted by vested interests in the party.

The conflicts
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ended when these leaders together with 158 other MCA
members were expelled from the party.
the party have not been successful.

Efforts to reform
One such attempt, known

as the Chinese Unity Movement was initiated in 1971 by
young leaders to gain grass root support, but failed, because
it was "too expressely chauvinistic" and therefore lost the
support of the established leaders like Tan Siew Sin (Kam
Hing, 1980:179).
In 1974j Tan Siew Sin resigned from the post of the
President of the MCA.

His successor was Lee San Choon.

Though Lee San Choon comes from grass root background, he
is not widely regarded as the principal leader of the
Chinese community in the country (Kam Hing, 1980:176).

In

1977 9 he faced a serious challenge from certain section of

the MCA members when he initiated a move to oust the Deputy
President of the party, Dr. Lee Siok Yew, with the intention
of giving the post to his candidate, Tan Sri Chong Hong
Nyan.

This move was opposed by Michael Chen, the Minister

for Housing and New Villages, who felt that due to his
seniority in the party, he was more eligible to be the
candidate for the post of the Deputy President of the MCA.
In the election, Lee San Choon’s candidate was defeated by
Michael Chen.

In the MCA's General Assembly of 1979 > the

contest was again revolved around Lee San Choon and
Michael Chen.

Michael Chen nominated himself for the post

of the President of the party.
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By making such a move, Michael Chen dared to do what most
MCA leaders thought he would not do (Siaw,

The

1980:218).

election result, however, gave the victory to Lee San Choon.
Power struggles within the party created division which
further weakened the party.
The MIC fared even worse than the MCA.
the weakest partner in the Alliance.

The party is

In terms of electoral

strength, the MIC is not an asset to the coalition.

Its

presence in the coalition serves more to symbolise the all
embracing image of the coalition . The importance of the
MIC as a political party is derived primarily from its
membership

in the Alliance (and the National Front) coali

tion, particularly since the Indian population does not
constitute as much as one quater of the total electorate
in any constituency (Ratnam and Milne, 1967:^0).

Outside

the coalition, the MIC would have no future of its own
(Milne and Mauzy,

1980:135)*

In addition, for the most part of its existence, the
party was suffering from serious internal conflicts mainly
as the result of personal conflicts which in turn was due
to the fightings over gaining party nominations.
1973,

Prior to

the MIC was torn by conflicts between factions loyal

to the president, Tun Sambanthan and the supporters of the
vice-president, V. Manikavasagam.

The MIC’s General

Meetings often turned into violent clashes between these
rival factions.

The party became more stabilized after
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Tun Razak personally intervened in 1973 and persuaded Tun
Sambanthan to give up the post of MIC's President.

Never

theless, rivalries still continue but less intensely and
the struggles now revolve around the party’s President,
Datuk Samy Vellu and his rival, Senator S. Subramaniam.
In considering the success and the stability of the
coalition party system in Malaysia, it is obvious that
UMNO is one of the key determinants.

Without the electoral

strength and the leadership role of UMNO, it is unlikely
that the coalition would survive.

However, in order to

retain this predominant position UMNO has to remain suffi
ciently united.

In the past, there had been numerous inter

nal crisis within UMNO caused by disparate dissidents but
the central leadership has been able to settle those crisis
and kept the party intact.

Against this background, it is

likely that the UMNO-led National Front will continue to
dominate the political scene for many years to come.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VII
THE COALITION PARTY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
One of the hypotheses of this paper is that the success
of alliance politics in Malaysia has been due to the ruling
party's socio-economic development strategies and policies
and their effectiveness in achieving ethnically balanced
development.

This chapter will analyze Malaysia's socio

economic development under its coalition party for the past
twenty six years.
Since coming to power in 1957s the Alliance cum

the

National Front coalition has been seen by its supporters as
a party that can be trusted to deliver goods.

On balance,

the party can be considered to be worthy of this image, for
under its rule the country has been enjoying more than two
decades of high and sustained economic growth.

Malaysia

today can be proud of having a per capita income, which is,
with the exception of Singapore and Brunei, the highest in
the region of South and Southeast Asia.

It has shown a

remarkable progress in education, health, transport
communication.

and

It has one of the best road and communication

systems in tropical Asia (Kasper, 1974: 17)»

Its poverty

eradication programs have also begun to show encouraging
results.
129
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The socio-economic progress is partly attributed to
favorable factors such as adequate infra-structural facili
ties, political stability, a rich resource base and a com
paratively efficient bureaucracy and partly due to the
ruling party's commitment to economic and social develop
ment.

Socio-economic progress has in fact been a recurrent

Alliance theme in almost every election.

The driving force

behind this commitment to economic development is the belief
of the party leaders that Malaysia's stability and national
integration depend to a large extent on socio-economic
development, and that economic progress would finally reduce
communal antagonism (Eudner, 1975:15)•
The commitment to development is reflected in the
substantial amount of allocations provided to the economic
sector under the various development plans.

Under the

Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1976), out of the total outlay
of M$9«8 billion, the allocation for economic and social
programs amounted to 72.3 percent and 1 3 *7 percent res
pectively.

Within the economic sector, the largest allo

cation was for land development which constituted about
21.7 percent (Third Malaysia Plan. 1976-1980. 1976: 231-232).
The total allocation for the Third Malaysia Plan was MS18.6
billion.

Out of this total allocation, M8l6.ff billion or

88.0 percent was allocated for socio-economic development.
A major portion of the allocation to the economic sector
went to poverty eradication projects such as agriculture
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and rural development (Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980.
1976: 233-238).

Under the Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1986,

the total allocation for public development expenditure
has been increased to M$42,830 million and out of this a
sum of M$2.2,8 billion or 37.9 percent is provided for eco
nomic sector (Fourth Malaysia Plan. 1 9 8 1 : 239).

As in the

earlier plans, a large portion, amounting to MS8.4 billion
is allocated to agriculture and rural development.

Table 10

gives a detailed account of public expenditure for the
period 1956-1980.

TABLE 10
Public Development Expenditure, 1956-1980 (By Sector)
(In $ Millions)

1956-1960 (FFYP)a
Target

%

' Actual

%

A. Economic
Agri & Rural
Development
Commerce &
Industry
Infra-structure

265.6

23.1

227.5

22.6

15.8

1.4

12.1

1.3

513.3

44.7

520.3

51.6

794.7

69.2

760.3

75.5

Others
Sub-total
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TABLE

10 (Continued)

1956-1960 (FFYP)a
Target

%

Actual

%

Education & Training

95.4

8.3

6 0 .9

6.0

Health

5 0 .0

4.4

12.7

1.3

Social & Com. Services

67.3

5.8

65.2

6.5

212.7

18.5

138.8

13.8

141.3

12.3

73.0

7.3

-

-

35.0

3.4

141.3

12.3

108.0

10.7

1148.7

100

1007

100

B. Social

Sub-total

C. Administration &
Defence
Gen. Adm.
Defence & Security
Sub-total
Total

-

1 9 61 -1 9 65 (SFYP)b

Target

%

C
/°/

Actual

A. Economic
Agri & Rural
Development
Commerce & Industry

545.3

2 5 .4

467.9

1 7 .6

27.0

1 .3

59.1

2 .5
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TABLE 10 (Continued)

1961-1965 (SFYP)b
Target

%

Ac tual

%

905.6

42.1

1236.7

46.7

1477.9

68.8

1763.7

66.5

Education & Training

260.0

12.1

236.5

8.9

Health

145.0

6.7

101.0

3.8

86.0

4.0

75.2

2.8

491.0

22.8

413.6

15.6

Gen. Adm.

88.1

4.1

167.1

6.3

Defence & Security

93.0

4.3

307.3

11.6

181.1

8.4

474.4

17.9

2150.0

100

2652.0

100

Infra-structure
Others
Sub-total
Social

Social & Com. Services
Sub-total
Administration &
Defence

Sub-total

Total
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TABLE 10 (Continued)

1966-1970 (FMP)c
Target

%

Actual

%

1086.6

23.9

1114.1

26.3

114.5

2.5

141.3

3.3

1537.8

33.8

1429.4

33.7

2738.9

60.2

2685.4

63.3

Education & Training

440.8

9.7

329.4

7.8

Health

189.4

4.2

146.6

3.5

Social & Com. Services 315-1

6.9

276.1

6.5

945.3

20.8

752.1

17.7

Gen. Adm.

126.4

2.8

138.1

3.3

Defence & Security

739.0

16.2

668.8

15.7

Sub-total

865.4

19.0

804.9

1 9 .0

4550.9

100

4242.4

100

A. Economic
Agri. & Rural Dev.
Commerce & Industry
Infra-structure
Others
Sub-total
Social

Sub-total
Administration &
Defence

Total
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TABLE 10 (Continued)

1971-1975 (SMP)
Target

%

Actual

%

1920.9

26.5

2129.1

21.7

583.6

8.0

1618.2

16»5

2335.5

32.2

3316.5

33.8

31.0

0.5

36.5

0.4

4870.9

67.2

7100,3

72.3

Education & Training

537.3

7.4

675.8

6.9

Health

213.6

2.9

173.9

1.8

Social & Com. Services 316.5

4.4

497.9

5.1

1067.4

U.7

1347.7

13.7

211 .6

2.9

348.7

3.6

Defence & Security

1350.0

18.6

10 24 .2

10.4

Sub-total

156l.6

21.5

1372.9

14.0

Total

7250.0

100

9820.8

100

A. Economic
Agri. & Rural Dev.
Commerce & Industry
Infra-structure
Others
Sub-total
B. Social

Sub-total
C. Administration &
Defence
Gen. Adm.
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TABLE 10 (Continued)

1976-1980 (TMP)
Target

%

Actual

%

Agri. & Rural Dev*

4735.5

25.5

7585.2

23.6

Commerce & Industry

1734.5

9.5

3205.2

10.0

Infra-structure

6 1 5 4 .0

33.2

10600.0

33.0

41.0

0.1

111 .0

0.4

12665*2

68.3

2 1 5 0 1 .4

67.0

1671.3

9.0

2 1 1 6 .2

6.7

377.1

2.0

529.7

1.6

1043.7

5.6

2915.1

9.1

3092.1

16 .6

5561.0

17.4

597.7

3.2

1229.3

3.8

Defence & Security

2200.0

11 .9

3784.0

11 .8

Sub-total

2797.7

15.1

5013.3

15.6

18544.9

100

32075.7

100

A. Economic

Others
Sub-total
Social
Education & Training
Health
Social & Com*
Services
Sub-total
Administration &
Defence
Gen. Adm*

Total
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Note:

a. First Five Year Plan
b. Second Five Year Plan
c. First Malaysia Plan

Sources:

Lim Mah Hui and William Canak, "The Political
Economy of State Policies in Malaysia", Journal
of Contemporary Asia. Vol, 2, No, 2, (1981)
pp. 21 If—215

To stimulate rural development, the Alliance Government
set up new agencies, the most important of which were the
Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and the Ministry
of Rural Development,

FELDA was set up in 1956 to open

up new lands and to provide lands to the landless.

The

Ministry of Rural Development was set up in 1960 to provide
coordination to the programs of rural development.

However,

the Ministry's main efforts were directed at the provision
of social overhead capital and infra-structure such as
roads, schools, health centers, etc.
Simultaneous to pursuing a vigorous program of rural
development, the Alliance Government also pursued a
vigorous policy of industrialization by encouraging foreign
investment.

Prior to 1970, the government followed a

complete laissez-faire policy by consciously limiting
public regulation of the economy and minimized interference
so as not to offend foreign investors (Hui and Canak,
1 9 8 1 : 2 1 2 ).

The emphasis on accelerating growth of the economy
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through investment in infra-structure did help to strengthen
the economy but this strategy failed to deal with the prob
lem of poverty and economic and social imbalances that
were prevalent in the society.

These imbalances were parti

cularly serious and had political implication because it
cut along racial lines.

The extent of the imbalances was

reflected in the comparison of the mean household incomes
of the main racial groups in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970.
The mean household income of

the Malays was MS 172, the

Chinese MS39A- and that of the Indians M$304»

Imbalance was

also reflected in the ownership of equity capital in the
corporate sector of the economy where in 1970, the

share

of the Malays was only 2»k percent while the Chinese share
was 2.7*2. percent and Indian share was 1.1 percent (Third
Malaysia Plan. 1976-1980, 1976: 18A-).
The reduction in the support for the Alliance in the
1969 elections and the ensuing racial riots led the
Alliance leaders to engage in a soul-searching reappraisal
of the party’s past economic policies and strategies.

The

government came to the conclusion that the racial riots had
their roots in the economic imbalance between the racial
groups.

The Malays, in particular, felt that they should

be given a greater share in the economy of the

country.

Spurred by political neccessity to eliminate these condi
tions, the political leaders decided that the approaches
to development had to be changed.

A new framework which
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emphasized a more equitable distribution of income and
wealth was needed.

The result was the New Economic Policy

formulated in 1970.

The NEP is a radical departure from

past policies, in the sense that it advocates the abandon
ment of unregulated competitive capitalism and calls for
an active role of the state in the allocation of the re
sources of the country and in the regulation of the eco
nomy.

Another major shift concerned the criteria for

planning.

In the past, the criteria for planning had large

ly been financial, administrative and growth.(Young, 1980:
212).

With the enunciation of the NEP, economic planning

was to be based on social criteria as well.

The shift

in development planning was viewed as a reaction to meet
the political demands of the Malays who felt that they
had been deprived in the share and participation of the
rapid development of the country.
The NEP is essentially a long term development frame
work stretching from 1971 to 1990.

It was designed to

achieve national unity through the two-pronged objectives
of poverty eradication and restructuring of Malaysian so
ciety in order to eliminate the identification of race to
economic functions.

The NEP has been implemented through

five year development plans, beginning with the Second
Malaysia Plan (1971-1976).

The country is now in the

Fourth Malaysia Plan.
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Progress in the Socio-Economic Development
A World Bank country economic report on Malaysia des
cribes the achievement of the Alliance/National Front Govern
ment in the socio-economic fields in the following words:
"There had been a number of notable achievements since i9 6 0 .
A marked increase in the level of investment led to a high
and sustained level of economic growth.

The allocation of

resources among sectors were generally good.

The public

sector expanded considerably, at the same time the private
sector grew vigorously.

Financial stability and strong posi

tion were continously maintained.

There was also progress in

social areas, especially in expanding opportunities for educa
tion and improving health conditions." (Young, 1980:xvii)
Since 1960, Malaysian economy has been enjoying a
considerably high growth rate compared to other countries
in Southeast Asia.

The growth performance seems remarkable,

particularly in view of the fact that the country has
proportionately large agricultural and

mining

whose products are easily influenced by external
(Kasper, 1974:21).

dis

sectors
factors

In the 1960s the average annual growth

rate of the economy was 6 percent and by the middle of the
1970 s the economy achieved an average growth rate of 8.7

percent per annum (Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia
Plan, 1976-1978, 1976:2).

The main source of growth

the 1970s was public development

expenditure.

in

Tables
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11 and 12

indicate the annual growth rate for the period

1970-1980.
TA BLE

11

Malaysia: Growth of Gross Domestic Product, 1970-1980

1970

1975

1980

12,308

17,363

26,188

GDP in real purcha
12,308
sing power (M&million)

16,481

27,760

GDP in constant 1970
prices (Mftmillion)

TABLE 12
Average Annual Growth Rate (%)

1971-1975

1976-1980

1971-1980

GDP in constant 1970
prices (%)

7.1

8.6

7.8

GDP in real purcha
sing power (%)

6.0

11.0

8.5

Sources: Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1988. Table 2-4, p. 24
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Over the decade, growth has also been recorded in almost
all sectors of the economy, with the highest growth being
recorded in manufacturing, services and construction sec
tors.

During 1971-1980, the manufacturing sector regis

tered a growth rate of 12.5 percent, construction 9 .6
percent and services sector 7.3 percent per annum (Fourth
Malaysia Plan. 1981: 16).

The share of the manufacturing

sector in the GDP has now increased to 20.5 percent, second
only to agriculture.
With regards to agricultural sector which is the main
stay of the economy, the growth rate was only if.3 percent
per annum for the period 1970-1980.

This modest growth,

however, met the target set by the Second United Nations
Development Decade.

Since independence, Malaysia has been

the largest producer of rubber.

To reduce the country’s

overdependence on rubber, the government also started
diversification of agriculture in the 1960s by branching
into oil palm, timber, cocoa and pepper.

Over the decade,

palm oil cultivation had increased greatly, enabling
Malaysia to emerge as the world's largest producer and ex
porter of palm oil.
Rapid growth was also experienced in export sector.
During 1976-1980, the growth in exports expanded by 9,k
percent per annum.

The main exports of Malaysia consist of

rubber, palm oil, sawlogs, copper, pepper, petroleum, cocoa
and manufactured goods such as wood products and textile.
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Petroleum is fast becoming the biggest revenue earner for
Malaysia*

In the early 1970*3 it was manufactured goods

that recorded the highest rates of export growth (42.0
percent per annum during 1971-1975)*
Despite fluctuations in the world economy, Malaysia
continues to maintain a favorable balance of trade, parti
cularly during 1970-1980.

During 1971-1975, the trade

balance recorded a surplus of M$4 billions*

However, the

greatest surplus was registered during the Third Malaysia
Plan (1976-1980) when the surplus reached M$21,954 millions
(Fourth Malaysia Plan. 1981: 22-23).
Another characteristic of the economy under the coali
tion government is a comparatively high savings rate.

The

reasons for the high savings rate include the attitude of the
Chinese community towards savings, the relatively high
degree of internal price-level stability and the compara
tively advanced public security system, implemented through
the Employees1 Provident Fund.

This fund covers all wor

kers in business employing more than five persons and
collects contributions from both employers and employees.
Benefits are normally paid out only at the retirement age
of fifty-five (Kasper, 1974: 14)«

Under the Second

Malaysia Plan, the average figure of savings rate was 18
percent per annum.

During 1976-1980, gross national sa

vings increased at 24*7 percent per annum (Fourth Malaysia
Plan. 1981: 25).
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Malaysia also enjoys a relatively high price-level
stability and thus a low rate of inflation.

From 1957 to

early 1972, consumer price rose only at an average of less
than 1 percent per annum (Kasper, 196^: 21).

During 1976-

1 9 7 9 » due to the world economic conditions which led to

the build-up of inflationary pressures, consumer price in
dex rose at an average annual rate of 4 percent.

However,

this is still low when compared to other countries.

The

low rate of inflation was in part due to the government's
anti-inflationary measures which included tightening

of

credits, anti-hoarding measures, improving the distributive
network and strictly controlling certain items, particularly
essential items.

In 1980, 19 commodities such as rice,

kerosene, flour, sugar, etc. ivere tagged as essential items.
The price of these items could not be arbitrarily raised
without the approval of the Price Review Committee of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry.

This machinery puts a

break to inflation.
Progress Towards Eradication of Poverty
In addition to achieving a steady economic growth,
Malaysia has given special emphasis to eradication of pover
ty and rural development.

The Malaysian Government views

poverty and economic imbalance as distruptive to national
unity.

Despite the overall high economic growth, the prob

lem of poverty and inequalities in the distribution of
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wealth remains large and persistent.

In 1970, about

792,000 households out of the total of 1.6 million house
holds were considered to be below poverty

line.

4 Of all

the poor households about 74 percent were Malay, 17 percent
Chinese and 8 percent Indian (Third Malaysia Plan, 19761980. 1976: 5)•

In terms of rural-urban composition,

about 89 percent of the poor were located in the rural
areas with most of them employed in the agricultural
sector.

In the past 1970 period, the policies of poverty

eradication were slanted towards agricultural and rural
development.
Prior to 1970, despite strong commitment to rural deve
lopment, little progress was made in terms of poverty era
dication mainly because the thrust of rural development
programs in the 1950s and 1960s were directed primarily
towards rural infrastructure such as the expansion of rural
roads, community projects, and land development but did
not deal directly with rural poverty and the-damaging role
of middlemen and exploitation.

Other factors which

dampened the effect of rural development were the dete
rioration of rubber price and the relatively long gestation
period of rural development investments, particularly in
vestment in tree crops.

In addition, Malaysia experienced

a high population growth which came close to 3 percent.
Realizing the seriousness of the problem of poverty
and due to the political neccessity to retain Malay votes,
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the Alliance Government has given top priority to eradica
tion of poverty.

The government through the NEP has been

aiming to reduce poverty to 16.7 percent in 1990.

Under

the Second Malaysia Plan which was based on the NEP, the
government launched a serious drive to eradicate poverty
by implementing programs such as expansion of JLand develop
ment for resettlement of landless population, in situ deve
lopment efforts (developments of the existing agricultural
lands) which include the construction of irrigation facili
ties in existing agricultural areas, agricultural subsidi
zation, improvement of marketing and credit facilities,
improvement of the living condition of the poor by provi
ding them with basic amenities in the form of water supply,
portable water and health facilities.
Land development deserves some mention, for it has
been playing an important role in the reduction of poverty.
Land development programs have been carried out by agencies
such as FELDA, Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation
Authority (FELCRA), Rubber Industry Small Holders Develop
ment Authority (RISDA) and State Economic Development Cor
porations (SEDCs).

Between 1971-1980, about 866,055

hectares of new lands were developed and approximately
72,200 households were resettled during the period (Fourth
Malaysia Plan, 1981: 35)*

Most of these new lands were

planted with rubber and palm oil.
The construction of irrigation facilities, particularly
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the two major multi-million dollar irrigation projects, the
Muda and the Kemubu schemes, were the main factors behind
the increased double cropping of rice and doubled the in
comes of nearly 75»000 rice farmers in the three poorest
states of Peninsular Malaysia - Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis.
These two irrigation projects were also responsible for
reducing the country's dependence on imports from more than
40 percent of domestic rice requirement in 1967 to 13 per
cent of the increased requirement in 1975 (Young, 1980: 49)•
The government had also identified target groups for
the purpose of poverty eradication and specific programs
were formulated to redress the problem of poverty among
these groups.

These groups constitute of rubber small

holders, rice farmers, coconut growers, estate workers, New
Village Residents, agricultural laborers and the urban poor.
On the whole there was some noticeable progress in res
pect to poverty eradication in the post-1970 period.

The

incidence of poverty declined from 49»3 percent in 1970 to
29.2 percent in 1980.

With regards to rural-urban compo

sition, the incidence of poverty among the rural population
decreased from 58.7 percent in 1970 to 37.7 percent in 1980.
There was also significant reduction of poverty among the
identified groups.

Due to replanting efforts and the use

of high-yielding seeds and improved processing facilities,
the incidence of poverty among rubber small holders declined
from 64*7 percent in 1970 to 41.3 percent in 1980.

The
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incidence of poverty among rice farmers, who constituted
the largest agricultural groups in Malaysia, also declined
from 88 percent in 1970 to 55*1 percent in 1980 mainly due
to cumulative effect of public measures such as irrigation
facilities, extension services, price support and subsidies.
Malaysian farmers are said to be the most subsidized
the regions.

in

The decline in the incidence of poverty among

fishermen was also attributed to such measures as the pro
vision of subsidies by the Department of Fisheries for the
purchase of boats and gears.

Some of the fishermen were

also absorbed into land schemes.

However, the incidence

of poverty is still high among the fishermen of the
coast states of Peninsula

Malaysia.

east

Among the coconut

growers, the reduction of poverty from 52.8 percent

in

1970 to 58.9 percent in 1980 was mainly due to the result
of replanting^rehabilitation schemes as well as intercrop
ping with cocoa and coffee.
To alleviate the problem of urban poverty, the govern
ment encourages and provides assistance for the urban poor
to start small scale enterprises.

In addition, the

long

term strategy for the redressal of urban poverty continues
to be the expansion of the basic public services, construc
tion of low-cost housing and providing assistance to
traders.
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Progress in the Restructuring of Society
The second prong of the NEP seeks to correct the socio
economic imbalances by restructuring the society and break
ing down racial compartmentalization, so that all the ra
cial groups could become equal partners in the development
of the country.

The restructuring of society involves

three main areas: employment by sector; employment by occu
pation and restructuring of the ownership of share capital
in the corporate sector.

The strategy of the Malaysian

Government is to establish by 1990 a pattern of employment
that reflects the racial composition of the country.

Pre

sently the Malays have a very large share in the primary
sector (67«6 percent in 1970) and they are under-represen
ted in the secondary and tertiary sector.

The

target

for restructuring of the ownership of share capital in the
corporate sector calls for the overall increase of domestic
ownership to 70 percent by 1990, with the increase of the
Malay share to 30 percent, the non-Malay share to 40 per
cent and leaving 30 percent for foreign ownership.

The

implementation of this policy is to be taken in the context
of an expanding economy and no particular group will expe
rience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation (Second
Malaysia Plan, 1971-1976. 1971: 1)
Various policies and programs are being implemented
to achieve the objectives and the targets of the restruc
turing of society.

The main thrust of the

restructuring

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150

programs have been and will continue to be through educa
tion and training of the Bumiputras, particularly
sciences, technology and business management*

in

The

the

MARA.

Institute of Technology has been playing an important role
in the training of the Bumiputras*

To ensure that private

enterprises conform to the government's policy in respect
to restructuring of society, investment incentives were
granted to those firms which restructured their workforce
to reflect the racial composition of the country.
The strategy to restructure the ownership of share ca
pital in the corporate sector includes the direct partici
pation of the government in the private sector.

This is

done through the setting up of public enterprises such as
the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA - the Council of Trust for
the Indigenous People), Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS),
the Urban Development Authority, the Credit Guarantee Cor
poration and the various state development corporations.
These institutions are involved in various aspects of pro
moting ownership and developing enterprises among

the

Bumiputras through multifarious activities such as provi
ding credits to the Bumiputras, purchasing and holding of
equity in trust, in order to transfer it to the Bumiputras
at a later date, providing technical assistance advisory
service and educational and training facilities.
Due to the implementation of these programs, some pro
gress has been made in respect to restructuring of society,
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particularly in restructuring employment pattern.

Unemploy

ment among the Bumiputras has decreased from 8.1 percent
in 1970 to 5.1 percent in 1980, that of the Chinese from
7.0 percent in 1970 to 5 .3 percent in 1980 and the Indians
from 11 percent to 7.5 percent.

The share of Bumiputra em

ployment in the secondary sector during 1 9 70 -1 9 80 also re
corded an increase of 7 *7 percent from 3 2 .1 percent in
1970 to 39*8 percent in 1980.

Similarly, in the tertiary

sector their share of employment also increased from 4 2 .6
percent to 47 percent.

In terms of occupational structure,

the Malays* share of employment in manufacturing sector
is estimated to have increased from 29 percent in 1970 to
33 percent in 1975 (Shepherd, 1980: 182).

The overall

changes in the pattern of employment in the period 1970 1980 is indicated in tables 13 and 14 •

TABLE 13
Peninsular Malaysia: Employment by Sector and Pace
1 9 7 0 , 1975 and 1980
(000)

Sector

1970
----------------- ------------------------Malay
Chinese
Indian
Others
Total

Primary3,
{%)

902.3
(67.6)

265.4
(19.9)

154.0
(11.5)

12.9
(1 .0 )

1,334.6
(1 0 0 .0 )
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TABLE 13 (Continued)

1970

Sector

Secondary13
{%)

Tertiary0
(%)

Total emp.d
(%)

Labor force
'(SIS)

Unemployment
(SO

Malay

Chinese

215.6
(32.1)

Indian

Others

394.3
(58.7)

57.1
(8 .5 )

4 .7
(0 .7 )

671.7
(100.0)

359.7
(42.6)

383-9
(45.5)

90.3
(10.7)

10.1
(1 . 2 )

844.0
(100.0)

1,477.6
(51.8)

1,043.6
(36.6)

301.4
(10.6)

27.7
(1 . 0 )

2,850.3
(100.0)

1,608.3
(51.9)

1,122.4
(36.2)

338.7
(10.9)

28.6
(0.9)

3,098.0
(100.0)

13 0. 7
(8 .1 )

78.8
(7.0)

37.3
(11.0)

0.9
(3 .1 )

247.7
(8.0)

Total

1975

Sector
Chinese

Indian

Others

1 , 0 0 9 .2
(68.4)

287.3
(19.5)

167.3
(11.3)

12.7
(0 .9 )

1,476.5
(100.0)

336.7
(36.1)

500.0
(53.6)

88.6
(9 .5 )

7.5
(0 .8 )

932.8
(100.0)

509.5
(44.0)

515.3
(44.5)

121 .6
(10.5)

11.5
(1 .0 )

1,157.9
(100.0)

1,855.4
(52.0)

1 , 3 0 2 .6
(36.5)

377.5
(10.6

31.7
(0 .9 )

3,567.2
(100.0)

1,975.7
(51.7)

1,390.7
(36.4)

421 . 8
(11.0)

34.9
(0 .9 )

3,823.1
(100.0)

12 0. 3
(6.1)

88.1
(6.3)

44.3
(10.5)

3.2
(9 .2 )

255.9
(6.7)

Malay
Primary
(SO

Secondary
(SO

Tertiary
(SO

Total emp.
(SO

Labor force
{%)

Unemployment
(SO

Total
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TABLE 13

(Continued)

1980
0 CCl/Oi

Chinese

Indian

Others

1,020.2
(66.3)

306.1
(19.9)

19 9.4
(13.0)

13 .4
(0.9 )

1 ,5 3 9 .1
( 100. 0 )

Secondary
(*)'

495.4
(39.8)

636.0
(51.1)

105.8
(8.5)

7.5
(0.6)

1 , 2 4 4 .7
( 100. 0 )

Tertiary
(#)

695.9
(47.0)

615.9
(41.6)

155.5
(10.5)

13 .3
(0.9)

1,480.6
(100.0)

2,211.5
(51.9)

1,558.0
(36.5)

460.7
(10.8)

34.2
(0.8)

4,264.4
(100.0)

2,331.4
(51.7)

1,645*4
(36.5)

498.1
(11.0)

37.2
(0.8 )

4,512.1
(100.0)

119.9
(5.1)

87.4
(5.3)

37.4
(7.5 )

3.0
(8 .1 )

247.7
(5.5)

Malay
Primary
i%)

Total emp,
(SO

Labor force
(20

Unemployment
(SO

Total

Note: a. Agriculture
b. Mining, manufacturing, construction and transport,
c. Wholesale and retail trade, banking, public ad
ministration, education, health, defence and
utilities,
d. Total employed.
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan, table 3-10, P» 57.
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TABLE 14
Peninsular Malaysia: Employment by Occupation and
by Race, 1970, 1975 and 1980
(000 )

1970
Occupation

Professional &
Technical
(%)

Malay

Chinese

Indian

Others

Total

64.2

54.0

14.8

3.7

136.7

(47.0)

(39.5)

(10.8)

(2.7)

(100.0)

7.4

19.3

2.4

1.6

30.7

Administration
& Managerial
(*)

(24.1)

(62.9)

(7.8)

(5.2)

(100.0)

Clerical
(2)

50.4
(35.4)

65.4
(45.9)

24.5
(17.2)

2.2
(1.5)

142.5
(100.0)

Sales
(#)

69.1
(26.7)

159.6
(61.7)

28.7
(11.1)

1.1
(0.4)

258.5
(100.0)

Service

(%r

100.0
(44.3)

89.5
(39.6)

32.9
(14.6)

3.4
(1.5)

(100.0)

Agricultural
(%)

920.5
(72.0)

221.5
(17.3)

123.7
(9.7)

13.2 1,278.7
(1.0) (100.0)

434.5

74.4

2.5

777.4

(55.9)

(9.6)

(0.3)

(100.0)

Production,
266.0
Transport & Others
(%)
(34.2)
Total
(%)

1,477.6
(51.8)

1 ,0 4 3 .6

(36.6)

301.4

27.7

(10.6)

(1.0)

2 2 5 .8

2,850.3
(100.0)
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TABLE 14

(Continued)

1975

Occupation
Malay
Professional
& Technical
(95)

Chinese

Indian

Others

Total

91.1

73.4

20.8

4.4

189.7

(48.0)

(38.7)

(11.0)

(2.3)

(100.0)

Administration 11.6
8c Managerial
(28.1)
(%)

24.3

3.0

2.4

41.3

(58.8)

(7.3)

(5.8)

(100.0)

Clerical
(95)

88.5
(46.0)

78.6
(40.8)

23.1
(12.0)

2.4
(1.2)

192.6
(100.0)

Sales
(90

85.9
(24.8)

227.2
(65.7)

31.4
(9.1)

1.2
(0.3)

345.7
(100.0)

Services
(90

145.7
(46.8)

123.3n
(39.6)

39.4
(12.6)

3.1
(11.0)

311.5
(100.0)

Agricultural
(95)

998.1
(70.5)

257.8
(18.2)

147.6
(10.4)

12.6
(0.9)

1,416.1
(100.0)

Production,
Transport &
Others
(50

434.5

518.0

112.2

5.6

1,070.3

(4 0 .6 )

(48.4)

(10.5)

(0.5)

377.5

31.7

(10.6)

(0.9)

Total
(95)

1,855.4
(5 2 .0 )

1,302.6
(36.5)

(100.0)
3,567.2
(100.0)
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TABLE 14

(Continued)

1980

Occupation
Malay

Chinese

Indian

Others

Total

Professional
& Technical

118.2

87.1

26.9

4.0

2 3 6 .2

OS)

( 50. 0 )

(36.9)

(11.4)

(1 .7 )

( 1 00. 0 )

1 6 .2

2 9 .2

3 .1

2 .7

51 . 2

OS)

(3 1 .6 )

(5 7.0)

( 6 . 1)

(5 .3 )

( 100. 0 )

Clerical

169.4
(55.3)

1 1 0 .8
(36. 2 )

21 . 0
(6 .9 )

5 .3
(1 .7 )

306. 5
( 100. 0 )

99.8
(23.1)

299.0
(69*2)

32.7
(7.6)

0 .8
(0. 2)

432.3
( 100. 0 )

16 8 . 4
(4-7.9)

140.1
(39.9)

40.7
( 11. 6 )

2 .1
(0. 6)

351.3
( 100. 0 )

998.9
(67*7)

289.9
(19.7)

17 5 . 4
(11.9)

1 0 .6
(0 .7 )

1,474.8
( 100. 0 )

Production,
Transport 8c
Others

64 O .6

6 0 i.9

16 0 . 9

8 .7

(5S)

(45.4)

(42.6)

(11.4)

(0. 6)

460.7

34.2

( 10. 8 )

(0. 8)

Administration
& Managerial

OS)

Sales
OS)

Service
(SS)

Agricultural
OS)

Total
(#)

2, 2 1 1 . 5
(51.9)

1,558.0
(3 6 .5 )”

1 , 4 1 2 .1
( 100. 0 )
4,264*4
( 100. 0 )

Note: a. This category includes all professionals, ranging
from lawyers and engineers to nurses and teachers
(in public as well as private sectors).
Source:

Fourth Malaysia Plan. 1981-1985, Table 3-11, p. 59.
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There has also been some progress in the restructuring
of the ownership of assets in the corporate sector.

The

share of Malaysian residents increased from 38*3 percent
in 1970 to 5 2 .5 percent in 1980, while the share of the
foreigners declined from 6 1•7 percent to 47»5 percent.

As

for the share of the Malays, there was an increase from
2.if percent in 1970 to 12.if percent in 1980.
is however below the planned target.

This increase

The main problem in

this case is to find enough Malays to buy the shares,
since most of the Malays still earn low incomes and have
negligible savings.

In addition, the idea of buying shares

is new to the Malays, particularly the rural Malays.

A

far more serious problem associated with the restructuring
of capital ownership is•the misconception on

the part of

the non-Malays who viewed that the objectives of the re
structuring programs were intended to benefit only the Malays.
This is rather unfortunate, because the restructuring pro
grams have also benefitted other racial groups as reflec
ted by the increase of the non-Malay share from

per

cent in 1970 to ifO percent in 1980 (Fourth Malaysia Plan.
1981: 63).
Progress in Industrialization
Despite an obvious bias towards rural development, the
Malaysian Government has also emphasized industrial growth,
particularly the expansion of the manufacturing sector.
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The need for rapid industrialization was due to the nation's
desire to diversify the economy, thereby avoiding the over
dependence on the tin and rubber industries and to find
employment outside agriculture (Kanapathy, 1970: 150)*
Prior to 1970, the government's role in industrial
promotion was directed at the preservation of sound and
stable monetary and financial climate and limiting the
government's participation and control (Sum Yee, 1972: 7^)*
The government acted more as a coordinator, while leaving
the initiatives entirely to the private sector*

In addi

tion to encourage the development of industries, the govern
ment formulated measures which include the development of
public utility services for industries, the provision of
guarantees regarding the security of foreign capital in
vestment, the establishment of well-serviced industrial
estates and the expansion of trade and technical training
by shifting the educational emphasis towards science,
management and the like.
The government also created two new independent agen
cies: the Tariff Advisory Board in 1963 and the Federal
Industrial Development Authority (FIDA) in 1967 to stream
line the industrialization efforts.

FIDA's main functions

is to administer incentives and to identify industrial
opportunities and make feasibility studies, giving prelimi
nary estimates of the respective projects and also to pro
vide training for workers and carry out applied industrial
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research.

In addition, FIDA took over the responsibilities

of the Tariff advisory Board concerning the setting of
tariffs when the board was abolished in 1970.
To cater to the financial requirement of the industry,
the government set up the Malaysian Industrial Development
Finance Ltd (MIDF).

MIDF provides loans to cover part of

the costs of land, factory building and machinery needed
to start a project.

In addition, MIDF also extends other

forms of assistance such as issuing of shares and their
underwriting and consulting services.
The government also gives relief from taxation in the
form of tax holidays.

The first pioneer industry ordinance

was the 1958 Pioneer Industries Ordinance which gave tax
relief for the period varying from two to five years,
depending on the fixed capital they invested.

To hasten

industrial growth, the government replaced the Pioneer
Industries Ordinance with the Investment Incentives Tax
in 1968 which gave additional tax holidays on the basis of
various criteria such as the firm's location, the type
of product, the degree of local content and export perfor
mance or an investment tax credit equal to 25 percent of
the value of investment (Shepherd, 1980: 182-183)»
Following the 1969 racial riots a new industrial
development strategy which was in line with the overall
objective of the NEP was formulated.

The new approach

called for a more active role by the government in industrial
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development#

In the past, the private sector was allowed

a free hand in carrying out investment and establishing
industries.

Under the new approach the government would

take the initiative in industrialization by identifying
feasible projects and participating in the establishment of
the industries.

Through this participation the government

hoped to give a new direction and influence the pattern of
ownership and employment so that they reflect the racial
composition of the country.
To enforce this policy, the government established
the Capital Investment Committee (composed of ministers
and senior government officials) whose main terms of refer
ence included the reviewing of policies and programs of
industrial development, both at the State and Central
levels; identifying of development priorities; streamlining
procedures for processing applications in order to speed
up decision-making.

Under the Capital Investment Committee,

FIDA was made the central executive agency (Sum Yee, 1972:
91-92).
To further reinforce the direction of industrial deve
lopment, the Industrial Coordination Act was legislated in
May 1975*

This act gave the government, at least in prin

ciple, broad authority to intervene, impose conditions for
approval and police conditions for investment.

Under this

act every person who want to engage in manufacturing
activity has to apply for a license.

The main purpose of
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the government in enforcing this act was to make sure that
optimum use was made of investment capital, land and
trained manpower.

The act however gave automatic approval

to firms employing less than twenty-five full time paid
workers and whose shareholders' funds were less than
M$250,000 (Shepherd, 1980: 1810.
Since independence, manufacturing sector has been the
fastest growing sector in the economy.

Between 1960-1970

the manufacturing sector grew by 207 percent in current
prices.

For the neriod 1971-1975 the average growth rates

of the manufacturing sector were 1 0 .9 percent and for the
years 1976-1978 1^.3 percent (Mah Hui, 1982: 36).

The

overall growth of the manufacturing sector and its position
in the Malaysian economy for the period 1970-1980 is shown
in table 1 5 .
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TABLE

15

Peninsular Malaysia: Value-Added Growth in Manufacturing
1970-1980

Share (%)

Average Annual Growth
rate {%)

1970

1975

1980

1971-75

1976-80

1971—<

15.3

10.9

9.3

2.1

7.1

4.0

Oil & Fats

6.3

12.9

14.1

26.0

17.1

22.6

Beverages &
Tobacco

12.1

10.9

9.9

6.9

9.8

8.0

2.1

2.5

3.0

13.3

19.7

15.7

12.4

12.1

12.0

8.7

13.0

10.3

Paper 8c
Printing

1.0

0.9

1.0

7.6

17.3

11.1

Industrial
Chemical

3.3

2.3

2.0

2.0

7.0

3.8

Chemical
Products

6.0

5.4

5.1

6.5

11.2

8.3

Petroleum
Products

4.2

3.1

3.5

3.5

17.0

8.3

Rubber Products 6.7

5.5

4.5

5.5

5.6

5.6

Cement

5.4

4.9

5.2

7.0

15.2

10.0

Non-metallic

2.0

1.6

1.7

4.7

14.7

8.3

Basic Metal

3.1

3.2

3.6

10.3

11.8

10.8

Electrical
Machinery

2.6

3.0

3.4

10.8

17.6

13.3

Food Produc
tion

Textiles
Wood 8c Wood
Production
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TABLE 13 (Continued)

Share (%)

Average Annual Growth
rate {%)

1970

1975

1980

Transport
Equipment

5.3

5.2

4.9

8.6

11.6

Other
Manufacturers

7.3

11.4

12.4

36.4

16.3

28.5

1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0

1 1 .6

1 3 .5

1 2 .5

Total
Manufactures
Source:

1971-75

1976-80

1971-80
9.7

Fourth Malaysia Plan. Table 16-1, p. 294

In short, the manufacturing sector has experienced one
of the highest growth rates in the Malaysian economy.

This

is principally due to the increased exports as well as the
increase in domestic demand.

As for the trend in indus

trialization, the emphasis in the late 1950 s and 1960s had
been on import substitution.

This is due to the need to

diversify the economy and to decrease the dependence on the
primary products (Mah Hui, 1982: 3 6 ).

In the 1970s, des

pite the continuance of import substitution, the emphasis
shifted to consumer durables such as household appliances
and also to the development of export-oriented industries,
such as wood and rubber products.
Apart from agriculture, the manufacturing sector has
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been and will continue to be a major source of employment
for the country.

During 1970-1980 the manufacturing sec

tor had generated the largest number of jobs and recorded
the highest rate of employment of 7.6 percent per annum.
In1980, its
15*8 percent.

share in the total employment accounted for
Employment in this sector is expected to

grow at 5»9 percent per annum in the eighties (Fourth
Malaysia Plan . 82-226).
Progress in the Public Services
Side byside with the expansion of the economy,

the

government also has accorded high priority to the expansion
of public services particularly the expansion of education,
health care, electricity, water, housing, etc.

Primary

education, though is not compulsory, is free for all
irrespective of race and the enrollment has been very high,
about 91*4 percent in 1980.

A large proportion of primary

school children managed to proceed to secondary schools
every year.

In addition to free schooling at the primary

level, the government also provides assistance of various
kinds to help the burden of out-of-pocket costs (cost of
books, school uniforms, snacks, transport and other supplies
which are not free).

This assistance is usually in the

form of loaned books, payment of examination fees and pay
ment for board and lodging in residential schools.

In

1980, there were ten secondary residential science schools
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with a total enrollment of 6162.

In addition, MARA, also

established Junior Science Colleges to provide additional
secondary science education to the Bumiputra.

Programs

for tertiary education was also expanded to meet the man
power requirement.

At present there are five universities

offering courses in humanities, law, medicine, sciences,
dentistry, agriculture and economics and management.

In

addition, there are a number of colleges and politechnics.
Enrollment in tertiary education increased by 235 »5 per
cent from 11,364 in 1970 to 38,125 in 1980.

On top of that

the number of Malaysian students overseas were estimated
to be 39,908 of whom 60.5 percent were Chinese, 23 percent
Bumiputra, 15»9 percent Indian and 0.6 percent others
(Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981: 349-350).
The government also attaches great importance to the
provision of health services throughout the country, parti
cularly to the rural population.

The main emphasis of me

dical care was both for the curative and preventive ser
vices.

Essentially, there are four types of services

rendered by the government: patient care services, public
health service, sanitation and nutrition, preventive ser
vices, and dental services.

The biggest public spending

for medical care in Malaysia has been for patient care ser
vices.

On the whole, the fees for public medical services

are very low and sometimes no fee is charged, particularly
for inpatient and outpatient treatment of the poor people.
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According to one survey, more than two-thirds of hospital
inpatients and more than three-auarters of outpatient treat
ment, paid no fees in 1980 (Meerman, 1980: 139)•

Provision

of preventive and curative services for the rural popula
tion has also been expanded.

Health centers and midwife

clinics have been established throughout the country to
provide services to the rural population.

Dental health

services have also been expanded to provide dental treatment
for the population, particularly to school children.

Under

the Third Malaysia Plan, mobile dental squads for school
children in rural areas were introduced.

In addition, the

government also undertook flouridation of public water
supply and provided mouth rinses for school children.

Accor

ding to one finding, the standard of preventive medical care
in Peninsular Malaysia is high compared to other developing
countries.

On top of that, the need of the poor and most

of the rest of the population is met through the public
system at minimal cost (Meerman, 1980: 143)•
Recognizing its importance to public health, the
government has also tried to expand the provision of elec
tricity and piped water.

Nevertheless, the provision of

electricity and water supply to the population is not
universal.

By 1980, about 790,000 households were provided

with electricity and about 59»4 percent of the total popu
lation had access to piped water supply.

However, this is

comparatively high when compared to other developing
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countries.

This is illustrated by the fact that in 1971,

less than 12 percent of the rural population of developing
countries had electricity, while in Malaysia, about

44

percent of the rural population had access to electricity
during the same period (Meerman, 1980: 145)*

As for safe

water supply, only about 15 percent of the rural population
in the developing countries had access to safe water supply
in 197 Z4..

In contrast, 49 percent of the rural population

in Malaysia used tapped and hygienically treated water
in 1974 (Meerman, 1980: 145)*
On the whole, the Alliance/National Front Government
can claim credit for many achievements, particularly in
the economic and social services.

At the same time the

country has also enjoyed relative peace and stability which
helped in no small way to attract foreign investment to
the country.

Economic development has engendered a compa

ratively high standard of living for the population.

The

nroblems of poverty and unequal distribution of incomes
and wealth are also being tackled.

The opposition parties

are finding difficulties to criticize the ruling party on
the economic front.

The government also could count on

the friendly mass media to give exposure and popularize
government programs to the people.
the image of a caring government.

This has reinforced
The image of prosperity

has filled the pages of newspapers and been telecast daily
by televisions and radios.

The favorable coverage given
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by the mass media has helped the government to impress the
people with its alliance

achievements.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to identify the major factors
behind the success of the coalition party system in Malaysia*
Three hyphotheses have been advanced to explain the success*
The first hyphotesis deals with the role of political
elites as an important determining factor for the success
of the coalition.

In particular, the aspect of elites

role that has been investigated in this thesis is elite
cooperation*
It is maintained in this thesis that the willingness
of the political elites of the various races to cooperate
and work together in harmony is crucial for the success
of the coalition.

The study tried to identify the various

variables that helped to foster elite cooperation.

The

various variables that have been examined include the socioeducational-linguistic-geographical background of the cabi
net ministers under the leadership of three
of Malaysia.

Prime Ministers

It is strongly believed that similarities in

the socio-educational-linguistic background have fostered
similar values, modes of thinking and orientation towards
elite cooperation.
The analysis shows that the Malaysian political elites

169
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irrespective of their racial background shared many simi
larities.

Most of them are drawn primarily from English

educated, western oriented families with relatively high
social standing.
UMNO

Majority of the national leaders of

have bureaucratic background and they come from the

upper class families of Malay society while the leaders of
the non-Malay parties of the ruling coalition are drawn
mainly from the rich and influential families of the
business community.
The study has also found that the majority of the
national leaders of the coalition party remained as cabinet
ministers for a long period of time.

This has given rise

to closer interaction between the political elites which
in turn contributes to the success and stability of the
edition.
The second hypothesis deals with the role and position
of UMNO in the coalition.

UMNO is the strongest partner

and the leader of the Alliance and National Front.

It

has been the backbone of the Malaysian Government since
independent.

It is hypothesized in this study that the

dominant position of UMNO in the coalition has contributed
to the success of the coalition.
To test this hypothesis, the study has examined the
electoral strength and performance of UMNO during the elec
tions, the political attitudes of the Malays with regards
to UMNO and the position of the other component parties in
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the coalition vis-a-vis.

The study has found that the

strength of the ruling coalition depends to a large extent
on the stability of UMNO to draw and retain the support of
the Malay electorate.

In terms of electoral performance,

UMNO has been able to constantly control the largest number
of seats in the Parliamentary and the State Assemblies.

In

most of the elections, UMNO has received overwhelming
support from the Malays.
The source of UMNO's electoral strength can be traced
to the political attitude of the Malays, particularly, the
attitude of deference towards the leaders.

The Malays

place great respect and esteem towards their leaders, es
pecially if the leaders come from high social standing.

By

coopting the support of the traditional Malay elites, UMNO
is able to retain the support of the Malays on the basis
of traditional loyalties.
The dominant position of UMNO has been further rein
forced by the willingness of the other component parties,
particularly the MCA and the MIC in their acknowledgement
of the superior position of UMNO in the coalition.

Their

acquiescence is partly the result of their own electoral
weakness.

The MCA and the MIC do not represent the Chinese

and Indians to the extent as UMNO represents the Malays.
The MCA has been losing ground to other Chinese-based
parties such as the DAP.

Many of the urban Chinese have been

skeptical with the ability of the MCA to defend the inter
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ests of the Chinese community.

The political weakness of

the MCA has been exacerbated by endemic intra-party con
flicts.

The position of the MIC is even worse than the MCA.

In terms of electoral strength, the MIC has not been much
of an asset to the coalition.

The MIC derives its impor

tance as a political party from its membership in the
coalition.

Furthermore, the party has also been struck by

acute internal conflicts and factionalism.

As the result

of the weakness of the MCA and the MIC, it has become more
important for the coalition to depend on UMNO for its
success and strength.
The last hypothesis posits that the success of the
coalition party is attributed to its effectiveness in suc
cessfully meeting the goals of socio-economic development.
To test this hypothesis, this study has examined Malaysia's
socio-economic policies and programs as well as their
effectiveness.

The Alliance (and the National Front) has

given the highest priority to economic and social develop
ment and Malaysia has enjoyed a high and sustained economic
growth.

From an average annual growth of 6.0 percent in the

1960 s , theeconomy reached agrowth rate of over 8 .0

cent by the

per

middle of 1970s. This is a commendable

achievement for a developing country.

The high economic

growth has in turn enabled the country to enjoy one of the
highest per

capita incomes in the South and Southeast

Asian regions.

In

1977» the per capitaincome was M$2,280
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equivalent to approximately US1,000 (Milne and Mauzy, 1980:
6 ).

Apart from emphasizing growth of the economy, the party
has also attempted to bring about an ethnically balanced
development by persuing a socio-economic policy which aims
at a more equitable distribution of wealth and incomes
through programs such as poverty eradication, rural develop
ment and restructuring of society.

Due to the combined

effect of eradication programs and rapid growth of economy,
encouraging progress has been made toward poverty eradi
cation as shown by the reduction of incidence of poverty
from 49»7 percent in 1970 to 29«9 percent in 1980.

The

government aims to reduce poverty to 16.7 percent by 1990.
Furthermore, as a result of restructuring process, more
Malays as well as other indigeneous people are entering
the modern sectors of the economy.

Their participation at

both the managerial and technical levels has also increased.
Progress has also been registered in other areas such
as in the provision of public services, particularly,
health care, housing, water and electricity.

The ruling

coalition party can look back with pride on its past record
of economic development.

In fact, its achievement in

socio-economic fields and in ethnic accommodation has
proved a valuable asset in its election campaigns.

In

every election, the electorate were reminded about this
record of achievement and the opposition parties have been
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at pains to criticize the ruling party on the economic
issues.

Indeed, the success of the coalition party as the

Malaysian ruling party is closely linked to its effective
ness in the socio-economic fields.
The coalition party system in Malaysia that began
with the temporary arrangement has apparently provided the
answer to the Malaysian multi-racial political dilemma.
Up to now, the coalition system seems to be the most approriate constitutional and political institution that is
best suited to the multi-racial composition of Malaysia.
It may not be able to satisfy all the competing demands of
the various races of Malaysia but it appears to be the only
workable

political framework for Malaysia.

The fact that

it is based on the principle of accommodation and compro
mises helps to minimize any serious racial conflicts.
system therefore, represents

The

an effort to reach the

broadest possible consensus and a device for conflist
management.
It is highly likely that the ruling coalition party,
the National Front will continue to dominate the Malaysian
political scene for sometimes.

Today, the Front has un

questioned control over the federal and state governments.
So far, the opposition parties have not been able to per
meate the strength of the coalition.

Its politics of con

sensus appears to work well and to have been accepted by the
people as demonstrated by its massive victories in elections.
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At the same time, however, it is also likely that the
Malaysian political system will he subjected to some
stresses and strains, particularly in view of the larger
size of the coalition which makes it more difficult for the
component parties of the coalition to interact more closely
with each other as it was in the Alliance.

Strains may

also be caused by the emergence of greater competitions
between the various ethnic groups as the result of greater
social mobilization and government's efforts to help the
Malays.

Already, there was some restlessness among the non-

Malays as they saw special measures being implemented to
assist the Malays.

Despite the

strains, it is unlikely

that there will be any real threat to the present multi
ethnic coalition system.
Nevertheless, the future success and durability of the
coalition party in Malaysia will continue to depend upon
its ability to maintain governmental effectiveness in the
socio-economic spheres, continuing elite-ethnic cooperation
and compromises and maintaining stable non-elite support.
To achieve the first, it is vital for the ruling coalition
to overcome the problem of outbidding so that all energies
can be devoted to economic development.

It is equally

necessary for the ruling coalition party to assuage the
fears and apprehensions of the non-Malays as regards to
the real intentions of the New Economic Policy.

As for
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the later, it is crucial for UffiO to be able to retain
its overwhelming support of the Malays•and to remain
sufficiently united.

In the past, UMNO has had its share

of problems, particularly the struggles between the socalled "new order" and the "old order." However, these
struggles have not affected the unity of UMNO in any signi
ficant way.

At the same time, it is equally important for

UMNO to be seen to make tactical concessions to the nonMalays in order to win over the support of the non-Malays
to the coalition.
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Notes
The amendment to Article 152 involves defining the term
"official purpose" which was not defined previously.
Amendment to Article 153 provides the King with the
power to give directions to universities, colleges etc.,
to reserve certain proportions of place for the Malays
as deemed necessary. Amendment to Articles 63 and 72
removed the protection previously provided to members of
Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies against
court proceedings for anything they say. Amendment to
Article 159 stipulated that the provisions under Article
10, Part 111 of the Constitution, Articles 63» 72 and
152 cannot be amended without the consent- of the Con
ference of Pulers.
2

The Sarawak Alliance was founded in October 1962 and
originally consisted of five political parties:Parti
Pesaka Anak Sarawak (Pesaka),Barisan Pakyat Jati Sarawak
(BERJASA), Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and the Sarawak
Chinese'Association (SCA).

^ Malaysian electoral system is structured along the British
electoral system, that is the first-past-the post system.
It is based on single-member territorial constituencies.
For the 1955 elections there were 52 constituencies. For
1959 elections, parliamentary constituencies were expanded
to 104 and the same number of seats were used in 1964 and
1969 elections. However, in 1974 the Parliament increased
the number of seats to 154 seats with 114 seats allocated
to Peninsular Malaysia and 16 seats to Sabah and 24 seats
to Sarawak.
^ Poverty line is measured by comparing absolute level of
household income with income required for minimun sub
sistence with respect to clothing, housing, consumer
durable goods to sustain a decent standard of living.
This definition does not take into account srevices and
facilities provided by the government. In 1980, the
income used to define poverty line was a monthly income
of $M180 in 1970 prices.
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APPENDIX A
Abbreviations Used
In the Appendix
Education

States

Occupation

Eng,

= English

B= Bureaucracy

H.K.= Hong Kong

Mly,

= Malay

P= Private Practice

K

Kedah

Is,

= Islamic

Kn,=

Kelantan

T

= Tertiary

M.C.S. = Malaysian
Civil
Service

N.S=

Negri
Sembilan

S

= Secondary

Pe = Penang

P

= Primary

Ph = Pahang

n.a

= not avaialble

J

= Johore

=

Pk = Perak
S

= Selangor

Sw = Sarawak
Tr = Trengganu
a

= still in office
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APPENDIX A
Ministers

1

.

Date
Educa(Place
tion
of Birth) (level)

Occupation

Tengku1s
Cabinet

Razak1s
Cabinet

Tengku Abdul
Rahman

1903
(K)

Enj
(TJ

Public
Servant(B)

1955-1970

2.

Tun Abdul
Razak

1922
(Ph)

Enr
(T)

M.C.S
(B)

1955-1970

1971-1976

3.

Tun. Dr. Ismail 1915
(J)

Eng
(T)

Medical
(P)

1955-1970

1971-1973

Sulaiman bin
Abd. Rahman

1912
(J)

Enf
<T)

Lawyer
(B)

1959-1963

5.

Aziz b. Ishak

191*f
(Pe)

Enr;•
(S]

Public
Servant(B)

1953-1962

6.

Mohd. Khir
b. Johari

1923
(K)

Enr
<sl

Teacher

1957-1970

7.

Saadon Jubir

1917
(J)

Ens
(T)

Lawyer

1957-1970

Bahaman b.
Shamsuddin

1906
(N.S)

Ene
(sl

M.C.S
(B)

1957-1969

Col. H.S. Lee

1901
(H.K)

Ent
(T)

Business

1957-1970

8

.

9.

1971-1976

1971-1973

Hussein'
Cabinet

Educa
Date
tion
(Place
of Birth) (level)

Occupation

Tengku’s
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

10. V.T.Sambanthan

1919
(Pk)

Eng.
(T)

Rubber
1957-1970
Planter(Bus)

1971-1973

11. Tan Siew Sin

1916
(M)

Eng.
(sj

Business

1957-1970

1971-1974

12. Lim Swee Aun

1915
(Pk)

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant(B)

1962-1968

13* Capt. Hamid
Khan

1900
(Pg)

Eng.
(s)

Teacher
(B)

1959-1969

14. Abd. Rahman
Talib

1916
(Ph)

Eng.
(Sj

Public
Servant(B)

1959-1967

15* Ismail b. Mohd . 1922
(K)
Yusof

Eng.
(S)

Public
Servant(B)

1959-n.a.

16. Hj. Khalid
Awang Osman

1922
(Pe)

Eng.
(S)

Public
Servant(B)

1959-1969

17. Dato Syed
Jaafar Albar

1914
(S)

Mly/Is.

Business

1959-n.a.

18. Leong Yew Koh

n.a.

n.a.

Business

1959-1963

19* V. Manikavasagam

1926
(S)

Eng.
(S)

Business

1957-1970

20. Cheah Tiera Sim

n.a.

Eng.

Business

1959-1963

Hussein's
Cabinet

1971-1976
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Ministers

Senu b. Abdul
Rahman
Ghazali b.
Jawi
Abd. Rahman
b, Yaacob

Date
Educa(Place
tion
of Birth)

Occupation

Tengku's
Cabinet

1919

Eng,
(T)

Public
Servant(B)

196/f-n.a.

192*t

Eng.
(S)

Public
Servant(B)

1957-1970

(K)

(Pk)
(Sw)

Eng.
(T)

1928

, Lawyer

1923

Eng.

Public
Servant(B)

1 9 6 V 1970

(sT

1908

n.a.

Iban Chief

1963-1970

Donald Stephen 1920
(Sb)

Eng.
(S?

J ournalist

1965-n.a.

Ghanie Gilong

Temenggong
Jugah

1971-1976

1971-1973

(Sw)

Eng.

(sT

Business

1968-1970

(Sw)

1971-1975

1925

Mly.

Teacher

1969-1970

1971-1975

Dato Hamzah b# 1926
Abu Samah
(Ph)

Eng.
(T)

Lawyer

1968-1970

1971-1975

Fatimah Hj.
Hashim

Mly.

Housewife

1969-1970

1971-1973

Abd# Ghaffar
Baba

Hussein's
Cabinet

1965-1969

(Pk)

Sulaiman b.
Bulon

Razak's
Cabinet

1932

(M)

1917

(J)

1976-1977

1976-1979
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Date
Educa(Place
tion
of Birth)

Occupation

Tengku's
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

Hussein's
Cabinet

31. Tan Sri Abdul
Kadir Yusoff

1918
(J).

Eng
(T)

32. Engku Mohsein
b, Abd. Kadir

1928
(Tr)

Eng
(S?

Public
Servant

196if— 1970

1971-n.a.

33. Lee Siok Yew

1924
(S)

n.a

n.a.

1964-1970

1970-1976

34. Lee San Choon

1935
(Ph)

Eng

(sT

Welfare
Officer

1969-1970

1970-1976

1976— 1981a

35. Hj. Abdul Taib
Mahmud

1936
(Sw)

Eng
(T)

Public
Servant

1960-1970

1970-1976

1976—n.a.

36. Ong Yoke Lin

1917
(S)

Eng
(S)

Business

1955-1970

1970-1973

37. Khaw Kai Boh

1918
(Pk)

Eng
(t T

Public
Servant

1963-1969

38. Datuk Hussein
Onn

1923
(J)

Eng
(TJ

Public
Servant

1970-1976

1976-1981

39. Tan Sri Mohd.
Ghazali Shafie

1922
(Ph)

Eng
(T)

Public
Servant

1971-1976

1976— 1981a

40. Dato Ong Kee

1914
(Sw)

Eng
(T)

Business

1971-1976

1976-1981

Pub. Servant 1969-1970
(Attorney Gen)

1971-1975

1976-1979
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Ministers

Date
(Place
of Birth

Education

Occupation

Tengku's
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

Hussein 11
Cabinet

41. Ali Hj. Ahmad

1934
(J)

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant

1969-1970

1970-1976

1976-1977

42. Dato Abdul
Samad Idris

1923

Mly.
(P)

Journalist

1969-1970

1970-1976

1976-1981

43. Tengku Ahmad
Rithaudin

1932
(Kn)

Eng.
(T)

Lawyer

1971-1976

1976-1981'

44. Mohammed b.
Yaacub

n.a.
(Kn)

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant

1971-1976

1976-1981

45. Hajjah Aishah
Ghani

1924
(S)

Eng.
(S)

Journalist

1972-1976

1976-1981'

46. Michael Chen
Wing Sun

1932
(Pk)

Eng.
(T)

Lawyer

1973-1976

1976-1981

47. Dato Wan Kadir

1926
(Tr)

Is.
(T)

Public
Servant

1974-n.a.

48. Dato Musa
Hitam

1934
(J)

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant

49. Dato Mohammed
Rahmat

1939
(J)

Eng.
(s!

50. Dato Sharif
Ahmad

1933
(Ph)

Eng.
(S)

1968-n.a.

1973-1976

1976-1981

Teacher

1973-1976

1976-1981

Public
Servant

1973-1976

1976-1981
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Ministers

Educa
Date
tion
(Place
of Birth)

Occupation

n.a.

Tengku1s
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

Hussein's
Cabinet

51* Tuan Hj. Yusuf
Abdullah

n.a.

Is.
(T)

52. Dato Asri Hj.
Muda

1923
(Kn)

Is.

Journalist

55* Dato Abdul
Manan Osman

1936
(Tr)

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant

1977— 1981a

5'-'» Dato Richard Ho n.a.

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant

1977-1981

55• Dato Paul
Leong

1939
(Pk)

Eng.
<t T

Miner

1978-1981a

56. Tan Sri Chong
Hong Nyan

1924
(S)

Eng.
(T)

M.C.S

57* Leo Moggie

1943
(Sw)

Eng.
(T)

Civil
Servant

1978-1981a

58. Dato Hj. Mohd.
Nasir

1916
(Kn)

Mly & Is

n.a.

1978-1981a

59. Dato Sri Hj.
Kamaruddin b.
Mat Isa

1930
(Pk)

Mly.

Teacher

60. Liew Sip Hon

1925
(Pk)

Eng.
(T)

Public
Servant

1974-1976

1976-1977
(PAS)

1974-1976

1976-1977
(PAS)

1974-1976

1974-1976

1976-198la

1976-1979

1978-1981a
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Ministers

Date
Educa(Place
tion
of Birth)

Occupation

Tengku's
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

Hussein's
Cabinet

61. Dr. Nik Hussein
b. Abdul Rahman

n.a.
(Kn)

Eng.
(T)

Dentist

1978-1981a

62. Dr. Goh Cheng
Teik

1943
(Pe)

Eng.
(T)

University
Professor

1976— 1981a

63* Rafidah Aziz

1946
(n.a)

Eng.
(T)

University
Lecturer

1977— 1981a

64. Dato Dr. Neo
Yee Pan

En
(T

University
Professor

1978— 1981a

(j)

65. Datuk Seri Dr.
Mahathir Mohd.

1925
(K)

Eng.
(T)

66. Tengku Razaleigh 1939
(Kn)
Hamzah

Eng.
(T)

Business

1977-1981a

67. Datuk Sanusi
Junid

1944
(K)

Eng.
(T)

Accountant

1978— 1981a

68. Datuk Mokhtar
b. Hashim

1942
(N»S.)

Eng.
(T)

Research
Officer

1978-1981a

69. Clarence E.
Mansul

n.a.
(Sabah)

Htdi

70. Mohd. Ali
b. Sharif

n.a.
(Ph)

n«a#

Med. Doctor
(Private Practice)

1974-1976 1977-1981a

Date
Educa(Place
tion
of Birth)

71. Datuk Abdullah

b. Abdul Rahman

1944

(Tr)

Occupation

Eng
(T)

Lawyer
n.a.

Tengku's
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

Hussein's
Cabinet

1978-n.a.

72. Datuk Ramli

1930

b. Omar

(Pk)

Eng
(S?

75. Datuk Sami

n.a.
(Pk)

Eng
(T)

Architect

1933

Eng
(T)

Business

(Ph)

75. Tuan Hj. Salleh

n.a.
(Sw)

n.a

76. Dato Mak Hon

1939

Eng
(T)

Architect

1978— 1981a

Vellu
74. Datuk Chan

Siang Sun
J afaruddin

Kara
77. Dr. Sulaiman

(Pk)

n.a.

1974-1975

1976-1981
1978-1981s

197Jff— 1975

1978-1981s
1978-n.a.

1978-1981s

(Sw)

Eng
(T)

Dentist

Hj. Ahmad

78. Edmund Langgu

1936

n.a

Teacher

1978-1981

1938

(Sw)
n.a.
(Tr)

Eng
(T)

Teacher

Abdul Rahman

1978-1981s

K. Pathmanaban

n.a.

Eng
(T)

Public
Servant

1978-198Is

.

o

79. Hj. Zakarla
CO
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Ministers

81• Dr* Ling
Leong Sik

Date
Educa
tion
(Plac e
of Birth)
n.a*

82. Datuk Najib b. 1953
Tun Abdul
(Ph)
Bazak

Eng.
(T)

Occupation

Tengku's
Cabinet

Razak's
Cabinet

Hussein's
Cabinet

n.a.

1978— 1981a

n.a.

1978-1981

03
-o
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